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Chair:  Gautam Kaul 
 
 
This dissertation examines issues in agency, incentives and contracting.  The first two 
essays examine the relation between managerial power and supplier value while the third 
essay examines the behavior of investors in religious funds and fund performance. 
 
In Essay One, I find that supplier wealth is adversely affected around top management 
turnover events of customers.  The negative wealth effect on suppliers is stronger with 
greater market power of customers.  In contrast, suppliers’ market power has no own 
wealth effects.  The results suggest that contractual incompleteness in a long-term 
product market relationship exposes suppliers to breach of implicit contracts by new 
management of customers, and this risk increases with market power of customers.  I 
further find that suppliers have a lower industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio after a 
  xi
customer’s management turnover event relative to a control group matched by industry 
and asset size.  
 
In Essay Two, I hypothesize and find strong evidence that stock payment in non-
diversifying mergers negatively impacts the wealth of bidder suppliers, especially under 
circumstances where control loss of the bidder is most severe, such as when the target has 
institutional block-holders and the bidder do not.  Furthermore, the retention likelihood of 
bidder suppliers is significantly reduced by 12.7% when the bidder has no block-holders 
to counter-balance the target’s control blocks under stock financing in non-diversifying 
mergers.  Interestingly, I also find that stock payment to the target’s control blocks 
generate positive announcement returns to the bidder suppliers in diversifying mergers.  
Hence, stock payment to the target’s control blocks can have beneficial or detrimental 
wealth effect on the bidder suppliers, depending on whether they face direct replacement 
threats from the target suppliers. 
 
In Essay Three, I find that investors in religious funds exhibit flat flow-to-performance 
sensitivity, as would be predicted by the doctrine of religious loyalty.   Furthermore, 
church-sponsored funds experience positive fund flows when past return is negative.  
Religious funds significantly under-perform major market indices and the secular socially 
responsible funds, and their poor performance is related to their higher industry 
concentration.  Lastly, I find no evidence that church’s sponsorship affects industry 





Economists have long recognized that a corporation is a nexus of contracts between 
shareholders and stakeholders (e.g. Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 
1985).   Under the “nexus of contracts” perspective of the firm, agency conflicts exist 
between shareholders and stakeholders since actions that maximize shareholder value 
might not be the same actions that maximize stakeholder value.   This agency conflict is 
particularly severe in long-term contracts due to the heavy reliance on implicit 
contracting.  Under the incomplete contracts theory, future contingencies are hard to 
predict and costly to specify, ex-ante.  Hence, stakeholders engaged in a long-term 
contracting relationship with the firm must rely heavily on the use of implicit contracting.   
As strongly espoused by Shleifer and Summers (1998), stakeholders must therefore trust 
the incumbent management to deliver on implicit promises without legal enforcement.   
 
To the extent that long-term contracting facilitates relationship-specific investments and 
reduce contracting costs, management must commit to building trust with stakeholders.  
As the ability of management to deliver on trust is strongly influenced by their 
controlling power, corporate decisions that result in control loss of management should 
have a detrimental wealth effect on the firm’s stakeholders, even if such decisions 
enhance shareholder value.  The adverse wealth effect on stakeholders of control loss of 
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management should be especially severe under circumstances where stakeholders would 
require protection of implicit contracts.    
 
The controlling power of management and wealth implications on stakeholders is an 
important research area relatively unexplored in the finance literature.  It is an area worth 
studying in great detail as it involves understanding the dynamics of power balance 
among managers, shareholders and stakeholders.  By studying the wealth implications on 
each firm participant of changes to the power structure among contracting parties, we can 
gain further insights into how financing choices, investment decisions, product market 
strategies, labor relationships, and the boundaries of the firm respond in order to protect 
each firm participant from value expropriation by the others.   
 
1.1 Extant Literature 
In research that examine agency conflicts between shareholders and debt-holders, only a 
few studies focus on the shift in power from shareholders to managers and the wealth 
consequences on debt-holders of this gain in managerial controlling power.  For example, 
Klock, Manis and Maxwell (2005) find that anti-takeover provisions lower the cost of 
debt financing.  To the extent that anti-takeover provisions enhance managerial power to 
resist takeovers, the authors conclude that these governance structures also protect debt 
holders from change-in-control transactions.  In another study, Chava, Livdan and 
Purnanandam (2007) show that firms with the lowest takeover defense pay higher spreads 
on their bank loans, in further support that weak managerial power to resist takeovers has 
adverse wealth implications on debt-holders who demand a higher risk premium, ex-ante. 
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In the area of labor, the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that managers 
protected by the passage of state anti-takeover laws pay workers higher wages in order to 
enjoy a quiet life of avoiding difficult decisions, costly efforts and stakeholder conflicts.  
Recent finance studies have also shown a growing interest in studying the motives behind 
the adoption of Employee-Share-Ownership Plan (ESOP) and wealth implications of 
ESOP adoptions on workers and shareholders as large ESOP adoptions shift power away 
from shareholders or managers to workers.   For example, Kim and Ouimet (2008) find 
that ESOP adoption leads to a higher firm value when the plan is small, and interpret 
their results to imply that most of the productivity gains generated by ESOPs accrue to 
employees (shareholders) when employees have substantial (small) control rights.   
 
Surprisingly, in the area of product market relationship with suppliers, there is a lack of 
studies that examine the controlling power of management and wealth implications on 
suppliers.  Suppliers are a group of stakeholders especially vulnerable to control dilution 
of management since a product market relationship involves long-term implicit 
contracting.   By studying the link between managerial controlling power and wealth 
effect on suppliers, we can gain insights on how governance structures or corporate 
decisions that affect managerial power can impact the ability of the firm to induce long-
term product market relationships with suppliers.  The first two essays of this dissertation 
attempt to fill this gap in the current finance literature. 
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1.2 Dissertation Focus 
The primary shared goal of Chapters Two and Three is to use suppliers as the specific 
group of stakeholders to analyze the important research question of how control dilution 
of management can affect the wealth of the firm’s suppliers.   Chapter Two uses turnover 
of top executives as a measure of total power loss of management to study the wealth 
implications on the firm’s suppliers.   On the other hand, Chapter Three focuses on 
management that remains with the firm, but has its controlling power diluted.  Using 
mergers, I examine how control dilution of bidder management through the use of stock 
financing can affect the wealth of bidder suppliers.   
 
Chapter Four departs from the common theme of the previous two chapters.  Instead, it 
examines the preferences of investors in religious funds through their flow-to-
performance sensitivity.  It also investigates the effects of distribution channels on 
investor behavior by separating the religious funds into church-sponsored and non-
church-sponsored funds.  Since investor behavior directly motivates the actions of fund 
managers, it further examines the performance of these funds.   
 
Lastly, Chapter Five concludes. 
5 
CHAPTER 2 




The literature on top management turnover has found that removal of poorly performing 
management benefits shareholders.  For example, Denis and Denis (1995) find that firm 
performance improves subsequent to the forced dismissal of a top executive.  Weisbach 
(1995) finds that top management changes are associated with a higher likelihood of 
divesting poorly performing acquisitions.   Moreover, the corporate governance literature 
also finds that a key mechanism by which governance structures can improve firm value 
is through disciplining managers.  For example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
construct a governance index based on 24 anti-takeover provisions as a proxy for 
shareholder power (or the ease of removing incumbent management) and find that firms 
with stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value.  Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find 
that a staggered board reduces firm value by seven times more than other firm-specific 
anti-takeover provisions as its presence insulates incumbents from removal. 
 
However, it is not clear that stakeholders of a firm would benefit from management 
turnover, even if it is disciplinary in nature.   Anecdotes of new management hurting 
suppliers or workers are plentiful.  For example, when Harold Geneen was ousted and 
Rand Araskog succeeded as the chief executive officer of the debt-ridden ITT 
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Corporation in 1978, Araskog sold off subsidiaries and retrenched workers1.  The British 
supermarket giant, Tesco2, has engaged in an aggressive price competition strategy and 
pushed its suppliers hard on price and payment terms, especially since Andrew Higginson 
became its chief financial officer in 1997.   
 
Despite these anecdotes and the importance of stakeholders to a firm, the finance 
literature has focused primarily on the impact of top management turnover on shareholder 
value.  To the extent that state anti-takeover laws protect management from disciplinary 
turnover, the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) is the closest in spirit to 
examining how a reduced likelihood of management turnover affects workers’ wealth.  
The authors show that insulated management opts for a “quiet” life by paying workers 
higher wages.  To the best of my knowledge, no studies have examined the effect of 
management turnover on supplier wealth, which would then directly affect the firm’s 
ability to induce long-term product market relationships with suppliers.   
 
In this chapter, I study the effects of management turnover on supplier wealth.   Under 
the implicit contracts hypothesis, contractual incompleteness exposes suppliers to 
potential breach of implicit contracts by new management of customers.  Hence, 
management turnover, even if it is disciplinary in nature, would have an adverse wealth 
effect on suppliers because the new management needs not honor implicit agreements 
between the suppliers and previous management.  Breaching of implicit contracts is also 
a most direct way to generate profits.   Furthermore, suppliers would be more at risk of 
                                                 
1 See the book titled “The ITT wars: an insider’s view of hostile takeovers” by Rand Araskog.  
2 See article at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3014279?f=singlepage 
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breach of implicit contracts when the customer has stronger market power.  Lastly, the 
profitability of suppliers would decrease after management turnover event of a customer 
since implicit promises are no longer being delivered by the customer.   
 
In contrast, under a competing value creation hypothesis, disciplinary management 
turnover can benefit both shareholders and stakeholders because a value-dissipating 
manager is ousted in pursuit of a better ability manager who can create market share and 
increase the overall size of the firm.  Furthermore, even if management turnover is 
voluntary, the exit of a top executive gives the firm a valuable option to find a better 
manager.  This option value, however, is higher under forced management turnover as the 
likelihood of finding better replacements increases when poorly performing executives 
exit.  In sum, the value creation hypothesis would predict a positive wealth effect on 
suppliers which increases with poorer performance of the departing executive.  Moreover, 
the market power of customers would have no negative wealth impact on suppliers.  
Finally, the profitability of suppliers would increase after management turnover event of 
a customer since the overall size of the customer firm increases under a better manager. 
 
I find strong evidence for the implicit contracts hypothesis.  Using event study 
methodology 3 , the mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to suppliers around 
announcements of death, resignation or dismissal of top executives4 of customers is 
statistically negative and economically significant, and is independent of the prior 
                                                 
3 I follow the approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) in using the market model with the CRSP 
equally-weighted market index as the market proxy to compute the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).   
4 Top executives include officers with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer 
(CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president. 
8 
performance of the resigned or dismissed executive.  Firstly, using 41 sudden deaths of 
top executives of customers over the sample period 1993 to 2006, the mean supplier CAR 
is -2.57% around the event window which starts from three days before to one day after 
the announcement, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  In sharp contrast, 
customer firms experiencing these sudden deaths of their top executives have a 
significantly positive mean CAR of 1.44% over the event window.   Hence, the negative 
supplier CAR cannot be driven by positive correlation with the stock price reaction of 
customers as the mean customer CAR is positive. 
 
Next, using 520 cases of resignation or dismissal of top executives of customers affecting 
1575 suppliers, I find that both customer and supplier CAR are significantly negative 
at -1.05% and -0.44% over the event window, respectively.   Furthermore, the mean 
supplier CAR is of similar order of negative magnitude whether the prior profitability of 
the firm, as measured by the return on assets or the market-to-book ratio, is above or 
below the industry median.  However, the magnitude of negative supplier CAR almost 
doubles when the customer’s market power increases from below the 25th percentile to 
above the 75th percentile.  This pattern is consistently observed for various market power 
proxies such as the firm’s market shares of sales or assets and the sales-based or asset-
based Herfindahl index.  In contrast, the mean supplier CAR exhibits no obvious relation 
with the supplier’s own market power.     
 
Using multivariate analysis and controlling for various customer and supplier firm 
characteristics, I confirm that the market power of a customer has a significantly adverse 
9 
announcement returns effect on its suppliers around the customer’s management turnover 
event.  The average sensitivity of supplier CAR to the customer’s sales-based Herfindahl 
index is -0.05, i.e., the mean supplier CAR will decrease by 5% as the customer’s 
industry changes from perfectly competitive to monopolistic.  Consistent with the event 
study results, the supplier’s market power has no own announcement returns effect.   This 
is not too surprising in view of the fact that the median supplier commands 0.5% market 
share of sales while the median customer has 11.6% market share of sales in its industry.  
Hence, the market power of customers would be a stronger driver of a supplier’s wealth 
than the supplier’s own market power.    
 
Lastly, I use a differences-in-differences approach to examine the change in profitability 
of suppliers around the event of a customer’s top management resignation or dismissal.   
These suppliers form the treatment group.  A control group of suppliers with no changes 
in top management of customers throughout the sample period is then matched by 
industry5 and asset size to suppliers in the treatment group.   Restricting the sample to 
close matches by asset size6 and examining the supplier’s profitability for three years 
before and after a customer’s top management turnover event, suppliers that experienced 
a customer’s management turnover event have a significantly lower industry-adjusted 
market-to-book (MB) ratio, post-event, than suppliers in the control group.  The loading 
on the interaction term between a post-event dummy with a customer’s management 
                                                 
5 Matching is done using 2-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 
6 The ratio of assets of the treated unit to the assets of the control unit cannot exceed 4:1.  As the ratio gets 
smaller, the matched pair becomes more similar in relative asset size but the sample size also decreases.  
The ratio of 4:1 is used as a tradeoff between sample size and close matching by asset size. 
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turnover dummy is -1.6 when the relative asset size between the treated and untreated 
supplier does not exceed a ratio of 1.5:1.   
 
However, examining the suppliers’ industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA), the loading 
on the interaction term is not statistically significant, despite being negative.   As the MB 
ratio is a forward-looking measure that incorporates future growth opportunities of the 
firm, while the ROA is a backward-looking accounting measure based on realized 
profitability, the MB ratio is a more appropriate measure of firm value based on market 
expectations.  Since implicit promises can constitute valuable intangible growth options 
to suppliers, the results are consistent with the interpretation that the market expects new 
management to renege on implicit agreements with suppliers.  
 
This chapter is closely related to studies on management turnover.  One line of research 
uses event study methodologies to examine the effect of CEOs on firm performance, 
focusing on the abnormal stock price reaction around the announcement of top 
management turnover (ex. Reinganum, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; 
Bonnier and Bruner, 1989; Khanna and Poulsen, 1995; and Denis and Denis, 1995).  
However, the decision to replace top executives is correlated with past firm 
characteristics and future growth prospect, and the announcement wealth effect can be 
confounded by these correlations, making inferences difficult.  Another line of research 
evaluates the stock price reaction to announcements of sudden death of managers (ex. 
Johnson et al., 1985; Borokhovich et al, 2006).   
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A third branch of research examines the change in profitability of the firm around 
management turnover events (ex. Denis and Denis, 1995; Weisbach, 1995; Bennedsen et 
al., 2008).  In particular, Bennedsen et al. (2008) use the death of CEOs and the CEO’s 
immediate family members for Danish firms to evaluate the change in firm profitability 
around these events.  I follow these studies in (a) using event study methodologies but 
focus instead on the impact of top management turnover on supplier wealth rather than 
shareholder value, and in (b) examining the change in profitability of suppliers around 
management turnover events of customers.   
 
 
This chapter also contributes to the literature that examines firm characteristics and 
implicit contracting.  Studies on the relation between financial structure and implicit 
contracting have examined how the firm uses lower leverage as a commitment device to 
induce implicit contracting with customers or suppliers (ex. Titman, 1984; Maksimovic 
and Titman, 1991; Kale and Shahrur, 2007).  In research on ownership blocks and 
implicit contracting, Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) find that equity ownership 
between trading partners is used to mitigate contractual incompleteness in product market 
relationships.   In an earlier study, Allen and Philips (2000) find a significantly positive 
relation between the magnitude of equity ownership between a supplier-customer pair 
and asset specificity.  I extend the literature by showing the effects of management 
turnover on implicit contracting.  One implication of my results is that frequent 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 develops the 
hypotheses and empirical predictions while Section 2.3 describes the empirical design 
and proxies.  The data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 2.4 and the 
empirical results are discussed in Section 2.5.  Finally, Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2. Development of Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions 
In this section, I develop the two competing hypotheses and derive their empirical 
predictions. 
 
2.2.1 Management Turnover and Implicit Contracts 
The motivation for the implicit contracts hypothesis comes from the recognition that 
product market relationships are long-term contracts between shareholders and suppliers.  
Since future contingencies are hard to predict, contracting parties often have to rely on 
implicit contracting or trust (Shleifer and Summers, 1988) to govern long-term 
relationships.  Under the separation of ownership and control in a modern corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932), the manager represents the shareholders in negotiating 
contracts with stakeholders.   To the extent that the trustworthiness of a corporation to 
protect implicit contracts without legal enforcement can act as a valuable asset to induce 
relationship-specific investments by stakeholders, the current management must build 
trust with stakeholders.  Since trust is relationship-specific to the contracting parties, 
management turnover disrupts the trust built with the incumbent management, and 
stakeholders fear holdups by the new management due to the nature of implicit 
contracting.    
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Under the implicit contracts hypothesis, replacement of both outstanding and poor-
performing management should predict a negative effect on supplier’s wealth as trust is 
non-transferable and suppliers fear breach of implicit contracts by the new management 
in both cases.   
 
Prediction 1a: Announcement of management turnover would have a negative wealth 
effect on the firm’s suppliers.   The announcement wealth effect on suppliers would have 
no relation with the prior profitability of the firm. 
 
Furthermore, suppliers are more vulnerable to breach of implicit contracts by new 
management of customer if the customer has stronger market power.   As a customer 
commands a larger market share of sales in its industry, its suppliers would not be able to 
replace sales with the customer by trading with smaller competitors.  The market power 
of a customer also increases with greater industry concentration as there will be fewer 
competitors for the suppliers to trade with.  Conversely, a supplier is less vulnerable to 
breach of implicit contracts by new management of customers if the supplier has stronger 
market power.  Lastly, the profitability of a supplier after a customer’s management 
turnover event would be significantly lower than that pre-event, as implicit agreements 
are being breached and the wealth of suppliers is transferred to shareholders.   
 
Prediction 1b: The greater the market power of a firm, the more negative the wealth 
effect would be on its suppliers around the announcement of management turnover at the 
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firm.   In contrast, the greater the market power of a supplier, the less negative its own 
wealth effects would be around the announcement of management turnover of a customer.    
 
Prediction 1c: The profitability of a supplier post- management turnover of a customer 
would be lower than that pre- management turnover of the customer. 
 
2.2.2 Management Turnover and Value Creation   
Management turnover gives shareholders the option to select a higher ability manager 
who can create market share, increase firm size and benefit both shareholders and 
stakeholders with an overall bigger pie.  This option value is higher under disciplinary 
management turnover as the likelihood of finding better management increases with 
poorer performance by the predecessor.  This value creation hypothesis predicts that top 
management turnover would have an overall positive wealth effect on the firm’s suppliers, 
and this positive wealth effect would be stronger when poorly-performing management is 
replaced.    
 
Prediction 2a: Announcement of top management turnover would have a positive wealth 
effect on the firm’s suppliers.   The announcement wealth effect on a firm’s suppliers 
would exhibit an inverse relation with the prior profitability of the firm under the old 
management. 
 
Next, this hypothesis would not predict a negative wealth effect of a firm’s market power 
on its suppliers around management turnover announcements.  A firm with greater 
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market power has less fear of competitors gaining market share while the firm undergoes 
management changes.   Hence, market power of a firm cannot hurt its suppliers during 
management turnover events.   Furthermore, suppliers can benefit from the greater 
market power of a customer as the overall size of pie is larger.   Lastly, the supplier’s 
profitability after a customer’s management turnover event would be greater than that 
pre-event since firms expend costly resources to find a better replacement than the 
predecessor.   
 
Prediction 2b: The market power of a firm would have no negative wealth effect on its 
suppliers around announcements of management turnover at the firm.  
 
Prediction 2c: The profitability of a supplier after a customer’s management turnover 
event would be greater than that pre-event.   
 
2.3 Empirical Test Design and Proxies 
In the first part of this section, I design empirical tests to distinguish between the two 
competing hypotheses.   In the second part of this section, I construct the empirical 
proxies. 
 
2.3.1 Empirical Test Design 
2.3.1.1  Event Study Methodology 
To examine the stock price reaction of suppliers around announcements of management 
turnover of a customer, I compute the CAR using the market model as described in 
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Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) with the CRSP equally-weighted index as the market 
proxy.  Event period CAR is examined for the [-3, +1] window which starts from three 
trading days prior to one trading day after the announcement date.  First, I examine the 
supplier CAR around announcements of sudden death of a customer’s top executives.  
Next, I repeat the analysis for announcements of resignation or dismissal of a customer’s 
top executives.  I then sort the resignation or dismissal sample into two groups based on 
whether the prior profitability of the customer is above or below its industry median and 
examine the supplier CAR for each group.  I further re-sort this sample based on the prior 
market power of customer or supplier. 
 
2.3.1.2  OLS Regressions 
Univariate analysis does not allow inclusion of other firm controls that can affect the 
supplier CAR.   Hence, multivariate analysis based on OLS specification in (2.1) is used.   
 
[-3,+1] 1 cust 2 cust 3 ss 4 ss
' '
cust ss
SSCAR =α+β .PROFIT +β .MktPow +β .MktPow +β .PROFIT
                     +λ .X +δ .X +ε............(2.1)  
 
where SSCAR[-3,+1] is the supplier CAR over the [-3, +1] window; PROFITcust and 
PROFITss measure the industry-adjusted profitability of the customer and supplier in the 
year preceding management turnover, respectively; MktPowcust and MktPowss are the 
prior market power of customer and supplier, respectively; Xcust is a vector of covariates 
representing customer firm characteristics and  Xss is a vector of covariates representing 
supplier firm characteristics.   Year dummies are included to control for time variation.   
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2.3.1.3            Differences-in-Differences Methodology 
To examine the change in profitability of suppliers affected by top management turnover 
events of customers relative to a control group of suppliers with no changes of top 
management at customer firms, I use a differences-in-differences methodology.  The 
basic regression I estimate is (2.2).   
 
' '
i,t i t 1 i 2 i,t 3 i,t i i,t i,t i,tPROFIT =α+δ +β .CUSTTO+β .POST +β POST *CUSTTO+λ.X +γ.Z +ε ...(2.2) 
 
where PROFITi,t is the profitability of supplier i; αi controls for supplier fixed effects; δt 
represents a vector of year dummies; CUSTTOi is an indicator that takes on unity if the 
supplier belongs to the treatment group, and zero if supplier belongs to the control group;  
POSTi,t is a dummy that takes on unity after a customer’s management turnover event, 
and zero otherwise; Xi,t is a vector of covariates representing supplier firm characteristics;  
Zi,t is a vector of covariates representing the average firm characteristics of all customers 
of the supplier; and  εi,t is an error term.  The coefficient of interest is β3 which estimates 
the differential effects on profitability for a supplier in the treatment group relative to its 
match in the control group after a customer’s top management turnover event.  The 
profitability of suppliers is examined for three years pre- and post-event. 
 
The treatment and control group are formed as follows.  A supplier is assigned to the 
treatment group if it is affected by a customer’s top management turnover at any time 
during the sample period.  On the other hand, a supplier is assigned to the control group if 
none of its customers experiences any top management turnover throughout the sample 
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period.  Next, each supplier from the treatment group is matched to one supplier from the 
control group of the same industry7 and closest in asset size.  Matching is done without 
replacement. Unmatched suppliers in the treatment or control group are dropped.  To 
eliminate large differences in asset size between a treated supplier and its counterfactual, 
their relative asset size cannot exceed a ratio of 4:1.    
 
2.3.2  Empirical Proxies 
2.3.2.1  Firm Profitability 
I construct two proxies for firm profitability commonly used in the literature.  First, I use 
the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA) where the return on assets is 
computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest expenses 
plus income tax expenses, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Industry is 
defined by the 4-digit SIC codes.   The iaROA is a backward-looking measure as it is 
constructed based on historical accounting profitability.  To incorporate market 
expectations of future firm’s prospect, I also use the median industry-adjusted market-to-
book (iaMB) ratio of assets as a forward-looking measure of firm profitability.  The 
market-to-book ratio is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets 
where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and 
current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity 
plus long-term debt and current liabilities.   Profitability proxies are winsorized at 1% and 
99%.   
 
 
                                                 
7 Industry is defined by the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) codes when matching.   
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2.3.2.2  Market Power 
I construct four proxies for the market power of a firm.  First, I use the sales-based 
Herfindahl index computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional sales in its 
industry across all firms in the industry.   Next, I construct the asset-based Herfindahl 
index computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional asset size in its industry 
across all firms in the industry.   Both Herfindahl indices measure the market power of a 
firm arising from its industry concentration.  The third proxy is the firm’s market share of 
sales in its industry computed as the firm’s sales divided by the total sales of its industry.  
The last proxy is the firm’s market share of assets in its industry computed as the firm’s 
assets divided by the total assets of its industry.   Again, market power proxies are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%.   
 
2.3.2.3             Firm-Specific Controls 
I control for supplier’s as well as customer’s firm characteristics that can affect the stock 
price reaction of suppliers.  The logarithm of assets is used as a measure of firm size.  
Firms with higher R&D expenses will have more intangible assets and can be more 
sensitive to the information asymmetry resulting from management turnover.   Moreover, 
the use of R&D intensity as a proxy for asset specificity is prevalent in the literature on 
transaction costs economics (see review by Boerner and Macher, 2001).  Hence, I control 
for the R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.    
 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) show that decreased leverage can be used as a commitment 
device to induce relationship-specific trades with suppliers.  Furthermore, a more levered 
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firm has higher financial distress risk that can be exacerbated by the uncertainty around 
management turnover events.   I control for the debt level of a firm computed as the sum 
of short-term debt plus long-term debt of the firm, and divided by lagged assets.  
Additionally, the level of capital expenditure could proxy for investment intensity of the 
firm.   I control for the amount of capital expenditures divided by lagged assets.    
 
  
2.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Data Sources 
The main databases are the Compustat Industrial Annual, Compustat Industry Segments, 
Execucomp and the Center for Security Prices (CRSP) database.  Firm characteristics are 
obtained from the Compustat Industrial Annual database.  Customer-supplier pairs are 
identified from the Compustat Industry Segments.  Information on management turnover 
is obtained from Execucomp and news articles.  Stock prices and returns as well as the 
market indices are obtained from CRSP.  Utilities and financial firms are excluded.  
Suppliers that are subsidiaries of customers are also excluded.  Sample period is from 
1993 to 2006.  The detailed construction of the final dataset is described below.   
 
2.4.1.1            Identifying Customer-Supplier Pairs 
I follow the approach in Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) to identify customer-supplier 
pairs.  First, I select all firms listed on Compustat with non-missing values reported for 
assets and fiscal year-end stock prices.  Then, I retain firms that are also listed in 
Execucomp.  To identify whether these firms have suppliers, I check the Compustat 
Industry Segments.   Firms are required to report the names of all customers accountable 
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for over 10% of their annual sales.  Customer names and sales generated from these 
customers are reported in the Compustat Industry Segments.  I treat all disclosed 
customers to be major trading partners of the reporting firm (the supplier).    I manually 
match each customer name to its CUSIP in Compustat.  For customer names that are 
abbreviated, I used visual inspection and industry affiliation to determine whether the 
customer is listed in Compustat.   For the remaining unmatched customer names, I check 
their corporate websites and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations to determine if the 
customer is a subsidiary of a listed firm.  If so, the customer is assigned to its parent’s 
CUSIP.  Unmatched customers are then excluded. 
 
2.4.1.2             Management Turnover Data 
As mentioned earlier, customers listed in the Compustat Industry Segments must also be 
listed in the Execucomp database in order to be retained in the sample.  I use the 
Execucomp database to identify the names of officers with the titles of chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operation officer (COO), chairman or 
vice-chairman, president or vice president (VP) for customer firms.   I then identify the 
year where these top executives are no longer listed under the firm, and search Factiva or 
Google for news articles on the death, retirement, resignation or dismissal of these 
executives.  The first public announcement date is then retained.  Firms where news 
articles cannot be found are excluded.    
 
I include only unexpected deaths and exclude top executives who died after prolonged 
illnesses as their deaths would be anticipated.  I also exclude top executives who retired 
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because firms usually announce in advance of the intention of their top executives to 
retire, making it difficult to identify the exact first announcement date.   Additionally, 
most executives retire nearing retirement age and the market would have factored in the 
pending retirement of these executives from their age.  Hence, I retain cases where top 
executives died unexpectedly, resigned or were ousted. 
 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
For the sample period 1993 to 2006, 9267 unique customer-supplier pairs with 24,738 
relationship-years are identified from the Compustat Industry Segments where the 
customer is also listed in Execucomp, as shown in Table 2.1.  From this sample, there are 
789 and 4627 unique customers and suppliers, respectively.   Among the customers, there 
are 520 cases of resignation or dismissal, and 41 cases of sudden deaths of top executives.   
On average, each customer has 1.4 suppliers and each supplier has 4.9 customers.   A 
median supplier generates 13% of net sales from trades with a customer.  In contrast, a 
median customer spends only 0.13% of net sales on input purchases from a supplier.    
[INSERT TABLE 2.1] 
 
The median customer has 2914 million in assets and is almost 29 times larger than the 
average supplier who has 100 million in assets.  In terms of market capitalization, the 
median customer is almost 42 times larger than the median supplier while the median 
supplier is about 1.6 times larger than the median firm in Compustat 8.   Next, the median 
customer spends 0.9% of total assets on R&D while the median supplier spends 2.1%.  
                                                 
8 Summary statistics for the median firm in Compustat are generated after excluding financial firms and 
utilities. 
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The median firm in Compustat spends 0.0% of assets on R&D.  In terms of leverage, the 
median customer has a debt-to-asset ratio of 0.24 which is comparable to the median firm 
in Compustat.  In contrast, the median supplier has a lower debt-to-asset ratio of 0.19.   
Additionally, the median customer spends 6.1% of total assets as capital expenditure 
compared to 4.6% by the median supplier.   
 
As for market power, the median customer and supplier has 11.6% and 0.5% market 
share of sales, respectively.  Similar patterns are observed when market power is 
measured by the market share of assets.  In terms of industry concentration, the median 
customer and supplier belongs to industries with comparable industry concentration as 
measured by their sales-based and asset-based Herfindahl indices.  As for profitability, 
the median customer is more profitable than the median supplier as measured by the 
industry-adjusted and non-adjusted ROA or MB ratio.  The non-adjusted (industry-
adjusted) MB ratio for the median customer and supplier are 2.07 (0.25) and 1.80 (0), 
respectively.   Lastly, Panel C of Table 2.1 shows that the treatment and control group are 
comparable across various firm characteristics when the relative asset size of a match is 
small.  
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
In this section, I discuss the event study results followed by the multivariate analyses 
using OLS regressions.  Lastly, the differences-in-differences results are presented. 
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2.5.1 Event Study Results 
From Table 2.2, using a sample of 41 deaths of top executives of customers affecting 71 
suppliers, I find that the mean supplier CAR is significantly negative at -2.57% for the 
[-3,  +1] window with a p-value of 0.041.  The negative supplier CAR could be driven by 
the negative CAR of customers if the stock prices of a customer-supplier pair are 
positively correlated.  However, the mean customer CAR over the [-3, +1] window is 
1.44% and significantly positive at less than 1% level.   The negative supplier CAR 
provides preliminary evidence consistent with the implicit contracts hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.2] 
 
From Figure 2.1, the supplier CAR decreases on Day 0 while the customer CAR 
increases.  The plots confirm that the negative supplier CAR cannot be driven by the 
stock price reaction of customer.    
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1] 
 
Next, using 520 cases of top management turnover of customers affecting 1575 suppliers, 
Table 2.3 shows that both the customer and supplier CAR are significantly negative 
at -0.44% and -1.05%, respectively, over the [-3, +1] window under the Patell Z test.   
Furthermore, customer CAR is also negative in the pre- and post- announcement period.  
This suggests that the management turnover decision is correlated with other value-
relevant news about the customer.  For example, news related to poor performance of the 
customer might have preceded or coincided with its turnover announcement.  Hence, the 
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prior profitability of the customer could be driving its abnormal stock price reaction and 
not its management turnover event, per se.     
[INSERT TABLE 2.3] 
 
However, if the supplier CAR is driven by other value-relevant news about the customer 
rather than the turnover event, we would expect the supplier CAR in the pre-
announcement window to be strongly and significantly negative since it would be highly 
correlated with the customer CAR.  Yet, the pre-announcement supplier CAR is not 
statistically significant despite its negative magnitude.  Furthermore, the supplier CAR is 
positive, albeit insignificant, in the post-announcement period whereas the customer CAR 
remains strongly and significantly negative post-announcement.  Hence, it is unlikely that 
the supplier CAR over the [-3, +1] window is driven by other value-relevant news about 
the customer.   
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2] 
 
From Figure 2.2, the plots confirm that the customer CAR is negative in the pre- and 
post-announcement period whereas the supplier CAR exhibits no similar trend. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2.4] 
 
Using the turnover sample, Panel A of Table 2.4 shows that the mean supplier CARs over 
the [-3, +1] window are significantly negative at -0.63% and -0.44% when the customer’s 
prior ROA is above and below its industry median, respectively.  Similarly, Panel B 
shows that the mean supplier CARs over the event window are also significantly negative 
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at -0.56% and -0.65% when the customer’s prior MB ratio is above and below the 
industry median, respectively. Hence, management turnover of a firm has a negative 
announcement returns impact on its suppliers independent of the firm’s prior profitability. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2.5] 
 
Next, from Panel A of Table 2.5, the mean supplier CARs are negative for all four 
quartiles of customer’s market share of sales, but its negative magnitude almost doubles 
as the market power of customer increases from below the 25th percentile (lowest 
quartile) to above the 75th percentile (highest quartile).  The supplier CAR is -0.57% for 
the lowest quartile and -1.07% for the highest quartile.  From Panel B, the mean supplier 
CAR becomes more negative as the customer’s market share of assets increases.  Similar 
patterns are observed in Panel C and D where the market power of customer is measured 
by the sales-based and asset-based Herfindahl index, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.6] 
 
From Table 2.6, using the same four measures of market power, I do not find consistent 
evidence that the supplier CAR becomes less negative as the supplier‘s own market 
power increases.   For example, supplier CAR is -1.12% when the customer’s sales-based 
Herfindahl falls in the 25th-50th percentile, and is more negative than the supplier CAR 
of -0.43% when the customer’s sales-based Herfindahl is above the 75th percentile.  This 
could be explained by the fact that suppliers are, on average, much smaller in size and has 
weaker market share relative to their customers.  Thus, the market power of customers 
would be a stronger driving factor of supplier CAR than the supplier’s own market power.   
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2.5.2 Multivariate Analyses 
I now discuss the results using multivariate analyses.  From OLS regressions in Table 2.7, 
I find no relation between supplier CAR and the prior industry-adjusted MB ratio of 
customer and supplier after controlling for market power and other firm controls.  In 
other words, supplier CAR is independent of pre-event profitability of the customer. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.7] 
 
Next, controlling for the supplier’s market power and the customer’s and supplier’s 
industry-adjusted MB ratio as well as other firm characteristics, the supplier CAR shows 
a negative relation with the customer’s Herfindahl indices and market share measures, 
and is statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively.  The sensitivity of 
supplier CAR to the customer’s sales-based Herfindahl and market share of sales 
is -0.046 and -0.025, respectively.  Interpreting the first result, supplier CAR over the 
event window will decrease by 4.6% as the customer’s industry concentration changes 
from perfectly competitive to monopolistic.  Similarly, supplier CAR will decrease by 
0.25% as the customer’s market share of sales increase by 10%.  Consistent with previous 
event study results, supplier’s market power has no own wealth effect. 
 
Additionally, supplier CAR exhibits a weak significantly negative relation with the debt-
to-assets ratio of customer.  Intuitively, a highly levered customer is more vulnerable to 
financial distress and instability in top management aggravates the financial distress risk.   
Suppliers, as close trading partners, suffer some negative externalities due to the 
exacerbation of financial distress risks of customers by management turnover events.  
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Supplier CAR also exhibits a significantly negative relation with the customer’s capital 
expenditure.  Investment-intensive firms could be more vulnerable to fluctuations in 
operating income, and instability in top management aggravates such fluctuations.    
 
2.5.2.1 Robustness check 
Table 2.7 uses customer-supplier-year panel regressions.  However, a customer can have 
more than one supplier in a fiscal year and the same customer firm controls are repeated 
for each supplier-year.  Such panel regressions might bias upwards the significance of the 
coefficient estimates.  As a robustness check, I aggregate all suppliers of a customer into 
a value-weighted portfolio where the weight is the particular supplier’s revenue generated 
from the customer divided by the total expenditure spent on input purchases from all 
suppliers by the customer.  Hence, there is only one supplier CAR observation for each 
customer-year after aggregation.     
[INSERT TABLE 2.8] 
 
From Table 2.8, the significance level of the loadings decreases, as expected.   However, 
the negative relation between supplier CAR and the customer’s Herfindahl measures 
persists at 5% level of significance.  Moreover, supplier CAR continues to exhibit a 
negative relation with the customer’s market share proxies but the statistical significance 





2.5.3 Changes in Profitability of Suppliers Using Differences-in-
Differences Approach 
 
From Table 2.9, using the industry-adjusted MB ratio as a profitability proxy, the loading 
on the interaction term between the POST and CUSTTO dummy is negative, but 
insignificant, when no restriction is imposed on the relative asset size of the matched pair.  
When the relative asset size ratio does not exceed 4:1, the loading on the interaction term 
becomes significantly negative at -1.2.  With a maximum relative asset size ratio of 2:1, 
the loading on the interaction term is -1.5 after controlling for the supplier’s and 
customer’s firm characteristics.  In sum, suppliers subjected to a customer’s top 
management turnover events have a lower industry-adjusted MB ratio, post-event, 
relative to suppliers with no changes in customer’s top management. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.9] 
 
However, when the industry-adjusted ROA is used as the profitability proxy, the loading 
on the interaction term is insignificant regardless of the relative asset size of the matched 
pair.   As the MB ratio is a forward-looking measure that while the ROA is a backward-
looking accounting measure, the results implies that the market expects lower valuation 
for suppliers in the treatment group relative to suppliers in the control group after a 
customer’s management turnover event, even if post-event accounting profitability is not 
significantly affected yet.   The results are consistent with the interpretation of market 
expectations that implicit agreements between the firm and its suppliers are unlikely to be 
delivered by the new management.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the effects of top management turnover on the wealth of a 
firm’s suppliers.  Under the implicit contracts hypothesis, contractual incompleteness in a 
long-term product market relationship exposes suppliers to potential breach of implicit 
contracts by new management of customers.  This is because trust built with the 
departing management is non-transferable to the new management.  Hence, top 
management turnover, even if it is disciplinary in nature, has a negative wealth impact on 
the firm’s suppliers.   
 
In contrast, under the value creation hypothesis, management turnover gives the firm an 
option to find a better manager who can create market share and increase the overall size 
of the firm to benefit both shareholders and stakeholders.  This option value increases 
under disciplinary management turnover as the likelihood of finding a better manager is 
higher when the predecessor has poorer performance.  The value creation hypothesis 
predicts a positive wealth effect on a firm’s suppliers around management turnover 
events, especially if poorly-performing management is removed.     
 
I find strong evidence in support of the implicit contracts hypothesis.  The abnormal 
stock price reaction of suppliers is significantly negative around announcements of death, 
resignation or dismissal of top executives of customers.  Supplier CAR continues to be 
negative and significant independent of the prior profitability of customers.  Furthermore, 
the negative announcement returns impact on suppliers is larger with greater market 
power of customers.  In contrast, I find no evidence that the mean supplier CAR becomes 
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less negative as the supplier’s own market power increases.  Using OLS regressions, I 
confirm that the market power of customers is a more important driving factor of supplier 
wealth around management turnover events of customers than the supplier’s own market 
power.  I also confirm that the supplier CAR has no relation with the prior profitability of 
customers.   
 
Lastly, using a differences-in-differences approach, suppliers that experienced a 
customer’s management turnover event have a significantly lower industry-adjusted MB 
ratio, post-event, relative to a control group of suppliers matched by industry and asset 
size.  Hence, consistent with the implicit contracts hypothesis, management turnover 
adversely affects the wealth of suppliers. 
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Figure 2.1 
Plots of cumulative abnormal return around death of customer’s top executives 
Figure 2.1a and 2.1b present the plots of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
suppliers and customers, respectively, around announcements of sudden death of 
customers’ top executives with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial 
officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-
president.  Day 0 is the announcement day.  The supplier and customer CAR are 
computed using the market model following the approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) with the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the market proxy.  The mean 
supplier (customer) CAR is plotted for ten days pre- and post-announcement.  The 
sample consists of 41 customers with 71 suppliers for the sample period 1993 to 2006.  
Financial firms and utilities are excluded.  Suppliers who are subsidiaries of the 
customers are also excluded.   
 





































Plots of cumulative abnormal return around turnover of customer’s top executives 
Figure 2.2a and 2.2b present the plots of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
suppliers and customers, respectively, around announcements of resignation or dismissal 
of customers’ top executives with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief 
financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, 
president or vice-president.  Day 0 is the announcement day.  The supplier and customer 
CAR are computed using the market model following the approach of Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) with the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the market proxy.  The 
mean supplier (customer) CAR is plotted for ten days pre- and post-announcement.  The 
sample consists of 520 customers with 1575 suppliers for the sample period 1993 to 2006.  
Financial firms and utilities are excluded.  Suppliers who are subsidiaries of the 
customers are also excluded.   
 


















































Customers and suppliers are identified from the Compustat industry segment files and 
only customers that are also listed in Execucomp are retained.  Financial firms and 
utilities are excluded.   Suppliers that are subsidiaries of customers are also excluded.  
Sample period is from 1993 to 2006.  Asset refers to the book value of total assets.  
Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by stock price. R&D 
is the R&D expenses scaled by lagged asset of the firm.  Debt is the sum of long-term 
and short-term debt divided by lagged asset of the firm.  CAPEXP is the capital 
expenditure divided by lagged assets.  Market share of sales is the ratio of the firm’s sales 
to the total sales of its industry where industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard 
Classification Industry (SIC) codes.  Market share of assets is the ratio of the firm’s 
assets to the total assets of its industry.  Sales-based Herfindahl index is computed by 
summing the square of a firm’s fractional sales in its industry across all firms in the 
industry.  Asset-based Herfindahl index is computed by summing the square of a firm’s 
fractional assets in its industry across all firms in the industry.  ROA is the return on 
assets and computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest 
expenses plus income tax expenses, and divided by assets.  iaROA is the median 
industry-adjusted ROA.  Market-to-book ratio of assets (MB) is computed as the market 
value divided by book value of assets where market value is the sum of the market value 
of equity plus long-term debt plus current liabilities while the book value of assets is the 
sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  iaMB is the 
median industry-adjusted MB.  Panel A presents customer and supplier firm 
characteristics.  Panel B presents the number of customers, suppliers and customer-
supplier pairs.  Panel C describes the firm characteristics of suppliers in the treatment and 
control groups.  Suppliers that experience a customer’s top management turnover at any 
time during the sample period are assigned to the treatment group while suppliers that do 
not experience any customer’s top management turnover and can be matched to the 
treated suppliers by 2-digit SIC codes and asset size are assigned to the control group.  
Each supplier in the treatment group is matched to only one supplier in the control group. 
Size ratio is the relative asset size of the matched pair. Top management includes officers 
with the titles of chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, 
chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  Panel D shows the correlation 




Panel A: Firm characteristics of customers and suppliers  
 Mean Median Standard Deviation
Assets of customers (millions) 9385 2914 12614 
Assets of suppliers (millions) 1029 100 3892 
Assets of all Compustat firms (millions) 1345 80 5215 
Market Capitalization of customers (millions) 16276 4293 37913 
Market Capitalization of suppliers (millions) 1569 112 9792 
Market Capitalization of all Compustat firms (millions) 1572 69 10926 
R&D expenses of customers 0.047 0.009 0.095 
R&D expenses of suppliers 0.148 0.021 3.571 
R&D expenses of all Compustat firms 0.103 0.000 4.790 
35 
Debt level of customers 0.270 0.238 0.334 
Debt level of suppliers 0.404 0.190 5.531 
Debt level of all Compustat firms 0.514 0.240 12.73 
CAPEX of customers 0.082 0.061 0.090 
CAPEX of suppliers 0.090 0.046 0.384 
CAPEX of all Compustat firms 0.114 0.050 1.133 
Market share of sales of customers 0.200 0.116 0.223 
Market share of sales of suppliers 0.052 0.005 0.135 
Market share of sales of all Compustat firms 0.066 0.007 0.151 
Market share of assets of customers 0.199 0.110 0.225 
Market share of assets of suppliers 0.050 0.005 0.131 
Market share of assets of all Compustat firms 0.066 0.007 0.152 
Sales Herfindahl index of customers 0.234 0.186 0.180 
Sales Herfindahl index of suppliers 0.235 0.189 0.177 
Sales Herfindahl index of all Compustat firms 0.243 0.195 0.179 
Asset Herfindahl index of customers 0.230 0.191 0.183 
Asset Herfindahl index of suppliers 0.232 0.188 0.189 
Asset Herfindahl index of all Compustat firms 0.250 0.198 0.188 
ROA of customers 10.76% 10.74% 10.16 
ROA of suppliers  0.15% 6.67% 24.30 
ROA of all Compustat firms  1.04% 7.28% 23.91 
iaROA of customers  5.34% 2.93% 11.27 
iaROA of suppliers  -3.06% 0.05% 21.82 
iaROA of all Compustat firms  -4.01% 0.00% 21.53 
MB of customers  2.94 2.07 3.22 
MB of suppliers  3.16 1.80 8.48 
MB of all Compustat firms  3.82 1.59 46.00 
iaMB of customers  0.97 0.25 3.04 
iaMB of suppliers  1.06 0.00 8.35 





Panel B: Customer-supplier pairs 
# unique customer-supplier pairs with customers in Execucomp and Compustat segments 9267 
      # relationship-years with customers in Execucomp and Compustat segments 24738 
      # unique customers 789 
      # unique suppliers 4627 
# resignation or dismissal of top executives of customers 520 
# sudden deaths of top executives of customers 41 
# suppliers per customer (Mean) 4.9 
# suppliers per customer (Median) 2.0 
# customers per supplier (Mean) 1.4 
# customers per supplier (Median) 1.0 
Supplier’s revenue from a customer/supplier sales (Mean) 48.51%
Supplier’s revenue from a customer/supplier sales (Median) 13.22%
Customer’s expenditure on a supplier/customer sales (Mean) 0.90% 

















 Median value is reported 
Assets of treatment group (in mns) 102 101 101 104 136 
Assets of control group (in mns) 94 86 84 88 102 
Market capitalization of treatment group (in 
mns) 105 117 116 119 157 
Market capitalization of control group (in mns) 100 88 89 99 112 
R&D expenses of treatment group 0.013 0.016 0.024 0.028 0.027 
R&D expenses of control group 0.012 0..024 0.032 0.039 0.031 
Debt level of treatment group 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.17 
Debt level of control group 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.17 
CAPEXP of treatment group 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.038 
CAPEXP of control group 0.047 0.043 0.041 0.041 0.039 
Market share of sales of treatment group 0.0064 0.0050 0.0042 0.0040 0.0044 
Market share of sales of control group 0.0060 0.0048 0.0042 0.0035 0.0034 
Market share of assets of treatment group 0.0064 0.0051 0.0040 0.0040 0.0043 
Market share of assets of control group 0.0058 0.0046 0.0041 0.0039 0.0036 
Sales-based Herfindahl of treatment group 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Sales-based Herfindahl of control group 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Asset-based Herfindahl of treatment group 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Asset-based Herfindahl of control group 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 
iaROA of treatment group 0.25% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32% 
iaROA of control group 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
iaMB of treatment group -0.021 0.00 -0.0028 -0.015 -0.015 
iaMB of control group 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.027 -0.016 
Panel D: Correlation matrix for customer (CUST) and supplier (SS) firm characteristics.   
 

































































CUST Assets 1                    
CUST R&D -0.118* 1                   
CUST Debt 0.212* -0.135* 1                  
CUST 
CAPEXP -0.063* 0.0722* 0.125* 1                 
CUST Market 
shares of sales 0.230* -0.118* -0.051* -0.088* 1                
CUST Market 








0.021* -0.084* -0.057* -0.123* 0.789* 0.796* 0.964* 1             
CUST iaROA -0.027* 0.185* -0.179* 0.084* -0.0025 -0.035* -0.067* -0.085* 1            
CUST iaMB -0.086* 0.246* -0.195* 0.134* 0.033* -0.013 -0.011 -0.038* 0.306* 1           
SS Assets 0.141* -0.052* 0.012 -0.025* -0.0036 -0.014 -0.031* -0.039* -0.034* 0.0130 1          
SS R&D 0.0057 0.0137 -0.0065 -0.0004 0.011 0.0094 0.0069 0.0055 0.0110 0.0034 -0.0073 1         
SS Debt 0.0034 0.0287* 0.0126 0.0654* -0.023* -0.023* -0.028* 0.0225*-0.0058-0.0037 -0.0044 0.575* 1        
SS CAPEXP 0.0034 0.0287* 0.0136 0.0654* -0.023* -0.023* -0.028* -0.025* 0.0025 0.0071 -0.0065 0.871* 0.702* 1       
SS Market 














0.0088 -0.120* 0.0611*0.0309*0.1235*0.1257*0.1577*0.1548* -0.068* -0.024* -0.039* 0.0120 0.0054 -0.018*0.3466* 0.339* 0.943* 1   
SS iaROA -0.0105 0.0044 -0.0006 -0.0045 -0.0175 -0.0163 -0.0133 -0.0115 0.017 0.0019 0.0050 -0.918* -0.742* -0.861* 0.0070 0.0067 -0.020* -0.021* 1  
SS iaMB -0.0129 0.0224* -0.023* 0.0009 -0.0163 -0.0171 -0.020* -0.020* 0.0207* 0.0158 -0.0120 0.0241* 0.0163 0.0182 -0.030* -0.032* -0.036* -0.033* -0.0186 1 
 






















Supplier and customer cumulative abnormal return around death announcements 
Panel A and B present the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of suppliers and customers, 
respectively, around announcements of sudden death of customers’ top executives with 
the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating 
officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  The sample 
consists of 41 customer firms with 71 suppliers for the sample period 1993 to 2006.  The 
supplier and customer CAR are computed using the market model following the approach 
of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) with the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the 
market proxy.  The mean supplier (customer) CAR is reported.   [-3, +1] represents the 
window used to cumulate the abnormal returns from three days before to one day after 
the announcement date.  CAR over the pre-announcement [-30, -4] window and post-
announcement [+2, +30] window are also reported.  Patell’s Z statistic (Patell, 1976) and 
the rank test Z statistic are reported with p-values in parenthesis.  Financial firms and 
utilities are excluded.  Suppliers that are subsidiaries of customers are also excluded.  
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Supplier CAR 
  Supplier CAR 
Window N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 















Panel B: Customer CAR 
  Customer CAR 
Window N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 




















Supplier and customer cumulative abnormal return around turnover 
announcements 
Panel A and B present the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of suppliers and customers, 
respectively, around announcements of resignation or dismissal of customers’ top 
executives with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), 
chief operating officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  The 
sample consists of 520 customer firms with 1575 suppliers for the sample period 1993 to 
2006.  The supplier and customer CAR are computed using the market model following 
the approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) with the CRSP equally-weighted market 
index as the market proxy.  The mean supplier (customer) CAR is reported.   [-3, +1] 
represents the window used to cumulate the abnormal returns from three days before to 
one day after the announcement date.  CAR over the pre-announcement [-30, -4] window 
and post-announcement [+2, +30] window are also reported.  Patell’s Z statistic (Patell, 
1976) and the rank test Z statistic are reported with p-values in parenthesis.  Financial 
firms and utilities are excluded.  Suppliers that are subsidiaries of customers are also 
excluded.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Supplier CAR 
  Supplier CAR 
Window N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 















Panel B: Customer CAR 
  Customer CAR 
Window N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 
















Supplier cumulative abnormal return and past profitability of customers 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of suppliers around 
announcements of resignation or dismissal of customers’ top executives sorted into two 
groups based on whether the customer’s profitability in the year preceding management 
turnover is above or below its industry median.  Top executives are officers with the titles 
of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer 
(COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  Supplier CAR is computed 
from the market model following the approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) using 
the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the market proxy.  The mean supplier CAR 
is reported.  Proxies for the profitability of suppliers are (i) the median industry-adjusted 
return on assets (iaROA) in Panel A, and (ii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-
book (iaMB) ratio of assets in Panel B.  Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes.  ROA is computed as the sum of net income before 
extraordinary income plus income tax expenses plus interest expenses, and divided by 
lagged assets.  MB is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets 
where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and 
current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity 
plus long-term debt and current liabilities.   [-3, +1] represents the window used to 
cumulate the abnormal return from three days before to one day after the announcement 
date.  CAR over the pre-announcement [-30, -4] and post-announcement [+2, +30] 
window are also reported.  Patell’s Z statistic (Patell, 1976) and the rank test Z statistic 
are reported with p-values in parenthesis.  Financial firms and utilities are excluded.  
Suppliers must have non-zero assets and sales reported in Compustat and cannot be 
subsidiaries of their customers.  Customers must be listed in Execucomp.  *,**,*** 
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Past industry-adjusted ROA of customers 
 Supplier CAR 
 Customer iaROA  > 0 Customer iaROA  < industry median 
Window N Mean 
CAR 
(%) 







Patell Z Rank Test 
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Panel B: Past industry-adjusted market-to book ratio of customers 
 
 Supplier CAR 
 Customer iaMB  > 0 Customer iaMB < 0 
Window N Mean 
CAR 
(%) 







Patell Z Rank Test 
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Supplier cumulative abnormal return and customer’s market power  
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of suppliers around 
announcements of resignation or dismissal of customers’ top executives sorted by the 
customer’s market power.  Top executives are officers with the titles of chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, 
vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  The sample is sorted into 4 quartiles 
according to the customer’s market power in the year preceding the announcement.   
Supplier CAR is computed from the market model following the approach of Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the market proxy.  
The mean supplier CAR is reported.  Proxies for the market power of customers are (i) 
the market share of sales in Panel A, (ii) the industry sales-based Herfindahl in Panel B, 
(iii) the market share of assets in Panel C, and (iv) the industry asset-based Herfindahl in 
Panel D.  Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes.  
Sales-based Herfindahl is computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional sales 
in its industry across all firms in the industry.  Asset-based Herfindahl is computed as the 
sum of the square of a firm’s fractional assets in its industry across all firms in the 
industry.   Market share of sales is the firm’s sales divided by the industry sales.  Market 
share of assets is the firm’s assets divided by the industry assets.  Supplier CAR is 
cumulated from three days before to one day after the announcement date. Patell’s Z 
statistic (Patell, 1976) and the rank test Z statistic are reported with p-values in 
parenthesis.  Financial firms and utilities are excluded.  Suppliers must have non-zero 
assets and sales reported in Compustat and cannot be subsidiaries of their customers.  
Customers must be listed in Execucomp.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
Panel A: Customer’s market share of sales 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s market share of sales  N Mean CAR(%) % positive Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  356 -0.57 41.9 -1.321* -1.188 
    (0.0932) (0.1178) 
25th to 50th percentile 354 -0.31 41.8 -1.134 -1.355* 
    (0.1285) (0.0882) 
50th - 75th percentile 382 -0.78 41.4 -1.464* -1.791** 
    (0.0716) (0.0371) 
>75th percentile 398 -1.07 38.4 -2.786*** -1.647* 
    (0.0027) (0.0502) 
 
Panel B: Customer’s market share of assets 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s market share of assets  N Mean CAR (%) % positive Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  390 -0.65 40.8 -1.272 -1.706** 
    (0.1017) (0.0445) 
25th to 50th percentile 315 -0.13 41.6 -1.185 -1.382* 
    (0.1180) (0.0840) 
50th - 75th percentile 372 -0.61 44.6 -0.561 -0.984 
    (0.2874) (0.1629) 
>75th percentile 413 -1.46 36.8 -3.616*** -2.112** 




Panel C: Customer’s sales-based Herfindahl 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s sales-based Herfindahl N Mean CAR (%) % positive Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  362 -0.52 41.7 -1.414* -1.633** 
    (0.0787) (0.0518) 
25th to 50th percentile 355 -0.60 42.5 -0.764 -1.402* 
    (0.2223) (0.0809) 
50th - 75th percentile 424 -0.69 42.0 -1.352* -0.919 
    (0.0883) (0.1793) 
>75th percentile 349 -0.99 38.9 -1.899** -0.899 





Panel D: Customer’s asset-based Herfindahl 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s asset-based Herfindahl N Mean CAR (%) % positive Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  321 -0.25 41.7 -1.638* -1.715** 
    (0.0507) (0.0437) 
25th to 50th percentile 431 -0.87 42.5 -1.162 -1.967** 
    (0.1227) (0.0250) 
50th - 75th percentile 376 -0.74 40.7 -1.791** -1.639* 
    (0.0367) (0.0511) 
>75th percentile 362 -1.08 38.1 -2.222** -1.082 





Supplier cumulative abnormal return and own market power  
This table presents the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of suppliers around 
announcements of resignation or dismissal of customers’ top executives sorted by the 
supplier’s market power.  Top executives are officers with the titles of chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, 
vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  The sample is sorted into 4 quartiles 
according to the supplier’s own market power in the year preceding the announcement.  
Supplier CAR is computed from the market model following the approach of Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market index as the market proxy.  
The mean supplier CAR is reported.  Proxies for the market power of suppliers are (i) the 
market share of sales in Panel A, (ii) the industry sales-based Herfindahl in Panel B, (iii) 
the market share of assets in Panel C, and (iv) the industry asset-based Herfindahl in 
Panel D.  Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes.  
Sales-based Herfindahl is computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional sales 
in its industry across all firms in the industry.  Asset-based Herfindahl is computed as the 
sum of the square of a firm’s fractional assets in its industry across all firms in the 
industry.   Market share of sales is the firm’s sales divided by the industry sales.  Market 
share of assets is the firm’s assets divided by the industry assets.  Supplier CAR is 
cumulated from three days before to one day after the announcement date. Patell’s Z 
statistic (Patell, 1976) and the rank test Z statistic are reported with p-values in 
parenthesis.  Financial firms and utilities are excluded.  Suppliers must have non-zero 
assets and sales reported in Compustat and cannot be subsidiaries of their customers.  
Customers must be listed in Execucomp.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Supplier’s market share of sales 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s market share 
of sales  
N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  301 -0.65 41.9 -0.251 -0.857 
    (0.4010) (0.1961) 
25th to 50th percentile 356 -1.12 43.0 -1.736** -1.244 
    (0.0413) (0.1072) 
50th - 75th percentile 372 -0.52 40.3 -1.895** -2.195** 
    (0.0291) (0.0144) 
>75th percentile 402 -0.43 41.0 -1.282* -1.375* 





Panel B: Supplier’s market share of assets 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s market share 
of assets  
N Mean CAR 
(%) 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  289 -0.22 42.9 0.436 -0.254 
    (0.3314) (0.3998) 
25th to 50th percentile 362 -1.36 42.5 -2.049** -1.540* 
    (0.0202) (0.0623) 
50th - 75th percentile 378 -0.73 39.7 -2.563*** -2.532*** 
    (0.0052) (0.0059) 
>75th percentile 206 -0.33 43.2 -0.699 -1.148 




Panel C: Supplier’s sales-based Herfindahl 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s sales-based 
Herfindahl  
N Mean CAR 
(%) 
[-3, +1] 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  300 -0.72 42.3 -1.613* -1.316* 
    (0.0534) (0.0946) 
25th to 50th percentile 402 -0.50 45.2 -1.028 -1.125 
    (0.1521) (0.1307) 
50th - 75th percentile 376 -1.05 40.7 -1.645* -2.123** 
    (0.0501) (0.0173) 
>75th percentile 358 -0.41 41.1 -0.908 -1.102 





Panel D: Supplier’s asset-based Herfindahl 
  Supplier CAR 
Customer’s asset-based 
Herfindahl  
N Mean CAR 
(%) 
[-3, +1] 
% positive  Patell Z Rank Test Z 
<25th percentile  294 -0.57 42.9 -0.780 -0.720 
    (0.2176) (0.2362) 
25th to 50th percentile 409 -0.92 41.1 -2.291** -1.984** 
    (0.0110) (0.0240) 
50th - 75th percentile 372 -0.75 40.6 -1.048 -1.447* 
    (0.1473) (0.0745) 
>75th percentile 361 -0.38 42.1 -0.932 -1.335* 






OLS regressions of supplier cumulative abnormal return  
This table presents OLS regressions of the relationship between supplier cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), the past profitability of customers and the market power of 
customers and suppliers.  Dependent variable is the supplier CAR over the [-3, +1] 
window from three trading days before to one trading day after announcements of top 
management turnover at customer firms for the sample period 1993 to 2006.  Top 
management includes officers with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief 
financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, 
president or vice-president.  The CAR is computed from the market model following the 
approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market 
index as the market proxy.    Proxies for market power are (i) the sales-based Herfindahl 
index, (ii) the asset-based Herfindahl index, (iii) the firm’s market share of sales in its 
industry, and (iv) the firm’s market share of assets in its industry.  Profitability proxy is 
the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (MB) ratio of assets.  Industry is defined by 
the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes.  Sales-based Herfindahl index 
is computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional sales in its industry sales 
across all firms in the industry.  Asset-based Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of 
the square of a firm’s fractional assets in its industry assets across all firms in the industry.   
Market share of sales is the firm’s sales divided by total sales of the industry.  Market 
share of assets is the firm’s assets divided by the total assets of the industry.  MB is 
computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market value is the 
sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while the 
book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and 
current liabilities.  Firm controls are as follows: the R&D expenses (R&D) divided by 
lagged total assets; the debt level (debt) computed as the sum of long-term debt plus 
current liabilities and divided by lagged total assets; the capital expenditure (CAPEXP) 
divided by lagged total assets; size is the logarithm of total assets.  Year dummies are 
included.  Standard errors are clustered by customers.  P-values are reported in 
parenthesis.  All explanatory variables are for the year preceding turnover announcements 
and winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Suppliers that 
are subsidiaries of customers are also excluded.  Customers must be listed in Execucomp.  
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Dependent variable is supplier CARs over [-3, +1] window 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer sales-based Herfindahl  -0.0459    
 [0.0068]***    
Customer asset-based Herfindahl  -0.0389   
  [0.0167]**   
Customer market share of sales   -0.0254  
   [0.0960]*  
Customer market share of assets    -0.0291 
    [0.0513]* 
Customer industry-adjusted MB 0.0022 0.0021 0.0024 0.0023 
 [0.3278] [0.3651] [0.2920] [0.3139] 
Customer R&D -0.0672 -0.0542 -0.0737 -0.0761 
 [0.2385] [0.3450] [0.1899] [0.1736] 
 
48 
Customer Debt -0.0322 -0.0330 -0.0313 -0.0301 
 [0.0668]* [0.0650]* [0.0894]* [0.1051] 
Customer CAPEXP -0.1054 -0.1064 -0.0996 -0.1033 
 [0.0106]** [0.0107]** [0.0122]** [0.0104]** 
Customer Size -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0003 
 [0.5382] [0.5363] [0.8374] [0.9104] 
Supplier sales-based Herfindahl  0.0128    
 [0.3318]    
Supplier asset-based Herfindahl  0.0178   
  [0.1804]   
Supplier market share of sales   0.0187  
   [0.1782]  
Supplier market share of assets    0.0185 
    [0.1780] 
Supplier industry-adjusted MB -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 [0.1868] [0.2021] [0.2007] [0.1968] 
Supplier R&D 0.0213 0.0230 0.0235 0.0232 
 [0.3834] [0.3484] [0.3380] [0.3418] 
Supplier Debt 0.0043 0.0041 0.0032 0.0031 
 [0.5706] [0.5890] [0.6690] [0.6761] 
Supplier CAPEXP -0.0392 -0.0376 -0.0380 -0.0382 
 [0.2757] [0.2921] [0.2890] [0.2869] 
Supplier Size -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0026 -0.0026 
 [0.3047] [0.3294] [0.2210] [0.2215] 
Intercept 0.0680 0.0648 0.0579 0.0561 
 [0.0734]* [0.0873]* [0.1147] [0.1266] 
Observations 1245 1245 1245 1245 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0125 0.0121 0.0095 0.0103 






OLS regressions of value-weighted portfolio of supplier cumulative abnormal 
return 
This table presents the OLS regressions of the portfolio of supplier cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) formed at the customer level and the customer’s market power.  For each 
customer, the revenues generated from trades by each supplier are summed across all 
suppliers to compute the total input expenditure of the customer.  The CAR of each 
supplier are multiplied by the supplier’s revenues from the customer and divided by the 
customer’s total input expenditure, and the weighted supplier CAR is summed across all 
suppliers of the customer to form a portfolio of supplier CARs.   Dependent variable is 
the value-weighted portfolio of supplier CAR.  Supplier CAR is computed from the 
market model following the approach of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) with the CRSP 
equally-weighted market index as market proxy.  The CAR is cumulated over the [-3,+1] 
window from three trading days before to  one trading day after announcements of top 
management turnover of customers.  Top management includes officers with the titles of 
chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating officer 
(COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president   Proxies for market power 
are (i) the sales-based Herfindahl index, (ii) the asset-based Herfindahl index, (iii) the 
firm’s market share of sales in its industry, and (iv) the firm’s market share of assets in its 
industry.   Profitability proxy is the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (MB) ratio 
of assets.  Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
Codes.  Sales-based Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s 
fractional sales in its industry sales across all firms in the industry.  Asset-based 
Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the square of a firm’s fractional assets in its 
industry assets across all firms in the industry.   Market share of sales is the firm’s sales 
divided by the total industry sales.  Market share of assets is the firm’s assets divided by 
the total industry assets.  MB is computed as the market value divided by book value of 
assets where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt 
and current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of 
equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  Customer firm controls are as follows: 
the R&D expenses (R&D) divided by lagged total assets; the debt level (debt) computed 
as the sum of long-term debt plus current liabilities and divided by lagged total assets; the 
capital expenditure (CAPEXP) divided by lagged total assets; and SIZE is the logarithm 
of total assets. Year dummies are included.  Standard errors are clustered by customers.  
P-values are reported in parenthesis.  All explanatory variables are for the year preceding 
turnover announcements and winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Utilities and financial firms are 
excluded.  Suppliers that are subsidiaries of customers are also excluded.  Customers 
must be listed in Execucomp.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 






Dependent variable is the portfolio of supplier CAR at the customer level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Customer sales-based Herfindahl -0.0649    
 [0.0171]**    
Customer asset-based Herfindahl  -0.0564   
  [0.0199]**   
Customer market share of sales   -0.0121  
   [0.6615]  
Customer market share of assets    -0.0141 
    [0.6024] 
Customer industry-adjusted MB -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0018 
 [0.5513] [0.5539] [0.5968] [0.5864] 
Customer R&D -0.0610 -0.0561 -0.0512 -0.0532 
 [0.3167] [0.3583] [0.4317] [0.4140] 
Customer Debt -0.0539 -0.0550 -0.0528 -0.0524 
 [0.0049]*** [0.0054]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0097]*** 
Customer CAPEXP -0.1075 -0.1089 -0.0987 -0.1000 
 [0.0265]** [0.0257]** [0.0428]** [0.0409]** 
Customer Size -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 
 [0.7247] [0.7284] [0.7267] [0.7561] 
Intercept 0.0261 0.0259 0.0168 0.0159 
 [0.4346] [0.4412] [0.6143] [0.6368] 
Observations 377 377 377 377 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0396 0.0372 0.0246 0.0248 





Post-event profitability of suppliers 
This table uses differences-in-differences methodology to compare the change in 
profitability of suppliers that experienced customer’s top management changes (treatment 
group) relative to suppliers which did not experience customer’s top management 
turnover (control group) for the sample period 1993 to 2006.  A supplier is assigned to 
the treatment group if it experiences a customer’s top management turnover at any time 
during the sample period while suppliers that do not experience any customer’s top 
management turnover throughout the sample period and can be matched to the treated 
suppliers by 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and asset size are 
assigned to the control group.  Each treated unit is matched to only one control unit most 
similar in asset size without replacement.  Results are reported with and without 
restrictions on the relative asset size ratio of a matched pair.  A supplier is considered as 
experiencing customer’s management turnover only once in year t even if multiple 
customers had management turnover in year t, giving unique supplier-years.  Customers 
must be listed in Execucomp in order to identify top management changes, if any.  Both 
treated and control units must have non-missing profitability data in Compustat in the 
three years pre- and post-customer’s management turnover of the treated unit.  Top 
management turnover are classified as the resignation or dismissal of top executives with 
the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), chief operating 
officer (COO), chairman, vice-chairman, president or vice-president.  Dependent variable 
is the supplier’s profitability in year t.  Profitability proxies are (i) the median industry-
adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) ratio of assets in Panel A, and (ii) the median industry-
adjusted return on assets (iaROA) in Panel B.  Industry is defined by the 4-digit SIC 
Codes.  ROA is computed as the ratio of the sum of operating income before 
extraordinary items plus interest expenses plus income tax expenses to lagged assets.  
MB is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market value 
is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while 
the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and 
current liabilities.  Post is a dummy that takes on unity after customer’s management 
turnover, and zero otherwise.  CustTO is a dummy that takes on unity for suppliers in the 
treatment group, and zero for suppliers in the control group.  Supplier firm controls are as 
follows: the market share of sales in its industry computed as the supplier’s sales divided 
by total sales of its industry; the R&D expenses (R&D) divided by lagged total assets; the 
debt level (debt) computed as the sum of long-term debt plus current liabilities and 
divided by lagged total assets; the capital expenditure (CAPEXP) divided by lagged total 
assets; firm size computed as the logarithm of total assets.  The average firm 
characteristics of all customers of a supplier in year t are also included in columns (2), (4), 
(6) and (8).  All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Financial firms and utilities are 
excluded.   Suppliers which are subsidiaries of their customers are also excluded.   
Standard errors are clustered by suppliers.  Year and supplier’s firm dummies are 










Ratio < 1.5 
Relative  Asset Size
Ratio < 2 
Relative Asset  Size 
Ratio < 4 
No restriction on 
Relative Asset Size 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post -0.358 -0.365 -0.365 -0.246 -0.436 -0.380 -0.191 -0.165 
 [0.722] [0.731] [0.652] [0.772] [0.479] [0.551] [0.605] [0.659] 
CUSTTO 2.849 2.920 3.221 2.920 1.024 1.079 -0.229 -0.189 
 [0.170] [0.149] [0.060]* [0.057]* [0.409] [0.392] [0.824] [0.850] 
Post*CUSTTO -1.594 -1.587 -1.760 -1.471 -1.326 -1.152 -0.398 -0.279 
 [0.076]* [0.080]* [0.033]** [0.055]* [0.019]** [0.032]** [0.334] [0.502] 
Supplier market 
share 2.528 3.038 3.397 2.907 1.133 1.149 0.913 0.829 
 [0.443] [0.372] [0.287] [0.309] [0.589] [0.558] [0.332] [0.383] 
Supplier R&D 0.302 0.199 2.593 1.015 0.932 -0.308 1.286 0.893 
 [0.927] [0.951] [0.459] [0.693] [0.742] [0.894] [0.337] [0.456] 
Supplier debt -0.067 0.006 -1.046 -0.954 -0.897 -0.818 -0.263 -0.191 
 [0.934] [0.993] [0.164] [0.192] [0.286] [0.306] [0.650] [0.729] 
Supplier 
CAPEXP 1.815 1.616 2.584 3.078 2.832 3.310 2.487 2.704 
 [0.076]* [0.064]* [0.046]** [0.091]* [0.016]** [0.023]** [0.018]** [0.020]** 
Supplier firm 
size -2.511 -2.610 -3.219 -2.769 -2.754 -2.469 -2.163 -2.013 
 [0.126] [0.119] [0.025]** [0.027]** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Mean customer 
iamb  0.307  0.172  0.129  0.033 
  [0.091]*  [0.116]  [0.167]  [0.670] 
Mean customer 
firm size  -0.066  -0.160  0.051  0.141 
  [0.835]  [0.516]  [0.770]  [0.348] 
Mean customer 
market share  1.004  -0.593  -1.405  -1.198 
  [0.683]  [0.802]  [0.303]  [0.192] 
Intercept 14.511 15.170 17.924 17.125 16.806 15.017 13.280 11.260 
 [0.217] [0.230] [0.057]* [0.079]* [0.005]*** [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.003]***
Observations 897 892 1206 1198 1859 1843 3550 3527 




169 169 229 229 360 360 705 705 
Supplier firm 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Dependent variable is supplier’s industry-adjusted ROA 
 
 Relative Asset Size Ratio < 1.5 
Relative Asset Size
 Ratio < 2 
Relative Asset Size 
 Ratio < 4 
No restriction on 
Relative Asset  Size 
Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Post -0.065 -0.072 -0.048 -0.055 -0.034 -0.037 -0.009 -0.006 
 [0.365] [0.329] [0.390] [0.345] [0.358] [0.322] [0.777] [0.839] 
CUSTTO -0.084 -0.084 -0.312 -0.319 -0.221 -0.218 -0.052 -0.038 
 [0.598] [0.582] [0.102] [0.102] [0.089]* [0.097]* [0.527] [0.646] 
Post*CUSTTO -0.038 -0.036 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 0.022 0.020 
 [0.494] [0.535] [0.820] [0.818] [0.735] [0.728] [0.366] [0.455] 
Supplier market share 0.162 0.155 0.077 0.081 0.006 0.007 0.040 0.043 
 [0.473] [0.481] [0.662] [0.639] [0.961] [0.957] [0.702] [0.681] 
Supplier R&D -0.178 -0.172 -0.401 -0.392 -0.432 -0.425 -0.708 -0.706 
 [0.534] [0.554] [0.040]** [0.048]** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Supplier debt -0.130 -0.135 -0.110 -0.115 -0.132 -0.136 -0.076 -0.078 
 [0.231] [0.257] [0.288] [0.306] [0.184] [0.192] [0.395] [0.397] 
Supplier CAPEXP 0.570 0.575 0.490 0.485 0.470 0.475 0.350 0.356 
 [0.227] [0.231] [0.278] [0.288] [0.125] [0.131] [0.068]* [0.068]* 
Supplier firm size 0.048 0.051 0.017 0.011 0.017 0.014 -0.0003 0.0009 
 [0.240] [0.176] [0.606] [0.718] [0.513] [0.592] [0.987] [0.965] 
Mean customer iamb  -0.012  -0.023  -0.003  -0.022 
  [0.927]  [0.845]  [0.968]  [0.742] 
Mean customer firm 
size 
 -0.058  -0.045  -0.039  -0.033 
  [0.596]  [0.591]  [0.518]  [0.313] 
Mean customer market 
share 
 0.250  0.165  0.057  0.040 
  [0.338]  [0.408]  [0.657]  [0.660] 
Intercept 0.063 0.563 0.271 0.720 0.191 0.586 0.070 0.369 
 [0.833] [0.632] [0.287] [0.441] [0.320] [0.373] [0.689] [0.366] 
Observations 900 886 1194 1175 1826 1800 3568 3521 
R-square 0.442 0.445 0.481 0.483 0.507 0.508 0.559 0.558 
# unique suppliers in 
treatment group 169 169 229 229 360 360 705 705 
Supplier firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






The Medium of Exchange, Control Loss, and  
Wealth Effect on Suppliers in Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are, arguably, among the most important 
investment decisions of a firm.   Like any major corporate investments, the choice of 
financing in M&A activities can have a significant impact on the acquirer’s ownership 
structure, financial leverage, taxes, risk and subsequent financing decisions.  
Consequently, the financing decision can have serious wealth implications, not only on 
the shareholders of both the acquirers and targets, but also on their stakeholders.  In this 
paper, I examine how the medium of exchange in M&A transactions can affect the 
wealth of suppliers to the merging partners, focusing specifically on the bidder suppliers. 
 
Under the incomplete contracts theory, future contingencies are hard to predict and 
stakeholders engaged in a long-term contracting relationship with a firm must rely 
heavily on implicit contracting with the firm.   Stakeholders must therefore trust the 
incumbent management to deliver on implicit promises without legal enforcement 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  To the extent that long-term contracting facilitates 
relationship-specific investments and reduce contracting costs, management must commit 
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to building trust with stakeholders. As the ability of management to deliver on trust is 
strongly influenced by their controlling power, corporate decisions that result in control 
loss of management should have a detrimental wealth effect on the firm’s stakeholders.   
Suppliers are a group of stakeholders especially vulnerable to control dilution of 
management since a product market relationship involves long-term implicit contracting.   
 
In M&A transactions, the controlling power of management can be diluted as follows.   
First, the current management is usually replaced in hostile takeovers.  In such cases, 
management can no longer protect implicit contracts with suppliers as their controlling 
power is completely removed.  Secondly, the choice of the medium of exchange can 
affect the controlling power of bidder management, even if they remain post-merger.  
Stock financing involves equity issuance and through the process, dilutes the ownership 
and control of the bidder’s existing major shareholders.  Dilution of the bidder’s 
controlling power is further exacerbated if the target has major shareholders, as stock 
payment will concentrate ownership in the hands of the target’s control blocks and create 
new dominant shareholders in the bidder.    
 
My primary focus is on how the bidder’s choice of stock financing over cash financing 
can affect the wealth of its suppliers, particularly under circumstances where control loss 
of bidder management is most severe.   To the extent that (i) the bidder suppliers cannot 
influence the choice of the target or the target ownership structure, and (ii) it is hard to 
think that bidder suppliers can influence the medium of exchange, the financing choice of 
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the bidder provides an ideal opportunity to examine control dilution of bidder 
management and wealth implications to its suppliers.   
 
I posit that the balance of controlling power between the acquirer and target in friendly 
mergers has a direct wealth impact on their suppliers because of the power of 
management to protect implicit contracts with its own suppliers.  In particular, I 
hypothesize that control loss of bidder management through stock payment in non-
diversifying mergers9  has a negative wealth effect on its suppliers, especially under 
circumstances where the target has major block-holders and the bidder does not.   
 
As the target’s control blocks are formed in the bidder post-merger, they can exert 
pressure on bidder management to renege on implicit agreements (e.g. trade credit, 
payment terms) with suppliers, thereby transferring wealth from suppliers to shareholders.  
Furthermore, the bargaining power of the target’s block-holders is enhanced in non-
diversifying mergers since suppliers to both merging parties are likely to be direct 
competitors and can threaten to replace each other.  On the other hand, in diversifying 
mergers, suppliers to the merging parties are unlikely to overlap in technology and any 
replacement threats used by the target’s block-holders to extract value from bidder 
suppliers will not be credible.   
 
Arguably, if retaining control is important to bidder management, they will choose cash 
financing over stock payment, especially under circumstances where control loss is most 
                                                 
9 A merger is non-diversifying if the acquirer and target belong to the same industry where industry is 
defined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. 
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severe.  Only in cases where bidder management faces little ownership dilution would 
stock financing be observed.  However, this is not necessarily the case as cash financing 
has its costs.  Given that most M&A transactions are large and firms have limited cash, 
cash payment typically involves debt financing, which increases the financial distress 
costs of the bidder.   Hence, in deciding on the M&A financing method, the bidder faces 
a tradeoff between the costs of control loss associated with stock financing and the 
financial distress costs of additional debt issuance.   Even under circumstances where 
control loss is significant, the bidder might still choose stock financing because the costs 
of cash financing is so high that the bidder is willing to accept considerable control 
dilution.  In other words, it is not necessarily the case that stock financing is used because 
the controlling power of bidder management cannot be diluted. 
 
I begin by using event study methodology to examine the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) of bidders and their suppliers around announcements of friendly merger bids 
where the payment method is cash10 or stock.  First, I sort the bids by merger types – 
diversifying or non-diversifying.   For non-diversifying mergers, bidder suppliers exhibit 
a significantly negative mean CAR of -1.82% over the [-3, +1] event window11.  In 
contrast, for diversifying mergers, the mean supplier CAR is significantly positive at 
0.79%.  As for the bidders, their mean CAR is strongly significantly negative for both 
merger types.  The negative supplier CAR under non-diversifying mergers can be driven 
by the negative bidder CAR if stock prices between trading partners are positively 
                                                 
10 Following Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masuli (2005), cash financing includes actual cash, liabilities 
and notes.  Furthermore, I classify stock options, common stock and preferred stock as stock financing.   
11 The [-3, +1] window starts from three days prior to one day after the bid announcement.  Unless 
otherwise stated, the CAR referred to in this paper is computed over the [-3, -1] window. 
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correlated.  However, this is unlikely since the bidders and their suppliers experience 
opposite wealth effects under diversifying mergers. 
 
Next, I perform two-way sorts by merger types and payment methods.  The negative 
supplier CAR observed under non-diversifying merger bids is primarily driven by stock 
financing.  Interestingly, stock financing in diversifying mergers generate a significantly 
positive supplier CAR of 1.31%, suggesting that stock payment, per se, does not 
adversely affect the wealth of bidder suppliers.  Moreover, the results are unlikely to be 
entirely driven by gain in market power of bidders under non-diversifying mergers as the 
supplier CAR is much smaller economically and statistically insignificant when cash 
payment is used.   
 
When further sorted by target ownership concentration, the use of stock financing under 
non-diversifying merger in the presence of target’s institutional block-holders generates 
the strongest adverse wealth effect to bidder suppliers.  The mean supplier CAR is 
statistically significant and economically large at -4.72%.  Interestingly, stock payment in 
diversifying mergers when the target has block-holders generates a significantly positive 
and economically large CAR of 5.19% to bidder suppliers, but when the target has no 
block-holders, the supplier CAR is merely -0.32% and statistically insignificant.  Hence, 
the positive announcement returns to bidder suppliers under stock payment in 




In sum, stock payment to the target’s control blocks can have beneficial or detrimental 
announcement return effects on bidder suppliers, depending on the merger types.  Under 
diversifying mergers where bidder suppliers do not face direct replacement threats from 
target suppliers, stock payment can benefit bidder suppliers by creating new monitors on 
the bidder, thereby reducing the ability of bidder management to dissipate firm value 
post-merger.    
 
Next, sorting instead by bidder ownership concentration, bidder suppliers are hurt the 
most when the bidder does not have institutional block-holders to retain power in the 
combined firm and stock payment is used in non-diversifying mergers to further increase 
the likelihood of control loss.  The supplier CAR is strongly significantly negative and 
economically large at -3.75%.  On the other hand, for the small sample of suppliers 
protected by the presence of bidder’s block-holders, the supplier CAR is positive and 
comparable in magnitude at 3.24%, albeit statistically insignificant. 
 
Using OLS regressions and controlling for various bidder firm characteristics as well as 
deal characteristics that have been shown to influence the financing decision by existing 
studies, stock financing in non-diversifying mergers continues to have a negative impact 
on supplier CAR, albeit at a 10% significance level.  This negative relationship persists 
after including the bidder CAR in order to control for possible positive correlation in 
stock price reaction between trading partners.  It is further robust to controlling for 
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turnover12 of bidder’s top executives during the M&A process.  Using OLS regressions 
for sub-samples based on whether the bidder and/or the target has institutional block-
holders, the negative supplier CAR observed under stock financing in non-diversifying 
mergers is primarily driven by cases where (i) the target has institutional block-holders, 
(ii) the bidder has no institutional block-holders, and (iii) their interaction. 
 
One prediction of control dilution of bidder management is their reduced ability to retain 
suppliers in the merged firm.  Using logistic regressions, I examine the retention 
likelihood of a bidder supplier post-merger.  The results show that the presence of 
target’s block-holders, per se, does not reduce the retention probability of bidder 
suppliers under stock financing in non-diversifying mergers. Rather, the retention 
likelihood of bidder suppliers is significantly reduced by 12.7% when the bidder does not 
have block-holders to counter-balance the target’s control blocks.  This result is intuitive 
as bidder management faces the worst control dilution associated with stock financing in 
this case. 
 
Finally, I use two approaches to examine the post-merger profitability of dismissed and 
retained bidder suppliers.  The first approach uses the supplier as its own control by 
examining the profitability of the same supplier pre- and post-merger.  I do not find 
significant changes in profitability13 of dismissed or retained suppliers in the three years 
after the merger relative to the three years prior to bid announcement for all combinations 
                                                 
12 The ability of management to protect implicit contracts with suppliers is completely removed when they 
are replaced.  Top management turnover, therefore, represents the ultimate control dilution and can be 
driving the supplier CAR. 
13 The profitability measures are the median industry-adjusted returns on assets, the median industry-
adjusted sales growth, and the median industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio. 
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of merger types and payment methods.   However, when further sorted by the presence of 
target’s or bidder’s block-holders, I find some evidence of an increase in post-merger 
profitability of retained bidder suppliers under stock payment in non-diversifying mergers 
where target has control blocks.  This result suggests that stock payment to target’s 
block-holders in non-diversifying mergers hurts bidder suppliers through lower retention 
likelihood, but as long as these suppliers are not replaced, they enjoy a higher 
profitability post-merger.  In contrast, the dismissed bidder suppliers continue to exhibit 
no significant changes in profitability after sorting by the presence of target’s or bidder’s 
block-holders. 
 
The second approach uses a differences-in-differences methodology to compare the 
profitability of “treated” suppliers with the profitability of their counterfactuals.  For the 
dismissed bidder suppliers, their counterfactuals are a group of bidder suppliers affected 
by the same merger type and payment method, but are retained in the combined firm.  
The counterfactuals are then matched by industry 14  and asset size to the “treated” 
suppliers.  I find that the dismissed bidder supplier has 36.3% lower industry-adjusted 
sales growth relative to its counterfactual, post-merger.   
 
As for the retained bidder suppliers, their counterfactuals are a group of bidder suppliers 
affected by the same merger type but a different payment method, and matched by 
industry and asset size.  Examining only non-diversifying mergers, I find that the post-
merger industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio (iaMB) of bidder suppliers affected by 
stock financing is significantly lower than that of their counterfactuals affected by cash 
                                                 
14 Industry is defined by 2-digit SIC codes in matching. 
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financing.  However, their post-merger industry-adjusted sales growth (iaSALESGW) is 
higher than that of their counterfactuals by 45.5% at a p-value of 0.064, while their post-
merger industry-adjusted returns on asset are not significantly different from that of their 
counterfactuals.  Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow matching by an 
additional dimension which is the presence of target’s block-holders.  Hence, we cannot 
analyze how the lower iaMB or higher iaSALESGW of the “treated” supplier post-
merger is related to the presence or absence of target’s block-holders. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, I review related 
literature on M&A financing and derive the empirical predictions.  Next, I discuss the 
empirical methodology and construction of empirical proxies in Section 3.3.  In Section 
3.4, I describe the data sources and present the descriptive statistics.  The empirical 
results are presented in Section 3.5.  Lastly, I conclude in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Related Literature and Empirical Predictions 
3.2.1 Studies on Determinants of M&A Financing Choices 
A number of existing studies have examined the motives behind M&A financing 
decisions.  The information asymmetry theory predicts that bidders with over-valued 
equity are more likely to finance with stock than cash.   Hence, earlier theoretical studies 
have focused on the role of information asymmetry about the bidder’s or the target’s 
value in influencing the choice of financing.  Hansen (1987) includes a “state-contingent 
pricing” effect of stock financing as it forces target shareholders to share the risk that the 
 
63 
acquirers may have overpaid.  Fisher (1989) focuses on the choice of financing in 
preempting competition among bidders by signaling the bidder’s valuation of the target.   
 
Subsequently, building on Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988), studies start to 
relate the preferences of bidder management for corporate control to the method of 
payment.  Specifically, Stulz (1988) observes that managers can rely on debt financing to 
maintain ownership level and voting power.   Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Martin 
(1996), and Ghosh and Ruland (1998) empirically examine the determinants of M&A 
payment methods and find that lower bidder managerial ownership is negatively related 
to the likelihood of stock financing, as would be predicted by a corporate control motive. 
Ghosh and Ruland (1998) further relate the M&A financing decision to the preferences of 
target management for control rights in the combined firm.  The authors find that 
managerial ownership of the target positively influences the likelihood of stock payment, 
and the target’s managers are more likely to retain job in the merged firm under stock 
financing.   In a recent study, Faccio and Masulis (2005) use a large sample of European 
M&A transactions for the period 1997-2000, and find that the tradeoff between control 
concerns and debt financing constraints strongly influences the financing choice. 
 
This paper is motivated by the above studies that relate control loss of bidder to the use of 
stock financing in M&A transactions.  As the M&A financing decision is a tradeoff 
between control concerns and debt financing constraints, it is not necessarily the case that 
the bidder will use stock financing only when there is no control loss.  Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that bidder suppliers can influence the payment method.  Hence, stock payment 
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can be used as an instrument to proxy for reduced ability of the bidder to protect implicit 
contracts with its suppliers in the M&A process, thereby allowing us to examine how 
control dilution of the bidder can impact stakeholder value.   
 
3.2.2 Studies on Announcement Wealth Effects of M&A Financing 
Decisions 
 
For acquisitions of publicly traded targets, studies have consistently documented a 
significantly negative average announcement returns to acquirers when stock financing is 
selected over cash financing (ex. Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane and Yang, 1987; Amihud 
et al, 1990; Servaes, 1991; and Brown and Ryngaert, 1991).  Furthermore, Amihud, Lev 
and Travlos (1990) report significantly negative bidder returns for stock payment, but 
only for those bidders with low management ownership.  The dominant explanation for 
the negative market reaction is that stock financing creates an adverse selection effect as 
acquirers have incentives to use over-valued equity as payment.  In contrast, for 
acquisitions of private targets, Chang (1998) shows a positive average announcement 
returns to acquirers when stock financing is used, and attribute the market reaction to 
monitoring activities by target shareholders.   
 
I follow these studies in using event study methodology to examine the market reaction, 
not only to the bidder, but also to their suppliers around announcements of M&A 
financing decision.  To the best of my knowledge, no other studies have examined the 
financing choice of the bidder and the consequent announcement returns effect on its 




3.2.3 Empirical Predictions 
The main hypothesis in this study is that stock financing in non-diversifying mergers has 
a negative wealth effect on bidder suppliers, especially under circumstances where 
control loss of bidder management is most severe.  The first prediction would be that 
stock payment in non-diversifying mergers has a negative announcement returns effect 
on bidder suppliers.  Since control loss of bidder management is substantial when the 
target has control blocks, the second prediction would be that the presence of target’s 
block-holders has an incremental negative announcement returns effect on bidder 
suppliers.  Moreover, the target’s block-holders gain the most power if the bidder does 
not have control blocks.  The third prediction would be that the presence of target‘s 
block-holders combined with the absence of bidder’s block-holders has the most adverse 
announcement returns effect on bidder suppliers.    
 
Control loss of bidder management can affect its ability to retain its own suppliers.  The 
fourth prediction is that bidder suppliers are less likely to be retained in the merged firm 
under stock payment in non-diversifying mergers, especially in the presence of target’s 
block-holders and the absence of bidder’s block-holders.  For dismissed bidder suppliers 
they should experience lower profitability post-merger, ceteris paribas.  As for the 
retained bidder suppliers, there are no clear predictions on their wealth effects post-
merger.  This is because the monitoring activities of target’s block-holders can have 
beneficial or detrimental effects on the retained bidder suppliers.  Monitoring lowers the 
ability of bidder management to dissipate firm value and brings benefits to both its 
shareholders and stakeholders.  On the other hand, monitoring can create pressure for 
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bidder management to renege on implicit promises with suppliers in order to generate 
profits.  Hence, the post-merger wealth effect on retained bidder suppliers of stock 
payment in non-diversifying mergers remains an empirical question. 
 
3.3 Empirical Methodology and Proxies 
3.3.1 Empirical Design 
3.3.1.1  Event Study  
I rely on event study methodology to examine the abnormal market reaction to bidder 
suppliers around announcements of merger bids.  I compute the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) using the market model as described in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
with the CRSP equally-weighted index as the market proxy.  Event period CAR is 
cumulated for the [-3, +1] event window which starts from three days prior to one day 
after the announcement.  I also report a [-30, -4] pre-event window and a [+2, +30] post-
event window.  Patell Z-statistics (Patell, 1976) and non-parametric rank test Z-statistics 
corrected for serial correlation are used as the test statistics.   First, I sort the merger bids 
according to their merger types – diversifying or non-diversifying.  Then, I perform two-
way sorts by merger types and payment methods.   Lastly, I sort by whether the target or 
bidder has institutional block-holders and their combinations.  The announcement returns 







3.3.1.2 OLS Regressions  
Univariate analyses using event study methodology do not allow us to control for other 
factors that can affect the supplier CAR.  Therefore, OLS regression with the general 




BSSCAR[-3,+1]=α+β .SAMEIND+β .ALLSTOCK+β .SAMEIND×ALLSTOCK
                                  +β .X+λ .Z+ε............................................................(3.1)  
 
where BSSCAR[-3,+1] is the CAR of bidder supplier over the event window, SAMEIND 
is a dummy that indicates a non-diversifying merger bid, ALLSTOCK is a dummy that 
indicates the use of stock financing,  X is a vector of covariates for the bidder firm 
characteristics and deal characteristics.   Z represents a set of year dummies.  Standard 
errors are clustered by bidders.   To analyze the effect of target and/or bidder ownership 
concentration, I further estimate (3.1) for eight cases according to whether the target or 
bidder has block-holders, and their combinations. 
 
Next, to examine the profitability of bidder supplier pre- and post-merger using the 
supplier as its own control, I estimate the general specification in (3.2). 
 
' ' '
i,k,t k 1 i,t i,t k,t t i,k,tPROFIT =α+θ +β .POST +δ .X +γ .W +λ .Z +ε ............(3.2)  
 
where PROFITi,k,t is the profitability of supplier k to bidder i in year t;  θk controls for 
firm fixed effects of supplier k; POSTi,,t is a dummy that takes on unity in the year after 
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the effective date of completion of the merger by bidder i, and zero otherwise; Xi,t and 
Wk,t are a vector of covariates for the bidder and supplier firm characteristic, respectively.  
Z represents a set of year dummies.  Standard errors are clustered by bidders.   
 
The profitability of bidder suppliers in the three years before the bid announcement date 
and in the three years after the effective date of merger completion is examined.  For 
dismissed bidder suppliers, I do not control for bidder firm characteristics as these 
suppliers are no longer trading partners of the bidder post-merger.  I estimate (3.2) for 
four combinations of merger types with payment methods, followed by eight 
combinations of merger types, payment methods and whether the target has institutional 
block-holders.  As there are relatively few cases where the bidder has institutional block-
holders, I do not estimate (3.2) for combinations of merger types, payment methods and 
whether the bidder has block-holders.   
 
3.3.1.3  Logistic Regressions 
Logistic regressions with the general specification in (3.3) are used to examine the 






exp(α+β SAMEIND+β ALLSTOCK+β SAMEIND×ALLSTOCK+γ X)
Pr(r=1)= .............(3.3)
1+exp(α+β SAMEIND+β ALLSTOCK+β SAMEIND×ALLSTOCK+γ X)
 
where r is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder supplier is retained after the effective 




3.3.1.4             Differences-in-Differences Methodology 
One disadvantage of using the supplier as its own control is that it does not allow 
comparison between suppliers affected by stock financing with those not affected by 
stock financing under the same merger type.  For example, a supplier affected by stock 
financing in a non-diversifying merger could have experienced an increase in profitability 
had the method of payment been cash.   Although the outcome under cash financing is 
not observed, we can select a control group of suppliers similar in firm characteristics but 
affected by cash financing under the same merger type (“untreated” suppliers), and use a 
differences-in-differences approach to compare the post-merger profitability of “treated” 
suppliers relative to the “untreated” suppliers.   One disadvantage of this approach is the 
difficulty in selecting the counterfactuals.  When the available pool of “untreated” 
suppliers is small, not all of the “treated” suppliers can be matched with a good 
counterfactual.   To achieve good matches, we must sacrifice sample size. 
 
I examine only non-diversifying mergers under this approach.  For the dismissed bidder 
suppliers (“treated” suppliers), their counterfactuals are a group of retained bidder 
suppliers (“untreated” suppliers) matched first by 2-digit SIC codes, and then by smallest 
differences in asset size.  To achieve good matches while retaining a reasonable sample 
size, the relative asset size of the matched pair must not exceed a ratio of 2.5:1.  As for 
the retained bidder suppliers affected by stock financing (the “treated” suppliers), their 
counterfactuals are a group of retained bidder suppliers affected by cash financing (the 
“untreated” suppliers) matched using the same methodology.   Matching is done without 




i,k,t k 1 i,t 2 k,t 3 i,t k,t
' ' '
i,t k,t t i,k,t
PROFIT =α+θ +β .POST +β .TREAT +β .POST ×TREAT
                    +δ .X +γ .W +λ .Z +ε ...............................(3.4)  
 
where TREATk,,t is a dummy that takes on unity if supplier k is “treated”, and zero if 
“untreated”.  The coefficient of interest is β3 which estimates the differential effects on 
profitability for a supplier in the treatment group relative to its counterfactual, post-
merger.  
The profitability of bidder suppliers in the three years before the bid announcement date 
and in the three years after the effective date of merger completion is examined.  
Unfortunately, when I sort the bidder suppliers into four combinations by merger types 
and whether the target has institutional block-holders, and try to match each “treated” 
supplier to an “untreated” supplier from within the same combination, I obtain few 
matches.  As a result, I cannot use the differences-in-differences approach to analyze the 
effects of target’s block-holders on profitability of bidder suppliers. 
 
3.3.2 Empirical Proxies  
3.3.2.1  Firm Profitability  
I construct three proxies for firm profitability commonly used in the literature.  First, I 
use the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA) where the return on assets is 
computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest expenses 
plus income tax expenses, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Industry is 
defined by the 4-digit SIC codes.   Next, I use the median industry-adjusted sales growth 
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(iaSalesGW) computed as the current sales minus lagged sales, and divided by lagged 
sales.    
 
Since these two measures are computed using historical accounting numbers, they are 
both backward-looking measures of firm profitability.  To incorporate market 
expectations of future firm’s prospect, I also use the median industry-adjusted market-to-
book (iaMB) ratio of assets as a forward-looking measure of firm profitability.  The 
market-to-book ratio is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets 
where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus short-term and long-
term debt while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus short-
term and long-term debt.   Profitability proxies are winsorized at 1% and 99%.   
 
3.3.2.2  Ownership Concentration 
To proxy for control blocks in the target, I use a target block-holder (TGBH) dummy to 
indicate the presence of an institutional block-holder in the target in the year preceding 
the merger bid.  A block-holder is defined to be an investor who holds more than 5% 
ownership in the firm.  Similarly, I use an acquirer block-holder (AQBH) dummy to 
indicate the presence of an institutional block-holder in the bidder.   
 
3.3.2.3  Factors Influencing M&A Financing Choice 
Following existing studies, I control for bidder firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics that can influence the M&A financing decision.  As information 
asymmetry about the bidder’s asset value increases such as after a stock run-up, the 
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bidder is more likely to use overvalued equity as payment (e.g. Martin, 1996).  Moreover, 
bidder’s existing shareholders experience less dilution in voting power after a stock run-
up.   I construct the RUNUP measure as the bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock 
return over the 360 days prior to the month of the bid.   I also control for the market run-
up (MKTRUNUP) computed as the buy and hold cumulative excess market return over 
the same period where the excess market return is the market return minus the risk-free 
rate.    
Furthermore, as the target assets increase in value relative to those of the bidder, stock 
payment is more likely due to its “state-contingent pricing” effect (Hansen, 1987).  I use 
a relative size measure (RELSIZE) computed as the ratio of the deal transaction value 
divided by the sum of the deal transaction value plus the market capitalization of the 
bidder in the year-end preceding the bid.  Jung et al. (1996) find that bidders with higher 
market-to-book (MB) ratio are more likely to use stock financing, possibly because the 
target shareholders are more attracted to stock of high-growth firms.    I compute the MB 
ratio as the market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of 
equity plus book value of debt. 
 
As stock financing dilutes the controlling power of major shareholders, bidders with 
institutional block-holders should have less incentive to use stock payment (e.g. Amihud 
et al., 1990; Stulz, 1988; Jung et al., 1996). I control for the fractional ownership 
(MAXBHOWN) held by the largest institutional block-holder of the bidder.  I also 
include its quadratic term as studies have found a non-linear relation between stock 
payment and managerial or dominant shareholder’s ownership (e.g. Martin, 1996; Ghosh 
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and Ruland, 1998; and Faccio and Masuli, 2005).  Under stock financing, the target’s 
major shareholders will remain as significant block-holders in the merged firm if the 
relative size of the deal is large.  Following the approach of Faccio and Masulis (2005), I 
include the control loss (CTRLLOSS) of bidder computed as the product between the 
target’s largest institutional block and the relative deal size.  If the bidder owns a larger 
fraction of the target prior to the merger bid, its bargaining position relative to the target 
is improved.  Hence, I further control for the bidder’s prior ownership in the target 
(PRIOROWN).   
 
Cash financing generally depends on the bidder’s debt capacity and current leverage.  
Theories on capital structure predicts that asset tangibility, earnings growth and asset 
diversification increase debt capacity while asset volatility decreases debt capacity (e.g. 
Myers, 1977; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001).   I use the ratio of plant, properties 
and equipment to total assets (NPPE) as a measure of asset tangibility.  Larger firms are 
likely to be more diversified, have lower flotation costs and better access to debt markets.  
Hence, I control for the logarithm of total assets (SIZE).  Highly levered bidder will have 
less debt capacity.  Following Faccio and Masulis (2005), I compute a financial leverage 
variable (FINLEV) that captures the bidder’s leverage if the M&A deal is entirely 
financed by debt.  FINLEV is constructed as the sum of the bidder’s long term debt and 
current liabilities plus transaction value, and divided by the sum of assets plus transaction 
value.  To measure the bidder’s asset volatility, I compute the standard deviation of the 
bidder’s stock returns (STDRET) in the 360 days prior to the month of the bid 
announcement.  Lastly, I include an indicator (TENDER) to control for tender offers.  
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3.3.2.4  Other Firm Characteristics of Bidders  
Market power enhances the bidder’s bargaining power over suppliers, and lowers the 
costs of breaching implicit agreements with them.  I use the market share of sales 
(MKTSHR) to proxy for market power.  The bidder’s market share of sales is computed 
as the ratio of bidder’s sales to total sales in its industry.   As the R&D intensity of a firm 
can proxy for the degree of information asymmetry or the intangibility of assets, I control 
for the bidder’s R&D expenses normalized by lagged assets.  I also include the bidder’s 
capital expenditure divided by lagged asset to control for investment intensity 
(NCAPEXP).  Besides FINLEV, I also use the debt-to-asset (DEBT/ASSET) ratio of 
bidder where debt is the sum of short-term and long-term debt.   Lastly, I control for 
turnover of bidder’s top executives within one year starting from the bid announcement.   
 
3.3.2.5             Supplier Firm Characteristics  
I control for market share of sales of the supplier, which can influence its bargaining 
power with the bidder.  Other supplier’s firm controls are the logarithm of assets, R&D 
intensity, debt-to asset ratio and capital expenditure.  Lastly, I include the sales 
dependency of the supplier on the bidder computed as the supplier’s revenues generated 
from trades with the bidder divided by the supplier’s net sales.  
 
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Data  
The main data sources are the SDC Platinum, Compustat Industrial Annual, Compustat 
Industry Segments, Center for Security Prices (CRSP) database, Thomson Financial 13f 
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Institutional CDA and Execucomp database.  Bidders and targets are obtained from the 
SDC Platinum database.  Firm characteristics are obtained from the Compustat Industrial 
Annual database. Customer-supplier pairs are identified from the Compustat Industry 
Segments.  Stock prices, returns and market indices required for event study analyses are 
obtained from the CRSP database.  Institutional block-holder ownership data are obtained 
from Thomson Financial 13f Institutional CDA database. Top management turnover is 
identified from the Execucomp database and news articles.  The detailed construction of 
the final dataset is described below.   
 
3.4.1.1             Data on Mergers 
Friendly mergers between publicly-traded domestic U.S firms with disclosed merger 
value from 1993 to 2006 are obtained from the SDC Platinum database.  Mergers 
involving bidders or targets in the utilities sector or financial industry are excluded.  
Deals involving leveraged buyouts, going private transactions or privatization, liquidation, 
joint ventures, or buyout of bankrupt targets are eliminated.  Furthermore, only 
completed deals in which the bidder acquired more than 50% ownership, and the 
payment method is all cash or all stock are included.   
 
The bidder must also be listed in Execucomp and have at least one supplier listed in the 
Compustat Industry Segments.  Bid announcement dates, effective dates of completion of 
the merger, transaction value, tender offers, prior ownership in the target by the bidder, 
and payment methods are further obtained from the SDC Platinum database.  The  SDC 
database also reports the bidder and target industry according to the 4-digit SIC codes, 
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and I use this information to classify mergers as non-diversifying if the bidder and target 
have the same 4-digit SIC codes, or diversifying otherwise.  The bid announcement dates 
are checked using news articles from Lexis-Nexis or Factiva. 
 
3.4.1.2  Identifying Customer-Supplier Pairs 
I follow the approach in Fee, Hadlock and Thomas (2006) to identify customer-supplier 
pairs.  First, to identify whether the bidders have suppliers, I check the Compustat 
Industry Segments.   Firms are required to report the names of all customers accountable 
for over 10% of their annual sales.  The customer names and the sales generated from 
these customers are reported in the Compustat Industry Segments.  I manually match 
each customer name to its CUSIP in Compustat.  For customer names that are 
abbreviated, I used visual inspection and industry affiliation to determine whether the 
customer is listed in Compustat.   For the remaining unmatched customers, I check their 
corporate websites and the Directory of Corporate Affiliations to determine if the 
customer is a subsidiary of a listed firm.  If so, the customer is assigned to its parent’s 
CUSIP. Lastly, only bidders listed as customers in the Compustat Segments are retained.   
 
3.4.1.3  Institutional Block-holder  
Institutional block-holder ownership data are obtained from the Thomson Financial 13f 
Institutional CDA database.  Institutional investors typically report their holdings on a 
quarterly basis.   I use the latest reported holdings for the year.   For each firm, I identify 
whether there are any institutional investors who hold more than 5% ownership in the 
firm.  If so, the firm is classified as having institutional block-holders.  For this group of 
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firms, I further identify the fractional holdings by the largest block-holder.  For firms 
with no institutional block-holders, the fractional ownership by the largest block-holder is 
assigned to zero. 
 
3.4.1.4             Management Turnover Data 
For each bidder, I check the Execucomp database to identify any top management 
turnover in the year following the bid announcement.  First, I use the Execucomp 
database to identify the names of officers with the titles of chief executive officer (CEO), 
chief financial officer (CFO), chief operation officer (COO), chairman or vice-chairman, 
president or vice president (VP) for bidders.  I then identify the year where these top 
executives are no longer listed under the firm, and search Factiva or Google for news 
articles on the resignation or dismissal of these executives.  If their resignation or 
dismissal occurred in the year following the bid announcement, I classify the bidder as 
undergoing management turnover.    
 
3.4.1.5            Targets that are Suppliers to Bidders 
I check for cases where the target is also a supplier to the bidder prior to the merger bid 
as the replacement threats on the other suppliers of the bidder would be most severe.  I 
found seven such cases in the initial merger sample, but after restricting the bidder to be 
listed in Compustat and Execucomp databases, only three cases remained.   To avoid 





3.4.1.6            Common Supplier to the Bidder and Target 
A supplier to the bidder could also be supplying to the target.  In this case, common 
suppliers face little retention threats in non-diversifying mergers, and their presence 
should be controlled for.  I found three such cases in the initial merger sample but after 
restricting the bidder to be listed in Compustat and Execucomp databases, only one case 
remained, which is then removed from the sample.    
 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.2.1  Merger Sample 
The sample consists of 356 successful friendly merger bids announced between domestic 
U.S. publicly traded firms for the period 1993 to 2006, as shown in Table 3.1.  Of these, 
we have 256 diversifying merger bids and 100 non-diversifying ones.  Stock payment 
was observed in 162 deals (45.5%), while cash financing was used in 194 deals (54.5%).  
The presence of target’s block-holders is observed in 40.9% of these bids while the 
presence of bidder’s block-holders is less frequently observed and occurs in 32.1% of 
these deals.   Furthermore, in 49.6% of these bids, both bidder and target have no block-
holders, while in 22.1%, they both have block-holders.  Most importantly, in 18.3% of 
the bids, the bidder has no block-holders but the target does.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.1] 
 
Next, stock payment was used more frequently in diversifying than non-diversifying 
mergers, and there is a higher frequency of bidder or target having control blocks under 
diversifying mergers than non-diversifying ones.  When bids are sorted by payment 
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methods, it is less likely to observe the presence of block-holders in the bidder or the 
target under stock-financed deals than cash-financed ones.  The presence of target’s 
block-holders is observed in 50.1% of cash-financed deals, but only in 27.8% of stock-
financed ones.  We further observe a lower frequency under stock-financed than cash-
financed deals that the target has block-holders but the bidder does not.  These findings 
concur with studies that show a negative relation between the use of stock payment and 
major shareholders’ ownership.  
 
On average, the deal transaction value is $1442 million with a relative deal size of 9.6%.  
The median deal involves target or bidder with no block-holders and no control loss.  The 
mean and maximum control loss is 0.41 and 6.76, respectively.  In addition, the largest 
block-holder of the bidder owns 21% in the maximum case.  The median bidder has no 
ownership in the target prior to bid while the mean bidder has 1.13%.  The bidder also 
experiences an average stock price run-up of 39% over the one year up to the month prior 
to bid, while the market run-up is only 9.8% over the same period.   If the deal is entirely 
financed by debt, the mean bidder would have a financial leverage of 28.9%. 
 
3.4.2.2  Characteristics of Bidders and their Suppliers 
The median bidder has $6549 million in assets and is 84 times larger than the median 
bidder supplier.  In terms of asset tangibility, the median bidder has 24% of total assets in 
plant, properties and equipment.  One large difference between the median bidder and its 
median supplier comes from their market share of sales, with the former commanding 
14.5% of industry sales and the latter commanding merely 0.22%.  Bidders are more 
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profitable than their suppliers.  The median bidder has an industry-adjusted ROA of 
12.25% while that for the median supplier is only 1.06%.  The same pattern is observed 
when profitability is measured by the industry-adjusted MB ratio.   
 
Another large difference between the median bidder and its median supplier comes from 
their dependency on trades with each other, with the former spending 0.10% of net sales 
on input purchases from a supplier and the latter generating 14.7% of net sales from 
trades with a bidder.  In other words, the supplier would be more vulnerable to 
managerial moral hazard of the bidder than the bidder would be to managerial moral 
hazard of the supplier.  
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, I discuss the event study results followed by the multivariate analyses.   
 
3.5.1 Event Study Results 
Sorting the bids by merger types, Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that bidder suppliers suffer 
adverse market reaction only in non-diversifying mergers. The mean supplier CAR is 
significantly negative and economically large at -1.82% over the [-3, +1] window.  As for 
the bidders, they suffer strong adverse market reaction under both merger types.  The 
bidder CAR is -2.00% and -1.36% for non-diversifying and diversifying mergers, 
respectively.  The negative supplier CAR in non-diversifying mergers could be driven by 
the negative bidder CAR if the stock prices of close trading partners are positively 
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correlated.  However, it is unlikely since the bidders and their suppliers experience 
opposite wealth effects under diversifying mergers.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.2] 
 
Next, I sort the bids two-way by merger types and payment methods.  From Panel B of 
Table 3.3, the negative supplier CAR observed previously under non-diversifying 
mergers is primarily driven by stock payment.  The mean supplier CAR is an 
economically large -2.69% over the [-3, +1] window under stock financing but much 
smaller at -0.57% over the same window under cash financing.  Moreover, it is only 
statistically significant under stock financing.  These results are not consistent with the 
alternative story that the negative supplier CAR observed in non-diversifying mergers is 
driven by market power gain of bidders.  In non-diversifying mergers, the market power 
of acquirers increase and the negative supplier CAR can reflect this gain in relative 
bargaining power of the bidders over their stakeholders.   However, for this alternative 
explanation to hold, we must also observe negative supplier CAR of comparable 
magnitude in cash payment, yet we do not.    
[INSERT TABLE 3.3] 
 
Interestingly, comparing the supplier CAR between merger types, we observe that it is 
not stock payment, per se, that has an adverse announcement returns effect on bidder 
suppliers.  The mean supplier CAR is significant and positive at 1.31% under stock 
payment in diversifying mergers.  Rather, it is the combination of stock payment with 
non-diversifying merger bids that negatively affects supplier CAR.  As for the bidders, 
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Panel A of Table 3.3 shows a negative bidder CAR for all combinations of merger types 
with payment methods, except when cash financing is used in non-diversifying mergers.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.4] 
 
From Table 3.4, the average announcement returns to the bidder suppliers are statistically 
significantly negative under non-diversifying for both cases where the target has and do 
not have institutional block-holders.  However, looking more carefully at the magnitude, 
the presence of target’s block-holder generates a negative supplier CAR of -4.72%, which 
is more than twice as large in magnitude as the negative supplier CAR of -2.04% 
observed in the absence of target’s block-holders.  In other words, the presence of the 
target’s control blocks has a large incremental adverse announcement returns effect on 
the bidder suppliers under stock payment in non-diversifying mergers.   On the other 
hand, control blocks of the target have no significant effect on supplier CAR when cash 
financing is used in non-diversifying mergers.   These results strongly support the main 
hypothesis explored in this paper. 
 
Interestingly, under stock financing in diversifying mergers, we observe a significantly 
positive and economically large supplier CAR of 5.19% when the target has block-
holders, but insignificant supplier CAR when the target has no block-holders.  Hence, the 
positive supplier CAR under stock financing in diversifying mergers, as noted previously 
in Table 3.3, is driven by control blocks of the target.  This finding supports the 
explanation that stock payment provides monitoring incentives to the target’s dominant 
shareholders.  Both shareholders and stakeholders of the bidder can benefit from these 
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monitoring activities since the ability of bidder management to dissipate firm value is 
reduced.  In sum, stock financing in the presence of target’s block-holders can have 
beneficial or detrimental wealth effect on the bidder suppliers, depending on the merger 
type.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.5] 
 
Table 3.5 shows that the absence of institutional block-ownership in the bidder strongly 
hurts the returns of bidder suppliers around bid announcements when stock financing is 
used in non-diversifying mergers.  The supplier CAR is economically large at -3.75%, 
and strongly statistically significant with a p-value less than 1%.  In contrast, supplier 
CAR is positive and of comparable magnitude at 3.24%, albeit insignificant, when the 
bidder has institutional block-holders.   These results provide further evidence that bidder 
suppliers are hurt the most under circumstances where they would require protection 
from bidder management but the ability of bidder management to provide protection is 
most diminished by stock payment.  Interestingly, supplier CAR is significantly positive 
at 1.62% under stock payment in diversifying mergers and the bidder does not have 
institutional block-holders.  One possible explanation is that monitoring by target’s 
block-holders, if any, is made more effective when the bidder has no counter-balancing 
control blocks.   
 
3.5.2 Multivariate Analyses 
Using OLS regressions, column (2) of Table 3.6 confirms that the use of stock financing 
in non-diversifying mergers have a negative impact on the announcement returns to 
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bidder suppliers, as evident from the significantly negative loading on the interaction 
term of SAMEIND and ALLSTOCK.   Controlling for various bidder firm characteristics 
and deal characteristics that can influence the M&A financing choice, the loading on the 
interaction term remains negative and largely unchanged, although its significance falls to 
the 10% level.  Additionally, the bidder’s stock return volatility has a significantly 
negative impact on supplier CAR while the bidder’s market share of sales has a weakly 
positive effect.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.6] 
 
Next, from Column (2) of Table 3.7, the loading on the interaction term of SAMEIND 
and ALLSTOCK is -0.10 when the target has block-holder, and is statistically 
significantly negative and economically large.  In this case, while stock payment in 
diversifying mergers increases supplier CAR by 6% over the [-3, +1] window, as 
indicated by the coefficient on ALLSTOCK, stock payment in non-diversifying mergers 
generates a supplier CAR of about -4%.  From Column (3), the loading on the interaction 
term of SAMEIND and ALLSTOCK is also significantly negative at -0.05 when the 
bidder has no block-holders.  In other words, stock payment under non-diversifying 
mergers in the absence of bidder’s institutional block-holders decreases supplier CAR by 
5%.  These findings are strongly consistent with the event study results.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.7] 
 
Furthermore, Column (7) shows that the negative supplier CAR under stock payment in 
non-diversifying mergers is primarily driven by mergers where the bidder has no block-
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holders but the target does.   Under such circumstances, stock payment increases supplier 
CAR by 7% in diversifying mergers but decreases supplier CAR by 6% (= 7.1 -12.8) in 
non-diversifying mergers. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.8] 
The analyses, thus far, focus on the announcement returns impact on bidder suppliers.  
One prediction of control dilution of bidder management is its reduced ability to retain its 
own suppliers, post-merger.  Using logistic regressions in Table 3.8, I find that the 
presence of target’s block-holders, per se, does not reduce the retention probability of 
bidder suppliers when stock financing is used in non-diversifying mergers.  Rather, the 
retention likelihood of bidder suppliers is significantly reduced by 12.7% only when the 
bidder does not have block-holders to counter-balance the target’s control.    Additionally, 
bidder suppliers are more likely to be retained if they are larger in size or derive a larger 
fraction of net sales from trades with the bidder.  They are less likely to be retained in 
tender offers or if they have higher debt-to-asset ratios.   Bidders who experienced a 
larger run-up in stock prices prior to the bid are also more likely to retain their suppliers.    
[INSERT TABLE 3.9] 
 
Next, I proceed to analyze the post-merger profitability of dismissed bidder suppliers 
separately for each combination of merger types and payment methods.  From Table 3.9, 
using the bidder supplier as its own control, I do not find significant differences in 
profitability of the dismissed suppliers pre- and post-merger for each combination of 
merger types and payment methods.   Furthermore, Table 3.10 also shows insignificant 
differences in profitability of the dismissed suppliers pre- and post-merger for each 
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combination of merger types, payment methods, and the presence of target’s or bidder’s 
block-holders.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.10] 
 
From Table 3.11, using a differences-in-differences approach focusing only on non-
diversifying mergers, I find that dismissed bidder suppliers have 36.3% lower industry-
adjusted sales growth (iaSalesGW), post-merger, relative to a control group of retained 
bidder suppliers.  The p-value is 0.012.  However, this pattern is not observed when 
profitability is measured by the industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA) or market-to-
book ratio (iaMB).   
[INSERT TABLE 3.11] 
 
Last but not least, I proceed to analyze the post-merger profitability of retained bidder 
suppliers separately for each combination of merger types and payment methods.   From 
Table 3.12, again using the bidder supplier as its own control, I do not find significant 
differences in profitability of the retained bidder suppliers pre- and post-merger.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.12] 
 
When sorted further by the presence of target’s or bidder’s block-holders, I find the most 
consistent evidence of an increase in post-merger profitability of the retained bidder 
suppliers for the combination of stock payment under non-diversifying mergers in the 
presence of target’s block-holders.  From Table 3.13, for this combination, the coefficient 
on iaROA is 0.064 at a p-value of 0.15.  The coefficients on iaSalesGW and iaMB are 
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0.555 and 1.023, respectively, and both are statistically significant.  This finding suggests 
the following.  Stock financing in non-diversifying mergers with target’s control blocks 
hurts bidder suppliers only through lower retention likelihood but as long as these 
suppliers are not replaced, they enjoy a higher profitability post-merger.   
[INSERT TABLE 3.13] 
 
Finally, from Table 3.14, the results from a differences-in-differences approach indicate 
that the post-merger iaMB of bidder suppliers affected by stock financing is significantly 
lower than that of their counterfactuals affected by cash financing.  However, their post-
merger iaSALESGW is higher than that of their counterfactuals by 45.5% at a p-value of 
0.064, while their post-merger iaROA is not significantly different from that of their 
counterfactuals.   In other words, I do not find consistent evidence that retained bidder 
suppliers affected by stock payment experience significant profitability differences, post-
merger, relative to retained bidder suppliers affected by cash payment. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.14] 
 
3.6   Conclusion 
In this chapter, I posit that the balance of controlling power between the bidder and target 
in friendly non-diversifying mergers have a direct wealth impact on bidder suppliers 
because of the ability of management to protect and retain its own suppliers in the 
merged entity.  In particular, I hypothesize that stock payment in non-diversifying 
mergers has a negative wealth effect on bidder suppliers, especially under circumstances 




First, focusing on market reaction to bidder suppliers around announcements of merger 
bids, stock financing in non-diversifying mergers where the target has block-holders and 
the bidder does not generates the most negative announcement returns to bidder suppliers. 
Using OLS regressions and controlling for bidder firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics that can influence the M&A financing decision, I confirm that the use of 
stock financing in non-diversifying mergers hurts the announcement returns to bidder 
suppliers.  Moreover, the negative announcement returns effect on bidder suppliers is 
driven by merger bids where (i) the target has institutional block-holders, or (ii) the 
acquirer has no institutional block-holders, and (iii) their joint effect.  However, I find 
that the presence of target’s block-holders, per se, does not reduce the retention 
probability of bidder suppliers under stock financing in non-diversifying mergers.  Rather, 
the retention likelihood of bidder suppliers is significantly reduced by 12.7% only when 
the bidder does not have block-holders to counter-balance the target’s control blocks.   
 
Using bidder suppliers as their own counterfactuals, I find no evidence of significant 
changes in profitability of dismissed bidder suppliers for all combinations of merger 
types, payment methods and target ownership concentration.   Using a differences-in-
differences approach, I find that dismissed bidder suppliers have 36.3% lower industry-
adjusted sales growth, post-merger, relative to a control group of retained bidder 




Next, again by using bidder suppliers as their own counterfactuals, I find some evidence 
of an increase in post-merger profitability of retained bidder suppliers under non-
diversifying mergers where stock payment was used and the target has block-holders.  
This finding suggests that control dilution of bidder management through stock financing 
in non-diversifying mergers hurts bidder suppliers through a lower retention probability, 
but as long as these suppliers are not replaced, they enjoy a higher profitability post-
merger.  Unfortunately, the limited sample size prohibits matching of counterfactuals by 
merger types, industry, firm size and target ownership concentration. 
 
Overall, I find strong evidence in support of my hypothesis.   Interestingly, I also find 
that stock payment to target’s control blocks generates positive announcement returns to 
bidder suppliers in diversifying mergers, possibly due to monitoring activities by target’s 






The sample consists of 356 friendly merger bids announced from 1993 to 2006 between 
publicly traded firms for which the bidder is listed in Execucomp, and has at least one 
supplier listed in the Compustat Industry Segments.  Only completed deals in which the 
bidder acquired more than 50% share ownership, and the offer consideration is all cash or 
all stock are included.  Both bidders and targets must be domestic U.S. firms.  Mergers 
involving financial firms or utilities are excluded.  Panel A and B describe the merger 
bids, and deal characteristics, respectively, while Panel C and D report firm 
characteristics of the bidders and their suppliers, respectively.  A merger is non-
diversifying if the bidder and the target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classifications (SIC) codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The bidder (target) has block-
holders if it has at least one institutional investor with more than 5% ownership.  The 
bidder experiences management turnover if there are resignation or dismissal of top 
executives within one year starting from the bid announcement date. Relative size of the 
deal (RELSIZE) is computed as the ratio of the deal transaction value to the sum of the 
market value of the bidder in the year preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.  
Control loss (CTRLLOSS) is computed as the maximum fractional ownership in the 
target held by an institutional investor with more than 5% ownership multiplied by 
RELSIZE.  MAXBHOWN_BIDDER measures the maximum fractional ownership in the 
bidder held by an institutional block-holder with at least 5% ownership.  RUNUP is the 
one-year buy and hold daily stock returns of the bidder computed up to one month before 
the bid.  Market runup (MKT_RUNUP) is the one-year buy and hold daily returns of the 
CRSP value-weighted market index minus the risk-free rate computed up to one month 
before the bid.  FINLEV measures the financial leverage of the bidder if the deal is 
entirely financed by cash through debt issuance, and is computed as the ratio of the sum 
of long-term debt and current liabilities of the bidder in the year preceding the bid plus 
the deal transaction value to the sum of the book value of assets of the bidder in the year 
preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.  PRIOROWN is the fractional 
ownership in the target held by the bidder prior to the bid.  STDRET is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns computed for one year up to the month prior to the bid.  
MKTSHR is the market share of sales computed as the ratio of the firm sales to total 
sales in its industry.  Asset refers to the book value of total assets.   Market-to-book ratio 
(MB) is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market 
value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities 
while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt 
and current liabilities.  NPPE is the value of plants, properties and equipment, divided by 
lagged assets.  R&D expenses are divided by lagged assets.  Debt-to-Asset ratio is the 
sum of long-term and short-term debt divided by lagged asset of the firm.  NCAPEXP is 
the capital expenditure divided by lagged assets.  iaROA and iaMB are the median 
industry-adjusted return on assets and market-to-book ratio, respectively, where industry 
is defined by the 4-digit SIC codes.  ROA is computed as the sum of net income before 




Panel A: Merger bids  
 








No. of merger bids 356 256 100 162 194 
% all stock payment 45.5 40.2 59.0 100 0 
% all cash payment 54.5 59.8 41.0 0 100 
% diversifying 71.9 100 0 63.6 78.9 
% non-diversifying 28.1 0 100 36.4 21.1 
% bids where bidder has block-holders 32.1 33.6 27.6 23.8 38.4 
% bids where target has block-holders 40.9 42.5 34.2 27.8 50.05 
% bids where both bidder and target have no 
block-holders 49.6 47.7 55.3 61.9 40.0 
% bids where bidder has block-holders and target 
has no block-holders 10.0 9.8 10.5 10.3 9.8 
% bids where bidder has no block-holders and 
target has block-holders 18.3 18.7 17.1 14.3 21.3 
% bids where both bidder and target have block-
holders 22.1 23.8 17.1 13.5 28.9 
% bids followed by bidder management turnover 7.6 7.9 6.7 4.6 9.9 
 
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Transaction value at effective date (million) 1442 361 2.94 59515 5229 
Relative deal size (RELSIZE)  9.55% 4.44% 0.027 69.87 0.132 
Control loss (CTRLLOSS) 0.407 0.00 0.00 6.76 1.217 
Ownership of largest block-holder of bidder 
(MAXBHOWN_BIDDER) 2.99% 0.00 0.00 21.09% 4.736 
Prior ownership in target by bidder 
(BIDDER_PRIOROWN) 1.13% 0.00 0.00 77.80% 6.492 
Bidder RUNUP 39.34% 23.95% -80.26% 342.66% 0.613 
Market RUNUP (MKT_RUNUP) 9.78% 1.06% -37.83% 46.56% 0.160 
Bidder Financial Leverage (FINLEV) 28.85% 26.56% 0.14% 84.12% 0.841 
 
 
Panel C: Bidder characteristics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Assets (million) 11358 6549 78.8 29601 10784 
R&D expenses   8.47% 7.03% 0 53.5 0.0849 
Debt-to-assets ratio  (DEBT/ASSET) 20.94% 19.26% 0 81.41% 0.178 
NCAPEX  8.09% 6.55% 0.74% 52.1% 0.0667 
NPPE 29.25% 23.95% 1.80% 70.14% 0.200 
Market share of sales (MKTSHR) 21.42% 14.55% 0.02% 84.19% 0.210 
iaROA  3.52% 1.83% -75.10% 37.00% 0.127 
MB ratio 4.64 3.24 0.54 22.20 3.684 
iaMB ratio 2.26 1.08 -2.31 16.78 3.347 
Standard deviation of stock returns (STDRET) 0.026 0.024 0.0077 0.084 0.0123 
Revenue spent on inputs with supplier/bidder’s 




Panel D: Characteristics of suppliers to the bidders 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Assets (million) 758 78 0.37 29601 2988 
R&D expenses   17.1% 9.7% 0 93.72% 0.221 
Debt-to-assets ratio  (DEBT/ASSET) 25.59% 12.72% 0 92.50% 0.397 
NCAPEX  9.79% 5.31% 0.12% 87.24% 0.141 
NPPE 27.19% 18.46% 0.73% 78.99% 0.279 
Market share of sales (MKTSHR) 2.90% 0.22% 0.00 84.19% 0.093 
iaROA  -3.00% 0.00% -75.16% 37.00% 0.216 
MB ratio 3.77 2.36 0.42 25.00 4.222 
iaMB ratio 1.25 0.024 -2.31 22.19 4.016 






Merger types and cumulative abnormal return of bidders and their suppliers 
This sample consists of 356 friendly merger bids announced from 1993 to 2006 between 
publicly traded firms for which the bidder is listed in Execucomp, and has at least one 
supplier listed in the Compustat Industry Segments.  Only completed deals in which the 
bidder acquired more than 50% share ownership, and the offer consideration is all cash or 
all stock are included.  Both bidders and targets must be domestic U.S. firms.  The 
bidders in the sample have a total of 1448 suppliers. The merger type is non-diversifying 
if the bidder and target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The event date is the announcement date of the bid.  
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is computed from the market model following 
standard event study methodology (see Brown and Warner, 1985) using the CRSP 
equally-weighted market index.  CAR are estimated for the [-3, +1] event window, 
starting from three days prior to one day after announcement.  A pre-event [-30, -4] and 
post-event [+2, +30] window are also presented.  Panel A and B present the mean CAR 
for bidders and their suppliers respectively.  *,**,*** represents statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1 % level respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Bidder CAR 
 Bidder CAR 










positive Patell Z 
Rank Test 
Z 
[-30,-4] 100 3.91 61.0 2.333***(0.0098) 
0.564 





           
[-3,+1] 100 -2.00 43.0 -2.542***(0.0055) 
-2.577***





           
[+2,+30] 100 1.01 46.0 -0.155 (0.4386) 
-1.249 







Panel B: CAR of suppliers to bidders 
 CAR of suppliers to the bidders 










positive Patell Z 
Rank Test 
Z 
[-30,-4] 327 -0.30 42.2 0.549 (0.2917) 
0.581 





           
[-3,+1] 327 -1.82 41.0 -2.153** (0.0157) 
-1.707**





           
[+2,+30] 327 -0.64 41.6 -0.605 (0.2727) 
-0.956 










Payment modes, merger types and cumulative abnormal return of bidders and their 
suppliers 
This sample consists of 356 friendly merger bids announced from 1993 to 2006 between 
publicly traded firms for which the bidder has at least one supplier listed in the 
Compustat Industry Segments.  Only completed deals in which the bidder acquired more 
than 50% share ownership, and the offer consideration is all cash or all stock are included.  
Both bidders and targets must be domestic U.S. firms.  The merger type is non-
diversifying if the bidder and target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, and diversifying otherwise.  Payment mode is (i) ALL CASH 
if the bidder offers cash only and (ii) ALL STOCK if the bidder offers equity only.  The 
event date is the announcement date of the bid.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
computed from the market model following standard event study methodology (see 
Brown and Warner, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market index  CAR are 
estimated for the [-3, +1] event window, starting from three days prior to one day after 
announcement.  A pre-event [-30, -4] and post-event [+2, +30] window are also presented.  
Panel A and B present the mean CAR for bidders and their supplier, respectively.  




Panel A: Bidder CAR  
 Bidder CAR  
 Non-diversifying Diversifying 










positive Patell Z 
Rank Test 
Z 
[-30,-4] 59 5.20 64.4 2.394***(0.0083) 
0.678 





           
[-3,+1] 59 -3.45 44.1 -3.380***(0.0004) 
-2.912***





           
[+2,+30] 59 0.79 45.8 0.102 (0.4595) 
-1.313* 





 ALL CASH 
[-30,-4] 41 2.06 56.1 0.772 (0.2201) 
0.057 





           
[-3,+1] 41 0.08 41.5 0.085 (0.4662) 
-0.490 





           
[+2,+30] 41 1.33 46.3 -0.363 (0.3582) 
-0.358 










Panel B: CAR of suppliers to bidders 
 Supplier CAR  











positive Patell Z 
Rank Test 
Z 
[-30,-4] 192 -1.89 40.6 -0.187 (0.4259) 
-0.725 





           
[-3,+1] 192 -2.69 39.1 -2.800***(0.0026) 
-2.069**





           
[+2,+30] 192 0.25 46.4 1.001 (0.1585) 
-0.208 






[-30,-4] 135 1.96 44.4 1.077 (0.1408) 
1.729** 





           
[-3,+1] 135 -0.57 43.7 -0.011 (0.4955) 
-0.277 





           
[+2,+30] 135 -1.89 34.8 -2.134** (0.0164) 
-1.242 






   
   






Target ownership concentration, payment modes, merger types and cumulative 
abnormal return of bidder suppliers 
This sample consists of 356 friendly merger bids announced from 1993 to 2006 between 
publicly traded firms for which the bidder is listed in Execucomp, and has at least one 
supplier listed in the Compustat Industry Segments.  Only completed deals in which the 
bidder acquired more than 50% share ownership, and the offer consideration is all cash or 
all stock are included.  Both bidders and targets must be domestic U.S. firms. The merger 
type is non-diversifying if the bidder and target belong to the same 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and diversifying otherwise.  Payment mode is (i) 
ALL CASH if the bidder offers cash only and (ii) ALL STOCK if the bidder offers equity 
only.  TGBH is a target block-holder dummy that takes on unity if the target has at least 
one institutional investor with more than 5% ownership in the year preceding the bid, and 
zero otherwise.  The event date is the announcement date of the bid.  Cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is computed from the market model following standard event 
study methodology (see Brown and Warner, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted 
market index.  CAR are estimated for the [-3, +1] event window, starting from three days 
prior to one day after announcement.  *,**,*** represents statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1 % level respectively.   
 
 
Panel A: Non-diversifying mergers 
 CAR of suppliers to the bidders 
 ALL STOCK 















Patell Z Rank Test Z 
[-3,+1] 47 -4.72 48.9 -1.709**(0.0437) 
-1.273 




















Patell Z Rank Test Z 
[-3,+1] 49 0.40 53.1 0.501 (0.3080) 
0.255 









Panel B: Diversifying mergers 
 CAR of suppliers to the bidders 
 ALL STOCK 















Patell Z Rank Test Z
[-3,+1] 92 5.19 57.6 3.926*** (<0.001) 
1.671** 




















Patell Z Rank Test Z
[-3,+1] 446 0.39 48.9 1.213 (0.1127) 
0.092 







  Table 3.5 
Bidder ownership concentration, payment modes, merger types and cumulative 
abnormal return of bidder suppliers 
This sample consists of 356 friendly merger bids announced from 1993 to 2006 between 
publicly traded firms for which the bidder is listed in Execucomp, and has at least one 
supplier listed in the Compustat Industry Segments.  Only completed deals in which the 
bidder acquired more than 50% share ownership, and the offer consideration is all cash or 
all stock are included.  Both bidders and targets must be domestic U.S. firms. The merger 
type is non-diversifying if the bidder and target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, and diversifying otherwise.  Payment mode is (i) ALL CASH 
if cash-financed, and (ii) ALL STOCK if stock-financed.  AQBH is a bidder block-holder 
dummy that takes on unity if the bidder has at least one institutional investor with more 
than 5% ownership in the year preceding the bid, and zero otherwise.  The event date is 
the announcement date of the bid.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is computed from 
the market model following standard event study methodology (see Brown and Warner, 
1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market index.  CAR are estimated for the 
[-3, +1] event window, starting from three days prior to one day after announcement.  
*,**,*** represents statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % level respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Non-diversifying mergers 
 CAR of suppliers to the bidders 
 ALL STOCK 















Patell Z Rank Test Z 
[-3,+1] 29 3.24 58.6 1.028 (0.1521) 
0.503 




















Patell Z Rank Test Z 
[-3,+1] 34 -2.21 29.4 -1.556* (0.0599) 
-1.083 









Panel B: Diversifying mergers 
 CAR of suppliers to the bidders 
 ALL STOCK 















Patell Z Rank Test Z
[-3,+1] 45 -0.48 42.2 -0.357 (0.3606) 
-0.157 




















Patell Z Rank Test Z
[-3,+1] 315 0.91 51.4 1.213 (0.1126) 
0.640 








OLS regressions of CAR of suppliers to bidders 
on merger types and payment methods 
This table presents OLS regressions of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
suppliers to the bidders on merger types and payment methods.  Dependent variable is the 
CAR of suppliers to the bidders.  CAR is computed from the market model following 
standard event study methodology (see Brown and Warner, 1985) using the CRSP 
equally-weighted market index for the [-3, +1] event window, starting from three days 
prior to one day after announcement.  The merger type is non-diversifying if the bidder 
and target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and 
diversifying otherwise.  SAMEIND is a dummy that takes on unity if the merger type is 
non-diversifying, and zero if otherwise.  ALLSTOCK is a dummy that takes on unity if 
the bidder offers stock only as payment, and zero otherwise.  Relative size of the deal 
(RELSIZE) is computed as the ratio of the deal transaction value to the sum of the market 
value of the bidder in the year preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.  Control 
loss (CTRLLOSS) is computed as the maximum fractional ownership in the target held 
by an institutional investor with at least 5% ownership multiplied by RELSIZE.  
MAXBHOWN_BIDDER measures the maximum fractional ownership in the bidder held 
by an institutional block-holder with at least 5% ownership.  BIDDER_RUNUP is the 
one-year buy and hold daily stock returns of the bidder computed up to one month before 
the bid.  Market runup (MKT_RUNUP) is the one-year buy and hold daily returns of the 
CRSP value-weighted market index minus the risk-free rate computed up to one month 
before the bid.  BIDDER_FINLEV measures the financial leverage of the bidder if the 
deal is entirely financed by cash through debt issuance, and is computed as the ratio of 
the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities of the bidder in the year preceding the 
bid plus the deal transaction value to the sum of the book value of assets of the bidder in 
the year preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.   TENDER is a dummy that 
take on unity if a tender offer was made, and zero otherwise.  BIDDER_PRIOROWN is 
the fractional ownership in the target held by the bidder prior to the bid.  
BIDDER_STDRET is the standard deviation of daily stock returns computed for one year 
up to the month prior to the bid.  BIDDER_MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the 
bidder, and is computed as the ratio of the bidder’s sales to total sales in its industry.  
BIDDER_SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets of the bidder.  Market-to-book 
ratio (BIDDER_MB) of the bidder is computed as the market value divided by book 
value of assets where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-
term debt and current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book 
value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  BIDDER_PPE is the value of 
plants, properties and equipment of the bidder, divided by lagged assets.  BIDDER_CAR 
is the CAR of the bidder over the [-3, +1] window computed in the same way as the 
supplier CAR.  BIDDER_TO is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder experiences 
resignation or dismissal of top management within one year starting from the bid 
announcement date, and zero otherwise.  Top management includes officers with the 
titles of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating 
Officer (COO), President, Vice-President, Chairman or Vice-Chairman.  Year dummies 
are included.  Mergers involving utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Standard 
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errors are clustered by bidder.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
Dependent variable is CAR of suppliers to the bidders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SAMEIND -0.025 -0.004 -0.017 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 [0.022]** [0.561] [0.074]* [0.845] [0.786] [0.693] 
ALLSTOCK -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 [0.815] [0.591] [0.841] [0.826] [0.863] [0.843] 
SAMEIND*ALLSTOCK  -0.037  -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 
  [0.046]**  [0.071]* [0.087]* [0.089]* 
RELSIZE   -0.039 -0.032 -0.015 -0.013 
   [0.428] [0.492] [0.776] [0.793] 
CTRLLOSS   0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 
   [0.110] [0.140] [0.163] [0.168] 
MAXBHOWN_BIDDER   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   [0.846] [0.834] [0.842] [0.785] 
MAXBHOWN_BIDDER2   -4.55E-06 -1.44E-05 1.22E-06 -1.31E-05
   [0.987] [0.960] [0.997] [0.963] 
BIDDER_RUNUP   -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
   [0.600] [0.720] [0.641] [0.619] 
MKT_RUNUP   0.028 0.019 0.025 0.025 
   [0.605] [0.711] [0.618] [0.623] 
BIDDER_FINLEV   0.026 0.033 0.034 0.032 
   [0.624] [0.537] [0.524] [0.532] 
TENDER   -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
   [0.790] [0.564] [0.563] [0.605] 
BIDDER_PRIOROWN   0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
   [0.858] [0.833] [0.827] [0.839] 
BIDDER_STDRET   -1.530 -1.440 -1.380 -1.391 
   [0.011]** [0.019]** [0.022]** [0.022]**
BIDDER_MKTSHR   0.0224 0.0270 0.0254 0.0256 
   [0.121] [0.071]* [0.094]* [0.093]* 
BIDDER_SIZE   -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
   [0.533] [0.751] [0.876] [0.841] 
BIDDER_MB   -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   [0.228] [0.274] [0.251] [0.234] 
BIDDER_PPE   0.006 0.002 0.004 0.003 
   [0.768] [0.922] [0.864] [0.893] 
BIDDER_CAR     0.082 0.082 
     [0.300] [0.305] 
BIDDER_TO      -0.008 
      [0.698] 
INTERCEPT 0.013 0.010 0.048 0.032 0.021 0.025 
 [0.414] [0.461] [0.448] [0.636] [0.736] [0.693] 
Observations 1176 1176 1166 1166 1166 1166 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.027 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.047 





OLS regressions of CAR of bidders’ suppliers on merger types, payment methods 
and presence of institutional block-holders 
This table presents OLS regressions of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
suppliers to the bidders on merger types, payment methods, and whether the target or the 
bidder has institutional shareholders who hold at least 5% ownership in the firm prior to 
bid announcements.  Dependent variable is the CAR of suppliers to the bidders.  CAR is 
computed from the market model following standard event study methodology (see 
Brown and Warner, 1985) using the CRSP equally-weighted market index for the [-3, +1] 
event window, starting from three days prior to one day after announcement.  The merger 
type is non-diversifying if the bidder and target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes, and diversifying otherwise.  SAMEIND is a dummy that takes 
on unity if the merger type is non-diversifying, and zero if otherwise.  ALLSTOCK is a 
dummy that takes on unity if the bidder offers stock only as payment, and zero otherwise.  
AQBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder has at least one institutional block-
holder with more than 5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  TGBH is a dummy that takes 
on unity if the target has at least one institutional block-holder with more than 5% 
ownership, and zero otherwise.  Relative size of the deal (RELSIZE) is computed as the 
ratio of the deal transaction value to the sum of the market value of the bidder in the year 
preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value. BIDDER_RUNUP is the one-year buy 
and hold daily stock returns of the bidder computed up to one month before the bid.  
Market runup (MKT_RUNUP) is the one-year buy and hold daily returns of the CRSP 
value-weighted market index minus the risk-free rate, computed up to one month before 
the bid.  BIDDER_FINLEV measures the financial leverage of the bidder if the deal is 
entirely financed by cash through debt issuance, and is computed as the ratio of the sum 
of long-term debt and current liabilities of the bidder in the year preceding the bid plus 
the deal transaction value to the sum of the book value of assets of the bidder in the year 
preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.   TENDER is a dummy that take on 
unity if a tender offer was made, and zero otherwise.  BIDDER_PRIOROWN is the 
fractional ownership in the target held by the bidder prior to the bid.  BIDDER_STDRET 
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns computed for one year up to the month 
prior to the bid.  BIDDER_MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the bidder, and is 
computed as the ratio of the bidder’s sales to total sales in its industry.  BIDDER_SIZE is 
the logarithm of book value of assets of the bidder.  Market-to-book ratio (BIDDER_MB) 
of the bidder is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where 
market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current 
liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-
term debt and current liabilities.  BIDDER_PPE is the value of plants, properties and 
equipment of the bidder, divided by lagged assets.  BIDDER_CAR is the CAR of the 
bidder over the [-3, +1] window computed in the same way as the supplier CAR. 
BIDDER_TO is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder experiences resignation or 
dismissal of top management within one year starting from the bid announcement date, 
and zero otherwise.  Top management includes officers with the titles of Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), President, 
Vice-President, Chairman or Vice-Chairman.  Mergers involving utilities and financial 
firms are excluded.   Standard errors are clustered by bidder.  P-values are reported in 
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parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.   
 
 Dependent variable is the CAR of suppliers to the bidders  













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SAMEIND -0.022 0.011 0.005 0.024 -0.013 -0.120 -0.016 -0.032 
 [0.119] [0.477] [0.699] [0.467] [0.562] [0.004]*** [0.494] [0.553] 
ALLSTOCK -0.011 0.060 0.023 -0.010 -0.003 0.063 0.071 -0.078 
 [0.553] [0.007]*** [0.141] [0.760] [0.853] [0.015]** [0.003]*** [0.067]*
SAMEIND* 
ALLSTOCK 0.018 -0.102 -0.052 0.002 0.009 0.023 -0.128 0.092 
 [0.462] [0.012]** [0.034]** [0.969] [0.730] [0.509] [0.001]*** [0.107]
RELSIZE 0.018 -0.115 0.016 -0.086 0.082 -0.670 -0.318 0.048 
 [0.746] [0.209] [0.755] [0.395] [0.098]* [0.000]*** [0.012]** [0.691] 
BIDDER_RUNUP -0.007 0.007 -0.008 0.020 -0.021 -0.028 -0.005 0.036 
 [0.526] [0.730] [0.471] [0.396] [0.036]** [0.124] [0.772] [0.238] 
MKT_RUNUP -0.011 0.010 0.076 -0.164 0.065 0.205 0.012 -0.178 
 [0.832] [0.880] [0.013]** [0.026]** [0.125] [0.014]** [0.852] [0.273] 
BIDDER_FINLEV -0.021 0.155 -0.019 0.163 -0.116 0.934 0.367 0.086 
 [0.688] [0.098]* [0.734] [0.068]* [0.043]** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.451] 
TENDER 0.009 -0.013 0.005 0.014 0.016 0.099 -0.038 -0.010 
 [0.491] [0.344] [0.649] [0.463] [0.088]* [0.000]*** [0.041]** [0.751] 
BIDDER 
_PRIOROWN 0.0002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005 
 [0.790] [0.733] [0.009]*** [0.193] [0.132] [0.139] [0.335] [0.234] 
BIDDER_STDRET -0.900 0.407 -1.166 -0.345 -1.759 1.243 0.065 -0.436 
 [0.068]* [0.486] [0.083]* [0.671] [0.001]*** [0.111] [0.928] [0.637] 
BIDDER_MKTSHR -0.006 0.047 0.027 0.038 -0.006 0.285 0.055 0.039 
 [0.799] [0.057]* [0.150] [0.325] [0.777] [0.001]*** [0.116] [0.368] 
BIDDER_SIZE 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001 -0.002 0.010 -0.006 
 [0.876] [0.727] [0.372] [0.473] [0.776] [0.868] [0.403] [0.578] 
BIDDER_MB 0.001 -0.002 0.0002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 [0.470] [0.514] [0.909] [0.773] [0.484] [0.393] [0.130] [0.863] 
BIDDER_PPE 0.054 0.009 0.037 -0.012 0.032 0.021 -0.019 0.039 
 [0.036]** [0.797] [0.119] [0.768] [0.261] [0.525] [0.680] [0.451] 
BIDDER_CAR 0.048 0.117 -0.002 -0.064 0.002 -1.001 0.252 0.172 
 [0.497] [0.420] [0.979] [0.750] [0.971] [0.001]*** [0.101] [0.424] 
BIDDER_TO 0.011 -0.091 0.025 -0.040 0.027 -0.078 0.095 -0.047 
 [0.521] [0.080]* [0.268] [0.217] [0.123] [0.002]*** [0.091]* [0.244] 
INTERCEPT 0.008 -0.068 -0.039 -0.082 0.032 -0.351 -0.131 0.036 
 [0.896] [0.484] [0.583] [0.335] [0.622] [0.001]*** [0.327] [0.742] 
Observations 696 470 909 257 596 100 313 157 






Logistic regressions on retention likelihood of bidder suppliers post-merger 
This table presents logistic regressions on the likelihood of bidder suppliers remaining 
post-merger with merger types, payment methods and presence of institutional block-
holders of the bidders and targets.  Dependent variable is a RETAIN dummy that takes on 
unity if the bidder suppliers remains with the bidder after the effective year of merger 
completion, and zero otherwise.  The merger type is non-diversifying if the bidder and 
target have the same 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and 
diversifying otherwise.  SAMEIND is a dummy that takes on unity if the merger type is 
non-diversifying, and zero if otherwise.  ALLSTOCK is a dummy that takes on unity if 
the bidder offers stock only as payment, and zero otherwise.  AQBH is a dummy that 
takes on unity if the bidder has at least one institutional block-holder with more than 5% 
ownership in the bidder, and zero otherwise.  TGBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the 
target has at least one institutional block-holder with more than 5% ownership in the 
target, and zero otherwise.  Relative size of the deal (RELSIZE) is computed as the ratio 
of the deal transaction value to the sum of the market value of the bidder in the year 
preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value. BIDDER_RUNUP is the one-year buy 
and hold daily stock returns of the bidder computed up to one month before the bid.  
Market runup (MKT_RUNUP) is the one-year buy and hold daily returns of the CRSP 
value-weighted market index minus the risk-free rate, computed up to one month before 
the bid.  BIDDER_FINLEV measures the financial leverage of the bidder if the deal is 
entirely financed by cash through debt issuance, and is computed as the ratio of the sum 
of long-term debt and current liabilities of the bidder in the year preceding the bid plus 
the deal transaction value to the sum of the book value of assets of the bidder in the year 
preceding the bid plus the deal transaction value.  TENDER is a dummy that take on 
unity if a tender offer was made, and zero otherwise.  BIDDER_PRIOROWN is the 
fractional ownership in the target held by the bidder prior to the bid.  BIDDER_STDRET 
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns computed for one year up to the month 
prior to the bid.  BIDDER_MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the bidder, and is 
computed as the ratio of the bidder’s sales to total sales in its industry.  BIDDER_SIZE is 
the logarithm of book value of assets of the bidder.  Market-to-book ratio (BIDDER_MB) 
of the bidder is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where 
market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current 
liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-
term debt and current liabilities.  BIDDER_PPE is the value of plants, properties and 
equipment of the bidder, divided by lagged assets.  BIDDER_CAR is the CAR of the 
bidder over the [-3, +1] window computed in the same way as the supplier CAR.  
SS_SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets of the supplier.  SS_iaMB is the median 
industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio of the supplier.  SS_DEBT is the sum of long-
term debt plus short-term liabilities of the supplier, and divided by its lagged assets.  
SS_MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the suppliers.  SS_DEPENDENCY is the 
sales dependency of the supplier on the bidder, and computed as the revenues generated 
from trades with the bidder divided by the supplier’s net sales.  Mergers involving 
utilities and financial firms are excluded.   Standard errors are clustered by bidder. A 
dummy indicating bidder’s management turnover is not included due to collinearity.  P-
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values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively.   
 
 Dependent variable is a REMAIN indicator 
 TGBH=0 TGBH=1 AQBH=0 AQBH=1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SAMEIND 0.100 -0.077 0.050 -0.143 
 [0.716] [0.823] [0.815] [0.731] 
ALLSTOCK 0.251 -0.290 -0.183 0.617 
 [0.445] [0.430] [0.563] [0.220] 
SAMEIND 
*ALLSTOCK -0.283 -0.150 -0.363 1.041 
 [0.469] [0.780] [0.278] [0.129] 
RELSIZE -0.892 1.481 -0.461 -2.428 
 [0.413] [0.384] [0.652] [0.213] 
BIDDER_RUNUP 0.214 0.225 0.270 -0.605 
 [0.219] [0.416] [0.097]* [0.261] 
MKT_RUNUP -0.666 -1.055 -0.801 1.284 
 [0.420] [0.275] [0.201] [0.467] 
BIDDER_FINLEV 0.345 -1.366 0.951 -0.291 
 [0.681] [0.361] [0.208] [0.839] 
TENDER 0.383 0.437 -0.062 0.813 
 [0.145] [0.058]* [0.816] [0.005]*** 
BIDDER 
_PRIOROWN -0.067 -0.052 -0.031 -0.085 
 [0.033]** [0.380] [0.145] [0.097]* 
BIDDER_STDRET -36.134 -33.664 -16.279 -73.598 
 [0.000]*** [0.042]** [0.110] [0.001]*** 
BIDDER_MKTSHR 0.777 -0.183 0.480 -1.158 
 [0.075]* [0.762] [0.221] [0.110] 
BIDDER_SIZE -0.159 -0.217 -0.069 -0.282 
 [0.054]* [0.132] [0.389] [0.050]* 
BIDDER_MB -0.036 0.005 -0.011 0.104 
 [0.168] [0.925] [0.647] [0.192] 
BIDDER_PPE -0.218 -0.439 0.149 -1.280 
 [0.708] [0.659] [0.753] [0.239] 
SS_SIZE 0.262 0.280 0.249 0.257 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
SS_DEBT-to-ASSET  -0.237 -0.204 -0.712 0.978 
 [0.315] [0.647] [0.001]*** [0.000]*** 
SS_MKTSHR -0.079 -0.393 0.101 1.447 
 [0.890] [0.706] [0.846] [0.496] 
SS_IAMB -0.042 -0.022 -0.035 -0.023 
 [0.030]** [0.347] [0.039]** [0.332] 
SS_SALES_ 
DEPENDENCY 1.522 2.608 1.796 2.892 
 [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.009]*** 
INTERCEPT 0.921 1.869 -0.254 3.642 
 [0.298] [0.243] [0.784] [0.020]** 
Observations 908 515 1093 333 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 





 Dependent variable is a REMAIN indicator 







Marginal Effect for (8) 
-(σ/2) to +(σ/2) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8)  
SAMEIND -0.134 0.943 0.506 0.527 0.056 
 [0.686] [0.353] [0.714] [0.135]  
ALLSTOCK -0.031 1.652 -0.319 -0.356 -0.042 
 [0.935] [0.021]** [0.761] [0.605]  
SAMEIND 
*ALLSTOCK 0.007 -2.920 1.509 -1.511 -0.127 
 [0.987] [0.293] [0.223] [0.029]**  
RELSIZE -0.815 -1.049 0.721 2.881 0.112 
 [0.484] [0.840] [0.860] [0.545]  
BIDDER_RUNUP 0.124 0.912 -0.697 0.823 0.102 
 [0.502] [0.472] [0.268] [0.073]*  
MKT_RUNUP 0.149 -7.445 5.553 -1.814 -0.078 
 [0.866] [0.439] [0.156] [0.178]  
BIDDER_FINLEV 0.005 6.314 -2.754 -0.585 -0.026 
 [0.996] [0.401] [0.333] [0.910]  
TENDER 0.202 1.467 1.403 -0.963 -0.099 
 [0.496] [0.212] [0.001]*** [0.009]***  
BIDDER 
_PRIOROWN -0.054 -0.035  0.094 0.054 
 [0.048]** [0.326]  [0.401]  
BIDDER_STDRET -36.055 2.469 -95.018 -41.296 -0.089 
 [0.002]*** [0.973] [0.036]** [0.414]  
BIDDER_MKTSHR 1.084 2.705 -0.217 -0.741 -0.044 
 [0.016]** [0.525] [0.862] [0.480]  
BIDDER_SIZE -0.213 0.553 0.009 0.063 0.009 
 [0.018]** [0.373] [0.974] [0.894]  
BIDDER_MB -0.010 -0.263 0.395 -0.041 -0.034 
 [0.729] [0.414] [0.002]*** [0.562]  
BIDDER_PPE -0.173 -4.619 0.026 0.546 0.025 
 [0.813] [0.226] [0.991] [0.674]  
SS_SIZE 0.292 -0.019 0.462 0.208 0.094 
 [0.000]*** [0.894] [0.027]** [0.000]***  
SS_DEBT-to-ASSET  -0.684 1.085 0.911 -1.398 -0.105 
 [0.013]** [0.009]*** [0.004]*** [0.014]**  
SS_MKTSHR -0.579 9.369 -3.387 1.108 0.029 
 [0.304] [0.011]** [0.228] [0.470]  
SS_IAMB -0.042 -0.048 0.004 -0.027 -0.034 
 [0.065]* [0.406] [0.922] [0.392]  
SS_SALES_ 
DEPENDENCY 1.501 1.753 4.629 2.572 0.135 
 [0.011]** [0.139] [0.000]*** [0.000]***  
INTERCEPT 0.536 -1.889 -1.636 -0.926  
 [0.675] [0.701] [0.601] [0.888]  
Observations 782 126 205 308  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  




Profitability of dismissed suppliers of bidders post-merger by merger types and 
payment methods 
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the profitability of dismissed suppliers 
of bidders post-merger relative to their profitability pre-merger.  A supplier is dismissed 
if it is no longer listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers in 
the year after the effective date of completion of the merger.  Dependent variable is the 
profitability of the dismissed supplier in year t.  Proxies for profitability are (i) the 
median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA), (iii) the median industry-adjusted 
sales growth (iaSalesGW) and (iii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) 
ratio.   Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  
Return on assets is computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus 
interest expenses plus income taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Sales 
growth is the current sales minus lagged sales, and divided by lagged sales. Market-to-
book ratio is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market 
value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities 
while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt 
and current liabilities.  A merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target share the 
same 4-digit SIC codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The payment method is ALL 
STOCK if only stock financing is used, and ALL CASH if only cash financing is used.   
Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of completion of the merger, 
and zero otherwise.  The sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date 
and three years after the effective year of completion of the merger.  Firm controls are as 
follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-ASSET ratio is the sum 
of long-term debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by lagged assets.  R&D is the 
R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.  CAPEXP is the capital expenditure divided by 
lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the firm computed as the ratio of 
the firm’s sales to total sales in its industry.  The prefix SS refers to the supplier.  
Supplier’s firm fixed effects and year dummies are included. Mergers involving utilities 
and financial firms are excluded.  Standard errors are clustered by bidders with p-values 
reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Non-diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is profitability of bidder supplier 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
POST -0.004 0.148 0.451 0.028 0.245 0.493 
 [0.844] [0.130] [0.119] [0.551] [0.377] [0.431] 
SS_SIZE 0.015 0.101 -0.667 -0.037 -0.049 -1.126 
 [0.598] [0.439] [0.030]** [0.421] [0.775] [0.026]** 
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.089 -0.008 -0.792 -0.241 -0.020 0.202 
 [0.240] [0.981] [0.159] [0.001]*** [0.946] [0.628] 
SS_R&D -1.210 0.464 5.739 -1.632 1.353 1.274 
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 [0.000]*** [0.181] [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.217] [0.231] 
SS_CAPEXP -0.492 1.407 -0.366 -0.265 1.648 -1.188 
 [0.093]* [0.073]* [0.796] [0.396] [0.187] [0.501] 
SS_MKTSHR 0.312 -0.737 -1.079 -0.152 1.514 -3.072 
 [0.215] [0.073]* [0.374] [0.788] [0.248] [0.275] 
INTERCEPT 0.193 0.291 4.209 0.477 -0.292 6.085 
 [0.070]* [0.575] [0.002]*** [0.055]* [0.800] [0.005]***
Observations 882 992 908 495 543 509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.698 0.375 0.535 0.783 0.284 0.619 
Year  dummies/SS fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is profitability of bidder supplier 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
POST 0.012 -0.081 -0.071 0.004 0.008 0.121 
 [0.726] [0.364] [0.841] [0.855] [0.897] [0.706] 
SS_SIZE 0.053 0.219 -1.426 0.063 0.159 -1.533 
 [0.101] [0.007]*** [0.000]*** [0.022]** [0.022]** [0.000]*** 
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.078 0.039 0.116 -0.108 0.076 0.982 
 [0.343] [0.843] [0.835] [0.036]** [0.375] [0.084]* 
SS_R&D -0.980 1.954 1.783 -0.992 1.875 3.553 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.123] [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.004]*** 
SS_CAPEXP -0.504 1.887 2.901 -0.132 2.499 2.045 
 [0.074]* [0.002]*** [0.068]* [0.567] [0.000]*** [0.281] 
SS_MKTSHR -0.281 -0.396 7.214 -0.064 0.024 -0.045 
 [0.483] [0.647] [0.167] [0.730] [0.913] [0.974] 
INTERCEPT -0.151 -1.036 5.615 -0.239 -1.239 7.054 
 [0.249] [0.009]*** [0.000]*** [0.104] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Observations 1345 1561 1419 2631 2917 2660 
Adjusted R-squared 0.705 0.370 0.507 0.722 0.398 0.626 
Year  dummies/SS fixed 




Profitability of dismissed suppliers of bidders post-merger by  
merger types, payment methods and target ownership concentration 
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the profitability of the dismissed suppliers of bidders post-merger relative to their 
profitability pre-merger.  A supplier is dismissed if it is no longer listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers 
in the year after the effective date of completion of the merger.  Dependent variable is the profitability of the dismissed supplier in 
year t.  Proxies for profitability are (i) the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA), (iii) the median industry-adjusted sales 
growth (iaSalesGW) and (iii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) ratio.   Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Return on assets is computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest 
expenses plus income taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Market-to-book ratio is computed as the market value 
divided by book value of assets where market value is the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities 
while the book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  Sales growth is the 
current sales minus lagged sales, and divided by lagged sales.  A merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target share the same 4-
digit SIC codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The payment method is ALL STOCK if only stock financing is used, and ALL CASH if 
only cash financing is used.   AQBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder has at least one institutional block-holder with more 
than 5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  TGBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the target has at least one institutional block-holder 
with more than 5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of completion of the 
merger, and zero otherwise.  The sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date and three years after the effective 
year of completion of the merger.  Firm controls are as follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-ASSET ratio 
is the sum of long-term debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by lagged assets.  R&D is the R&D expenses divided by lagged 
assets.  CAPEXP is the capital expenditure divided by lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the firm computed as 
the ratio of the firm’s sales to total sales in its industry.   Firm controls are computed at end of year t.  The prefix SS refers to the 
supplier.   Panel A and B report the results for non-diversifying and diversifying mergers, respectively.  Supplier’s firm fixed effects 
and year dummies are included.   Mergers involving utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Standard errors are clustered by bidders.  







Panel A: Non-diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
POST 0.020 0.089 0.327 -0.051 0.247 1.077 -0.023 -0.171 1.341 0.067 0.038 -0.555 
 [0.599] [0.649] [0.489] [0.492] [0.003]*** [0.126] [0.596] [0.594] [0.128] [0.283] [0.609] [0.075]* 
SS_SIZE -0.001 0.154 -0.634 0.065 -0.055 -0.835 0.040 0.053 -0.743 -0.121 0.018 -1.465 
 [0.967] [0.312] [0.091]* [0.318] [0.743] [0.058]* [0.387] [0.524] [0.354] [0.195] [0.855] [0.000]***
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.063 0.007 -0.171 -0.184 0.024 -2.020 -0.164 0.224 0.750 -0.351 0.028 -0.541 
 [0.480] [0.986] [0.838] [0.060]* [0.919] [0.042]** [0.026]** [0.555] [0.075]* [0.034]** [0.789] [0.145] 
SS_R&D -1.119 0.463 5.053 -1.414 0.531 7.034 -1.687 1.592 -0.256 -1.524 0.747 2.513 
 [0.000]*** [0.343] [0.071]* [0.000]*** [0.248] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.125] [0.908] [0.000]*** [0.199] [0.026]**
SS_CAPEXP -0.510 0.749 -1.020 -0.522 2.387 0.335 -0.406 1.020 -1.440 -0.191 2.817 -0.052 
 [0.249] [0.485] [0.592] [0.268] [0.069]* [0.909] [0.410] [0.421] [0.695] [0.641] [0.016]** [0.940] 
SS_MKTSHR -0.204 -1.097 2.966 0.297 -0.898 -2.137 -1.570 4.311 0.403 -0.217 0.101 -6.555 
 [0.871] [0.362] [0.127] [0.543] [0.047]** [0.202] [0.090]* [0.414] [0.936] [0.714] [0.530] [0.000]***
INTERCEPT 0.276 0.085 4.748 0.035 0.989 4.571 0.181 -0.694 3.931 0.896 -0.419 8.127 
 [0.010]** [0.888] [0.000]*** [0.917] [0.174] [0.034]** [0.290] [0.228] [0.216] [0.070]* [0.514] [0.000]***
Observations 641 712 648 241 280 260 261 287 266 234 1102 243 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.656 0.390 0.534 0.798 0.369 0.566 0.808 0.328 0.662 0.779 0.321 0.572 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supplier fixed 







Panel B: Diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
POST 0.042 0.027 0.248 -0.073 -0.027 0.219 -0.014 -0.017 0.455 -0.028 0.028 0.189 
 [0.234] [0.869] [0.516] [0.229] [0.833] [0.711] [0.726] [0.833] [0.281] [0.334] [0.704] [0.626] 
SS_SIZE 0.072 0.262 -1.180 0.019 0.173 -2.225 0.064 0.087 -1.469 0.055 0.230 -1.790 
 [0.060]* [0.027]** [0.000]*** [0.720] [0.051]* [0.008]*** [0.122] [0.414] [0.000]*** [0.114] [0.012]** [0.000]***
SS_DEBT/ASSET -0.102 0.111 0.466 -0.004 -0.246 -1.730 -0.133 -0.109 1.825 -0.078 0.155 0.350 
 [0.290] [0.653] [0.387] [0.972] [0.229] [0.139] [0.056]* [0.367] [0.036]** [0.234] [0.122] [0.597] 
SS_R&D -1.223 1.721 0.743 -0.420 2.267 2.939 -0.780 2.306 1.921 -1.230 1.426 5.003 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.544] [0.240] [0.003]*** [0.199] [0.007]*** [0.000]*** [0.101] [0.000]*** [0.118] [0.003]***
SS_CAPEXP 0.039 2.062 1.869 -1.325 1.679 6.121 0.034 1.935 -0.402 -0.434 3.080 6.162 
 [0.909] [0.007]*** [0.253] [0.002]*** [0.044]** [0.225] [0.889] [0.011]** [0.807] [0.205] [0.001]*** [0.018]**
SS_MKTSHR 0.030 0.795 4.997 -0.642 -2.012 16.145 -0.211 0.047 -1.028 -0.080 -0.250 -0.641 
 [0.946] [0.546] [0.151] [0.179] [0.169] [0.138] [0.400] [0.966] [0.651] [0.709] [0.416] [0.658] 
INTERCEPT -0.202 -0.943 4.577 0.085 -1.121 9.622 -0.386 -0.816 4.243 -0.125 -1.631 9.382 
 [0.207] [0.061]* [0.000]*** [0.686] [0.026]** [0.006]*** [0.040]** [0.063]* [0.003]*** [0.510] [0.000]*** [0.002]***
Observations 935 1096 1000 410 465 419 1092 1183 1051 1539 1734 1609 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.710 0.349 0.525 0.745 0.492 0.540 0.593 0.358 0.484 0.799 0.473 0.721 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supplier fixed 







Post-merger profitability of dismissed suppliers of bidders under stock financing in 
non-diversifying mergers using a differences-in-differences approach 
This table presents results using a differences-in-differences methodology to examine the 
profitability of dismissed suppliers of bidders post-merger relative to a control group of 
retained suppliers of bidders, under stock-financing in non-diversifying mergers. The 
treatment group consists of dismissed bidder suppliers under stock-financing in non-
diversifying mergers.  The control group consists of retained bidder suppliers under 
stock-financing in non-diversifying mergers, matched to the “treated” suppliers by 
industry and asset size.  Industry is defined by the 2-digit Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) codes in matching, and the relative asset size of a matched pair cannot exceed a 
ratio of 2.5.   A merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target share the same 4-digit 
SIC codes.  The sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date and 
three years after the effective year of completion of the merger.  A supplier is retained if 
it continues to be listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers in 
the year after the effective date of completion of the merger, and dismissed otherwise.  
Dependent variable is the profitability of the bidder supplier in year t.  Proxies for 
profitability are (i) the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA), (ii) the median 
industry-adjusted sales growth (iaSALESGW), and (ii) the median industry-adjusted 
market-to-book (iaMB) ratio where industry is defined by the 4-digit SIC codes.  Return 
on assets is computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest 
expenses plus income taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Sales growth is 
the current sales minus lagged sales, and divided by lagged sales.  Market-to-book ratio is 
computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market value is the 
sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while the 
book value of assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and 
current liabilities.  Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of 
completion of the merger, and zero otherwise.  Treat is a dummy that takes on unity if the 
suppliers belong to the treatment group, and zero if they belong to the control group.   
Firm controls are as follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-
ASSET ratio is the sum of long-term debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by 
lagged assets.  R&D is the R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.  CAPEXP is the 
capital expenditure divided by lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of 
the firm computed as the ratio of the firm’s sales to total sales in its industry.  The prefix 
SS refers to the supplier.   Supplier’s firm fixed effects and year dummies are included.   
Mergers involving utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Standard errors are 
clustered by bidders.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical 




 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 iaROA iaSALESGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
POST 0.014 0.092 -0.432 
 [0.676] [0.212] [0.226] 
TREAT -0.043 0.149 0.449 
 [0.446] [0.421] [0.347] 
POST*TREAT 0.022 -0.363 0.850 
 [0.716] [0.012]** [0.244] 
SS_SIZE 0.006 0.013 -0.615 
 [0.865] [0.895] [0.005]*** 
SS_DEBT-to-ASSET RATIO 0.024 0.370 0.719 
 [0.835] [0.078]* [0.430] 
SS_R&D -0.775 1.272 1.950 
 [0.010]*** [0.095]* [0.250] 
SS_CAPEXP -0.125 0.776 0.640 
 [0.474] [0.167] [0.527] 
SS_MKTSHR -1.286 2.035 12.883 
 [0.517] [0.282] [0.147] 
INTERCEPT 0.087 -0.314 2.378 
 [0.621] [0.499] [0.059]* 
Observations 405 461 440 
Adjusted R-squared 0.617 0.356 0.464 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 




Profitability of retained suppliers of bidders post-merger by merger types and payment methods 
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the profitability of retained suppliers of bidders post-merger relative to their 
profitability pre-merger.  A supplier is retained if it continues to be listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers 
in the year after the effective date of completion of the merger.  Dependent variable is the profitability of the retained supplier in year t.  
Proxies for profitability are (i) the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA), (iii) the median industry-adjusted sales growth 
(iaSalesGW) and (iii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) ratio.   Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Return on assets is computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest 
expenses plus income taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Sales growth is the current sales minus lagged sales, and 
divided by lagged sales.  Market-to-book ratio is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market value is 
the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book 
value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  A merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target share the same 4-digit 
SIC codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The payment method is ALL STOCK if only stock financing is used, and ALL CASH if only 
cash financing is used.   Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of completion of the merger, and zero otherwise.  
The sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date and three years after the effective year of completion of the 
merger.  Firm controls are as follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-ASSET ratio is the sum of long-term 
debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by lagged assets.  R&D is the R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.  CAPEXP is the 
capital expenditure divided by lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the firm computed as the ratio of the firm’s 
sales to total sales in its industry.   Firm controls are computed at end of year t.  The prefix AQ and SS refer to the bidder and its 
supplier, respectively.  Supplier’s firm fixed effects and year dummies are included.   Mergers involving utilities and financial firms 
are excluded.  Standard errors are clustered by bidders.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical 












 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 Non-Diversifying Diversifying 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
POST 0.031 -0.074 0.207 -0.076 0.160 -0.072 -0.036 -0.127 -0.201 0.021 0.061 -0.036 
 [0.163] [0.398] [0.220] [0.442] [0.289] [0.905] [0.328] [0.037]** [0.379] [0.422] [0.489] [0.866] 
SS_SIZE 0.002 0.018 -0.752 0.033 0.219 -1.733 0.041 0.194 -0.823 0.045 0.152 -1.188 
 [0.955] [0.828] [0.066]* [0.323] [0.082]* [0.008]*** [0.077]* [0.001]*** [0.015]** [0.217] [0.073]* [0.002]***
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.075 0.533 0.142 -0.001 -0.165 2.097 -0.188 0.262 0.017 -0.083 0.409 1.160 
 [0.002]*** [0.031]** [0.726] [0.988] [0.103] [0.050]** [0.010]** [0.262] [0.980] [0.172] [0.140] [0.071]* 
SS_R&D -0.866 1.476 5.722 -0.911 1.646 1.406 -0.763 1.671 3.291 -1.415 1.130 2.144 
 [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** [0.205] [0.403] [0.012]** [0.000]*** [0.043]** [0.000]*** [0.153] [0.066]* 
SS_CAPEXP -0.013 1.685 0.546 -0.110 1.525 -2.545 -0.405 0.638 2.618 -0.378 0.492 4.491 
 [0.943] [0.006]*** [0.412] [0.706] [0.481] [0.424] [0.330] [0.134] [0.335] [0.144] [0.531] [0.004]***
SS_MKTSHR -0.840 -0.584 5.147 -0.287 1.568 -1.193 -0.105 0.772 -1.483 0.093 1.183 2.719 
 [0.298] [0.647] [0.315] [0.364] [0.134] [0.807] [0.748] [0.105] [0.660] [0.860] [0.275] [0.533] 
AQ_SIZE -0.015 0.048 -0.214 0.108 -0.232 1.255 0.019 0.012 0.230 0.023 0.001 0.528 
 [0.527] [0.580] [0.451] [0.076]* [0.558] [0.433] [0.595] [0.815] [0.526] [0.393] [0.990] [0.070]* 
AQ_DEBT/ASSET 0.161 0.722 -0.936 -0.175 0.190 -3.842 -0.015 -0.256 1.230 -0.205 -0.513 0.663 
 [0.178] [0.029]** [0.331] [0.457] [0.830] [0.029]** [0.900] [0.167] [0.450] [0.058]* [0.044]** [0.514] 
AQ_R&D -0.175 -0.519 -1.395 -0.188 -0.358 -20.780 0.778 1.059 3.886 -0.525 -0.984 -0.412 
 [0.275] [0.341] [0.408] [0.748] [0.854] [0.000]*** [0.021]** [0.074]* [0.377] [0.081]* [0.066]* [0.816] 
AQ_CAPEXP 0.098 -1.818 0.059 0.338 -2.257 10.022 -0.075 0.480 -9.922 0.909 1.644 0.813 
 [0.793] [0.113] [0.988] [0.393] [0.486] [0.004]*** [0.877] [0.688] [0.123] [0.046]** [0.071]* [0.808] 
AQ_MB 0.004 -0.013 0.026 -0.046 -0.163 0.100 0.003 -0.002 0.050 -0.006 0.046 0.080 
 [0.475] [0.513] [0.564] [0.024]** [0.086]* [0.504] [0.516] [0.627] [0.416] [0.427] [0.081]* [0.293] 
AQ_MKTSHR -0.100 -0.152 -2.397 -0.779 -1.058 -19.676 -0.048 -0.440 2.884 0.024 -0.254 0.960 
 [0.585] [0.844] [0.045]** [0.020]** [0.545] [0.088]* [0.831] [0.231] [0.046]** [0.800] [0.158] [0.188] 
INTERCEPT 0.177 -0.756 5.712 -0.791 1.145 -0.159 -0.387 -1.167 0.814 -0.279 -0.966 -0.421 
 [0.472] [0.369] [0.070]* [0.246] [0.751] [0.991] [0.210] [0.018]** [0.800] [0.295] [0.214] [0.879] 115
 
 
Observations 665 733 696 263 295 288 885 1014 955 1177 1313 1175 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.663 0.392 0.475 0.701 0.371 0.516 0.642 0.346 0.518 0.663 0.295 0.560 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supplier fixed 

































Profitability of retained suppliers of bidders post-merger by  
merger types, payment methods and target ownership concentration 
This table presents OLS regressions that examine the profitability of retained suppliers of bidders post-merger relative to their 
profitability pre-merger.  A supplier is retained if it continues to be listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers 
in the year after the effective date of completion of the merger.  Dependent variable is the profitability of the retained supplier in year t.  
Proxies for profitability are (i) the median industry-adjusted return on assets (iaROA), (iii) the median industry-adjusted sales growth 
(iaSalesGW) and (iii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) ratio.   Industry is defined by the 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.  Return on assets is computed as the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest 
expenses plus income taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Sales growth is the current sales minus lagged sales, and 
divided by lagged sales.  Market-to-book ratio is computed as the market value divided by book value of assets where market value is 
the sum of the market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while the book value of assets is the sum of the book 
value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  A merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target share the same 4-digit 
SIC codes, and diversifying otherwise.  The payment method is ALL STOCK if only stock financing is used, and ALL CASH if only 
cash financing is used.   AQBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the bidder has at least one institutional block-holder with more than 
5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  TGBH is a dummy that takes on unity if the target has at least one institutional block-holder with 
more than 5% ownership, and zero otherwise.  Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of completion of the merger, 
and zero otherwise.  The sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date and three years after the effective year of 
completion of the merger.  Firm controls are as follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-ASSET ratio is the 
sum of long-term debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by lagged assets.  R&D is the R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.  
CAPEXP is the capital expenditure divided by lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the firm computed as the ratio 
of the firm’s sales to total sales in its industry.   Firm controls are computed at end of year t.  The prefix AQ and SS refer to the bidder 
and its supplier, respectively.   Panel A and B report the results for non-diversifying and diversifying mergers, respectively.  Supplier’s 
firm fixed effects and year dummies are included.   Mergers involving utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Standard errors are 
clustered by bidders.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 






Panel A: Non-diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
POST 0.007 -0.122 -0.121 0.064 0.555 1.023 0.004 -0.009 -0.051 -0.135 -0.054 -0.863 
 [0.829] [0.196] [0.612] [0.150] [0.055]* [0.002]*** [0.966] [0.965] [0.957] [0.298] [0.773] [0.488] 
SS_SIZE -0.003 0.017 -0.857 -0.008 0.014 -0.540 0.042 0.268 -1.684 0.055 0.342 -2.053 
 [0.959] [0.862] [0.110] [0.768] [0.944] [0.474] [0.334] [0.061]* [0.055]* [0.168] [0.230] [0.000]***
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.079 0.654 0.170 -0.034 0.538 0.497 0.015 -0.074 2.384 -0.147 0.494 3.124 
 [0.003]*** [0.033]** [0.749] [0.770] [0.211] [0.386] [0.871] [0.297] [0.031]** [0.053]* [0.466] [0.000]***
SS_R&D -0.914 2.168 6.594 -0.795 0.037 4.841 -0.362 3.649 4.766 -1.267 -0.708 -1.985 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.035]** [0.951] [0.157] [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.058]* [0.000]*** [0.375] [0.296] 
SS_CAPEXP 0.0060 1.043 0.550 -0.059 2.761 -0.013 -0.252 -1.038 -5.398 -0.193 5.498 1.217 
 [0.979] [0.022]** [0.638] [0.883] [0.164] [0.945] [0.676] [0.556] [0.296] [0.203] [0.000]*** [0.308] 
SS_MKTSHR -0.900 -1.495 4.436 -0.421 1.953 16.375 -0.565 0.448 -4.454 0.355 3.841 26.381 
 [0.315] [0.336] [0.433] [0.368] [0.466] [0.007]*** [0.088]* [0.643] [0.236] [0.665] [0.086]* [0.000]***
AQ_SIZE 0.027 -0.023 0.126 -0.136 -0.010 -1.036 0.095 -0.560 0.143 -0.020 0.122 2.246 
 [0.591] [0.786] [0.841] [0.002]*** [0.983] [0.051]* [0.615] [0.142] [0.963] [0.775] [0.608] [0.159] 
AQ_DEBT/ASSET 0.162 0.736 -1.287 0.222 2.635 -2.531 0.053 -0.809 -1.813 -0.585 0.612 -5.899 
 [0.325] [0.060]* [0.307] [0.285] [0.002]*** [0.260] [0.892] [0.468] [0.527] [0.437] [0.710] [0.324] 
AQ_R&D -0.366 0.858 -3.600 -0.126 -0.461 1.422 -0.074 -1.857 -24.249 -1.436 5.037 -23.185 
 [0.284] [0.107] [0.224] [0.241] [0.406] [0.181] [0.838] [0.072]* [0.001]*** [0.367] [0.316] [0.030]**
AQ_CAPEXP 0.256 -2.615 3.031 0.654 -1.037 -3.005 0.885 0.141 9.585 0.772 -3.963 11.842 
 [0.591] [0.009]*** [0.436] [0.520] [0.625] [0.389] [0.077]* [0.969] [0.223] [0.697] [0.407] [0.393] 
AQ_MB 0.007 -0.009 0.082 -0.003 -0.095 -0.063 -0.015 -0.091 0.079 -0.056 -0.131 0.161 
 [0.345] [0.725] [0.223] [0.754] [0.009]*** [0.264] [0.361] [0.074]* [0.718] [0.092]* [0.336] [0.724] 
AQ_MKTSHR -0.377 0.352 -4.937 1.169 -5.552 -9.300 -0.713 2.763 -12.163 0.075 -1.975 -40.198 
 [0.176] [0.649] [0.075]* [0.002]*** [0.156] [0.081]* [0.117] [0.007]*** [0.387] [0.929] [0.443] [0.002]***
INTERCEPT -0.113 -0.313 4.319 1.167 0.241 12.129 -0.940 4.301 9.619 0.612 -2.807 -6.731 
 [0.799] [0.656] [0.409] [0.005]*** [0.957] [0.022]** [0.598] [0.257] [0.677] [0.298] [0.157] [0.726] 118
 
 
Observations 460 512 482 205 221 214 156 181 174 107 114 114 
Adjusted R-squared 0.669 0.466 0.511 0.685 0.383 0.375 0.681 0.646 0.607 0.871 0.455 0.352 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supplier fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Diversifying mergers 
 Dependent variable is the profitability of supplier to bidder 
 ALL STOCK ALL CASH 
 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 TGBH = 0 TGBH = 1 
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
POST -0.026 -0.041 0.160 0.146 -0.177 -0.870 0.043 0.022 0.214 0.002 0.315 0.429 
 [0.491] [0.673] [0.542] [0.022]** [0.206] [0.380] [0.090]* [0.802] [0.362] [0.969] [0.247] [0.399] 
SS_SIZE 0.003 0.196 -0.660 0.051 0.175 -1.787 0.049 0.150 -0.997 0.003 0.086 -1.739 
 [0.886] [0.007]*** [0.184] [0.100]* [0.068]* [0.000]*** [0.325] [0.065]* [0.002]*** [0.946] [0.686] [0.119] 
SS_DEBT/ASSET  -0.120 0.332 0.557 -0.221 -0.059 -0.824 -0.107 0.466 0.537 0.025 0.279 1.648 
 [0.076]* [0.255] [0.385] [0.296] [0.337] [0.393] [0.218] [0.175] [0.422] [0.680] [0.492] [0.176] 
SS_R&D -1.195 1.674 1.454 -0.238 1.282 6.751 -0.833 2.143 3.092 -2.154 -0.326 -0.870 
 [0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.417] [0.585] [0.014]** [0.002]*** [0.023]** [0.016]** [0.003]*** [0.000]*** [0.750] [0.250] 
SS_CAPEXP 0.250 0.432 1.393 -1.163 0.842 3.361 -0.355 -0.434 2.752 -0.558 3.073 11.150 
 [0.585] [0.436] [0.646] [0.035]** [0.213] [0.413] [0.232] [0.489] [0.001]*** [0.150] [0.035]** [0.118] 
SS_MKTSHR 0.131 1.429 -0.228 -0.035 -0.308 2.302 0.559 2.216 3.994 -0.687 -0.813 0.963 
 [0.642] [0.035]** [0.953] [0.955] [0.566] [0.808] [0.355] [0.026]** [0.493] [0.423] [0.451] [0.791] 
AQ_SIZE -0.003 -0.043 0.015 -0.086 0.218 0.829 0.009 -0.078 0.650 0.038 -0.095 0.635 
 [0.935] [0.434] [0.963] [0.188] [0.382] [0.563] [0.802] [0.400] [0.019]** [0.762] [0.871] [0.676] 
AQ_DEBT/ASSET 0.073 -0.420 1.582 -0.074 -0.026 -0.043 -0.158 -0.748 0.133 -0.481 0.001 1.560 
 [0.577] [0.402] [0.347] [0.691] [0.956] [0.981] [0.281] [0.011]** [0.892] [0.175] [0.999] [0.459] 
AQ_R&D 0.828 0.504 6.101 0.018 1.518 -3.550 -0.139 -0.587 -0.943 -3.807 -7.123 1.726 
 [0.022]** [0.399] [0.191] [0.980] [0.047]** [0.581] [0.624] [0.382] [0.530] [0.021]** [0.206] [0.897] 







 [1.000] [0.211] [0.192] [0.419] [0.897] [0.499] [0.136] [0.068]* [0.065]* [0.027]** [0.126] [0.073]*
AQ_MB -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 0.010 0.005 0.048 -0.007 0.019 0.076 -0.004 0.105 0.086 
 [0.228] [0.134] [0.927] [0.084]* [0.703] [0.451] [0.454] [0.475] [0.423] [0.694] [0.065]* [0.331] 
AQ_MKTSHR 0.342 -0.394 3.833 0.010 -0.173 0.747 -0.091 -0.199 0.278 0.475 0.344 5.205 
 [0.203] [0.379] [0.011]** [0.956] [0.667] [0.768] [0.234] [0.224] [0.580] [0.184] [0.862] [0.413] 
INTERCEPT 0.022 -0.606 1.753 0.269 -3.211 1.511 -0.320 -0.405 -3.070 -0.187 -0.140 0.551 
 [0.943] [0.329] [0.600] [0.681] [0.151] [0.910] [0.349] [0.541] [0.325] [0.868] [0.977] [0.961] 
Observations 640 717 682 245 297 273 790 893 812 387 420 363 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.656 0.343 0.574 0.739 0.411 0.500 0.606 0.269 0.493 0.778 0.393 0.629 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supplier fixed 





















Post-merger profitability of retained suppliers of bidders under stock financing in 
non-diversifying mergers using a differences-in-differences approach 
This table presents results using a differences-in-differences methodology to examine the 
profitability of retained suppliers of bidders affected by stock financing in non-
diversifying relative to a control group of retained suppliers of bidders affected by cash-
financing in non-diversifying.  The treatment group consists of retained bidder suppliers 
who are affected by non-diversifying mergers and the use of stock financing.  The control 
group consists of retained bidder suppliers who are affected by non-diversifying mergers 
and cash financing, and matched to the “treated” suppliers by industry and asset size.   
Industry is defined by the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in 
matching, and the relative asset size of a matched pair cannot exceed a ratio of 2.5.   A 
merger is non-diversifying if the bidder and target have the same 4-digit SIC codes.  The 
sample is restricted to three years before the announcement date and three years after the 
effective year of completion of the merger.  A supplier is retained if it continues to be 
listed in the Compustat Industry Segments as the bidder’s suppliers in the year after the 
effective date of completion of the merger.  Dependent variable is the profitability of the 
retained supplier in year t.  Proxies for profitability are (i) the median industry-adjusted 
return on assets (iaROA), and (ii) the median industry-adjusted market-to-book (iaMB) 
ratio, where industry is defined by the 4-digit SIC codes.  Return on assets is computed as 
the sum of net income before extraordinary income plus interest expenses plus income 
taxes, and divided by lagged book value of assets.  Sales growth is the current sales 
minus lagged sales, and divided by lagged sales.  Market-to-book ratio is computed as the 
market value divided by book value of assets where market value is the sum of the 
market value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities while the book value of 
assets is the sum of the book value of equity plus long-term debt and current liabilities.  
Post is a dummy that takes on unity after the effective year of completion of the merger, 
and zero otherwise.  Treat is a dummy that takes on unity if the suppliers belong to the 
treatment group, and zero if they belong to the control group.   Firm controls are as 
follow:  SIZE is the logarithm of book value of assets; DEBT-to-ASSET ratio is the sum 
of long-term debt plus short-term liabilities, and divided by lagged assets.  R&D is the 
R&D expenses divided by lagged assets.  CAPEXP is the capital expenditure divided by 
lagged assets.  MKTSHR is the market share of sales of the firm computed as the ratio of 
the firm’s sales to total sales in its industry.  The prefix AQ and SS refer to the bidder and 
its supplier, respectively.  Supplier’s firm fixed effects and year dummies are included.   
Mergers involving utilities and financial firms are excluded.  Standard errors are 
clustered by bidders.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  *,**,*** represent statistical 




 Dependent variable is the profitability of  supplier to bidder
 iaROA iaSalesGW iaMB 
 (1) (2) (2) 
POST -0.095 -0.175 2.128 
 [0.462] [0.501] [0.025]** 
TREAT -0.035 -0.358 0.468 
 [0.189] [0.021]** [0.299] 
POST*TREAT 0.054 0.455 -2.209 
 [0.534] [0.064]* [0.016]** 
SS_SIZE 0.044 0.086 -0.497 
 [0.323] [0.574] [0.526] 
SS_DEBT-to-ASSET RATIO 0.062 0.302 -0.450 
 [0.474] [0.203] [0.550] 
SS_R&D -1.063 3.681 3.536 
 [0.002]*** [0.000]*** [0.089]* 
SS_CAPEXP -0.223 1.938 1.274 
 [0.581] [0.310] [0.655] 
SS_MKTSHR 0.595 -2.228 25.390 
 [0.825] [0.848] [0.391] 
AQ_SIZE 0.021 -0.668 1.179 
 [0.849] [0.100]* [0.255] 
AQ_DEBT-to-ASSET RATIO 0.010 1.093 -2.550 
 [0.969] [0.160] [0.143] 
AQ_R&D -0.151 -0.027 -4.398 
 [0.719] [0.983] [0.229] 
AQ_CAPEXP 0.025 -2.274 1.985 
 [0.965] [0.140] [0.648] 
AQ_MB 0.038 -0.080 0.022 
 [0.063]* [0.062]* [0.875] 
AQ_iaROA -0.563 0.396 -1.405 
 [0.179] [0.532] [0.684] 
AQ_MKTSHR -0.851 0.740 -14.769 
 [0.116] [0.569] [0.051]* 
INTERCEPT 0.080 6.165 -6.053 
 [0.945] [0.115] [0.488] 
Observations 351 394 363 
R-squared 0.751 0.490 0.673 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 





Faith-Based Investing:  




In recent years, faith-based investing has gained increasing popularity.  In May 1998, the 
Catholic Values (CV) 400 index15 was introduced by KLD16 to meet the demand of a 
growing clientele seeking to invest in accordance with their Catholic values.   
Furthermore, Morningstar reported that the fastest growing subset of the socially 
responsible funds is the religious funds and assets held by such funds has increased from 
less than $500 million in 1997 to more than $17 billion in 200717.   Faith-based investing 
is a form of socially responsible investing where investment portfolios are screened not 
only to meet social, environmental and governance factors, but also to satisfy religious 
criteria.  For example, Islamic funds generally avoid companies involved in pork 
processing and investments that bear interest, while Catholic funds avoid companies that 
promote abortion, pornography and non-married lifestyles.   
 
                                                 
15According to KLD inc., the CV400 Index is designed to represent the large-cap U.S. equity market 
available to Catholic investors who seek equity ownership in alignment with the moral and social teachings 
of the Church.   
16 KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. provides social research and indices for institutional investors. 
17  See article at http://news.morningstar.com/ARTICLENET/ARTICLE.ASPX?ID=188559. In addition, 
according to a 2003 survey by the U.S. Social Investment Forum (SIF), the market for assets that are 
deemed socially, morally or environmentally responsible has grown rapidly over the past decade and 
represents approximately more than 11% of the financial market as a whole, or an estimated $2.16 trillion. 
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It would be interesting to infer the preferences of investors in religious funds through an 
examination of their investment behavior.  Religious funds are distinguished by specific 
denomination or religion18 and some of them are associated with churches or sold to a 
selected group of investors.  For example, the New Covenant mutual funds belong to the 
Presbyterian Church while the MMA Praxis funds are part of the Mennonite Church.  
The AB Funds, sponsored by the Southern Baptist Convention, started by selling to only 
Southern Baptist ministers and employees of Southern Baptist entities and institutions 
such as universities, seminaries, hospitals and retirement homes in 2001. 
 
By clearly associating the fund with a religious denomination or marketing it through the 
churches, it is likely that religious funds appeal to a unique clientele of investors who 
identify themselves with the particular religious faith.  Hence, it is natural to suspect that 
the behavior of investors in religious mutual funds would differ from the behavior of 
investors in secular funds.  According to Smith (1922), “the morale of the Christian cause 
depends on whole-souled loyalty.”  As the morale of a religious cause depends on the 
devotion of men and women promoting it, followers are taught the doctrine of religious 
loyalty.  If religious funds capture primarily a religious clientele, the doctrine of religious 
loyalty is likely to influence the behavior of investors in these funds. 
 
In this paper, I first examine the behavior of investors in religious mutual funds and 
compare it to the behavior of investors in secular socially responsible mutual funds.  I 
expect that investors in religious funds will exhibit low sensitivity to short-term fund 
performance if they are guided by religious loyalty to the promotion of long-term faith-
                                                 
18Appendix A presents the religious denomination of religious funds in the sample. 
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based causes in investing.  Next, I study the effect of distribution channels of religious 
funds on the flow-to-performance sensitivity of their investors.  I sort the religious funds 
into two groups according to whether the fund is sponsored by churches (henceforth, 
church fund) or not (henceforth, non-church fund).  I expect religious loyalty to be 
stronger towards funds sponsored and distributed by churches.  This is because such 
funds are most likely held by church-goers who face peer pressure to demonstrate 
religious loyalty or are strongly devoted to religious causes upheld by the churches.    
 
Third, I examine the performance of these religious funds.  Faith-based investing can hurt 
financial returns to investors in two ways.  First, portfolio screening by religious values 
would exclude certain industries and stocks from the investment portfolio. This would 
result in inefficient diversification due to a constrained investment opportunity set.  
Consequently, religious portfolios would be more concentrated mechanically due to 
under-representation in industries excluded by screening and over-allocation of assets to 
other industries.  Unlike unconstrained portfolios where managers use their informational 
advantage to hold a more concentrated portfolio in order to generate superior returns 
( Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005), managers of screened portfolios must hold a 
more concentrated portfolio regardless of their informational advantage.  The lack of 
flexibility for religious fund managers to use their informational advantage in choosing 
the industry concentration of the fund can hurt performance.   
 
Second, the low sensitivity of investors to performance as predicted by their religious 
loyalty could reduce the incentives of managers to exert effort and result in poor fund 
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performance.  Although it is possible to restore the incentives of managers through other 
channels such as higher fees or the market for managerial talent, screening will still limit 
the flexibility of managers to use their informational advantage in industry and stock 
selection.   Hence, investors in religious funds must rationally expect the fund to under-
perform unconstrained benchmarks. 
 
Using a sample of 38 religious funds, I find that the average investor exhibits flat flow-to-
performance sensitivity.  Investors in religious funds do not chase returns.  They also do 
not penalize fund managers for poor performance with outflows.  In contrast, using a 
sample of 79 secular socially responsible funds, the typical investor exhibits positive 
flow-to-performance sensitivity, a result consistent with Bollen and Cohen (2005).   
Among the religious funds, the typical investor in non-church funds exhibits flat flow-to-
performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the typical investor in church funds not only 
does not chase past performance, they move flows into the fund when past returns are 
negative.  This interesting result suggests that investors of church funds increase their 
support of these funds when past fund performance is poor.    
 
When comparing an equally-weighted portfolio of religious funds to market indices such 
as the CRSP value-weighted market index, the S&P 500 total return index and the 
Domini Social (DS) 400 index19, the monthly return of the religious portfolio is, on 
average, -0.23% lower than the monthly return of the CRSP market index at a p-value of 
0.017.  However, the return differences between the religious portfolio and the other two 
                                                 
19  Although the CV400 index is more appropriate as a religious benchmark, it is not used due to a 
correlation of 0.999 with the DS 400 index since being introduced in May 1998.  The DS 400, which was 
introduced in 1991, is used instead in order to have a time series from 1993 to 2006. 
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market indices, although negative, are not statistically significant.   Separating the 
religious funds into two equally-weighted portfolios of church and non-church funds, the 
church portfolio significantly under-performs all three market indices by -0.42% per 
month while the non-church portfolio under-performs only the CRSP market index 
by -0.20% per month.   Based on raw returns, it would appear that the church-portfolio 
performs worse than the non-church portfolio against the three market indices. 
 
To adjust for the risk and style of the fund, I use the four-factor model to compute the 
abnormal return.  The religious portfolio generates significantly negative abnormal return 
of about -0.14% per month consistently across all three market indices.  In contrast, the 
portfolio of secular socially responsible funds does not generate significant abnormal 
return consistently across all three market indices.  Next, both the church and non-church 
religious portfolios generate significantly negative abnormal returns but the return 
differences between the two portfolios are not statistically significant.    Controlling for 
fund characteristics such as turnover, expense ratio, asset size, age and standard deviation 
of monthly returns, OLS results confirm that religious funds under-perform the secular 
socially responsible funds by 0.14% per month or an annualized 1.7%, albeit at 10% 
significance level.   Similar results are obtained using Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
 
Using the transformed difference of the Sharpe ratio between two portfolios according to 
Jobson and Korkie (1981), the religious portfolio displays a statistically significantly 
lower Sharpe ratio than the CRSP market index.  In contrast, the secular socially 
responsible portfolio appears as well diversified as the market portfolio.  Indeed, by 
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computing an industry concentration index (ICI) for each fund following the approach of 
Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005),  religious funds show a significantly higher ICI 
than secular socially responsible funds using both OLS and Fama-Macbeth regressions 
while controlling for the fund characteristics mentioned earlier.   
 
To investigate whether the negative abnormal return of religious funds is related to the 
higher ICI, I examine the loading on the interaction term between a religious fund 
dummy and the ICI variable.   OLS results show a significantly negative loading on the 
interaction term when the CRSP market index and S&P 500 total return index, but not the 
DS 400 index, are used in computing the abnormal returns.  Moreover, the loading on the 
religious dummy turns positive, albeit insignificant. This finding shows that a higher 
industry concentration for religious funds hurts performance, as would be expected if the 
industry concentration arises due to portfolio constraints imposed by religious screening 
rather than the informational advantage of fund managers.  Once their industry 
concentrations are controlled for, religious funds do not under-perform the secular 
socially responsible funds.   
 
This paper contributes to the literature that examines the behavior of mutual fund 
investors and their flow-performance sensitivity (ex. Ippolito, 1992; Brown, Harlow and 
Starks, 1996; Gruber, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Zheng, 1999; Del Guercios and Tkac, 2002; Nanda, Wang and 
Zheng, 2004).   To date, no study has examined investors in religious funds.   Despite the 
small asset size of religious funds, the increasing popularity of these funds indicates 
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demand by a growing clientele.  Moreover, the insensitivity of investors in religious 
funds to performance is a novel result in the mutual fund literature which has, to date, 
documented a strong convexity in flow-performance sensitivity of investors. 
 
Lastly, this chapter contributes to the literature that examines the cost to social investing.  
Extant studies have found mixed results for the performance of socially responsible funds 
(ex. Hamilton et al., 1993; Mallin et al., 1995;  Guerard,  1997; Kurtz, 1997; Sauer, 1997; 
Goldreyer et al., 1999;  Statman, 2000; Bauer et al., 2002; Geczy et al.,  2003;  Girard et 
al., 2005).  Critiques of socially responsible funds have questioned the screening 
stringency.  Bello (2005) has shown that the top ten holdings of socially responsible 
funds are not significantly different from that of the conventional funds.  This study 
shows that religious funds are less well-diversified than the market portfolio and have a 
higher industry concentration than secular socially responsible funds.    Hence, religious 
funds would be a more appropriately screened portfolio to address the effects of 
screening on performance than secular socially responsible funds.  This study shows that 
there is a tradeoff between financial returns and screening. 
 
The reminder of this chapter proceeds as follows.  I describe the data in section 4.2 and 
present the flow-performance analysis in section 4.3.  Section 4.4 analyses the Sharpe 
ratio and industry concentration of the funds, and presents the performance results as well.    
Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes.     
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4.2 Sample Construction and Data Description 
I compile a list of religious and secular socially responsible funds from the U.S. Social 
Investment Forum (SIF) website 20 , Morningstar as well as websites of religious 
investment organizations such as the Catholic Financial Services Corporation.   Appendix 
A lists the sample of religious funds by fund family.  Next, the financial performance 
data for the funds are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database.  Specifically, the CRSP mutual fund 
database provides information about the fund's monthly returns, total net assets, turnover 
ratios, expense ratios, investment objectives, and other fund characteristics.  Funds not 
found in the CRSP database for the sample period 1993 to 2006 are excluded. 
 
I further restrict the sample funds to U.S. equity mutual funds by removing balanced, 
bond, international, index and specialized sector funds.   I value-weigh funds with 
multiple share classes by the total net assets of each share class, i.e., funds with multiple 
share classes are counted only once.   Next, the fund holdings are obtained from the CDA 
database provided by Thomson Financial.  The fund holdings are matched to return data 
from CRSP using the mutual fund links tables.   Funds must have at least 24 months of 
return data to be included.  To identify church funds, I examine the website of each 
religious fund.  I find that only the family of AB funds, MMA Praxis funds and the New 
Covenant Funds are sponsored by churches.  Funds belonging to these three families are 
classified as church funds, and all other funds are classified as non-church funds. 
[Insert Table 4.1] 





Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of the sample funds.  The sample consists of 38 
religious funds and 79 secular socially responsible funds.  Among the religious funds, 13 
are church funds and 25 are non-church funds.  The average religious fund is 6.7 years 
old while the mean secular socially responsible fund is 12.8 years old.  On average, the 
church and non-church funds are 5.8 and 4.6 years old, respectively.   In terms of 
monthly total net assets, the average religious fund manages $63 millions while the 
average secular socially responsible fund manages $468 millions.  Church funds manage 
$109 millions, on average, and are much larger than non-church funds which manage an 
average of only $30 millions per month. 
 
The religious funds have a mean expense ratio of 1.56% which is higher than that of 
1.24% for the secular socially responsible funds.  Church funds have a mean expense 
ratio of 1.63% while non-church funds have a mean expense ratio of 1.54%.    Next, 
religious funds have a turnover ratio of 63% which is comparable to the turnover ratio of 
65% for the secular socially responsible funds.  The mean turnover ratio for church funds 
is 107% and is much higher than that of 42% for non-church funds.  As for their industry 
concentration, religious funds are more concentrated with a mean ICI of 0.151 while 
secular socially responsible funds have a mean ICI of only 0.089.   The higher ICI of 
religious funds relative to the secular socially responsible funds is largely driven by the 
church funds.  Church funds have a mean ICI of 0.151 whereas non-church funds have a 
much lower mean ICI of 0.111. 
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4.3 Flow-Performance Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, I investigate the flow-to-performance sensitivity of investors in religious 
funds.  Following existing literature, net inflows into the fund is constructed as the new 









, ,where  is the monthly total net assets and  is the monthly return of fund i at time t.i t i tTNA R  
The general form of the multivariate regression used in analyses is (4.2). 
 
i,t 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1
4 i,t-1 5 i,t-12 6 i,t-12 6 i,t-1 i,t
NMG =α+β R +β NEGDUM×R +β log(TNA )
              +β log(AGE )+β TO +β EXP +β SD +ε ...................(4.2)
 
 
where Ri,t-1 is the lagged raw return of the fund, NEGDUM is a dummy that takes on 
unity if Ri,t-1<0, and zero otherwise.  AGEi,t-1 is the fund’s age in months, TOi,t-12 is the 
annual turnover ratio, EXPi,t-12 is the annual expenses ratio, and SDi,t-1 is the standard 
deviation of monthly fund returns over the past 24 months up to month t-1.  New money 
growth is winsorized at 1% and 99% to remove outliers.  The time unit is one month. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one month, except for expenses and turnover which 
are lagged by one year.  Year dummies are included to control for time fixed effects.  
Standard errors are clustered by fund.  The panel is unbalanced since most funds do not 




From equation (4.2), β1 and β2 capture the sensitivity of investors to good and poor past 
performance of the fund, respectively, and are the coefficients of interest.   I expect β1 
and β2 to be insignificant if investors in religious funds exhibit negligible flow-
performance sensitivity. 
 [Insert Table 4.2] 
 
Table 4.2 presents the flow-performance sensitivity results.  As hypothesized, β1 and β2 
are statistically insignificant for religious funds, i.e., investors in religious funds exhibit 
flat flow-to-performance sensitivity.  In contrast, β1 is significantly positive for secular 
socially responsible funds under both OLS and Fama-Macbeth regressions. This 
interesting finding indicates that investors are not sensitive to past performance of the 
religious funds, and is consistent with religious loyalty to long-term faith-based investing.    
[Insert Table 4.3] 
 
Next, for the sample of religious funds, I examine the loading on the interaction term of a 
church fund dummy with past positive and negative returns of the fund.   From Table 4.3, 
investors in non-church funds continue to exhibit flat flow-to-performance sensitivity, as 
evident from the insignificant loadings on the RET and NEGDUM*RET variables.   
However, while the loading on CHURCH*RET is insignificant, the loading on 
CHURCH*NEGDUM*RET is significantly negative at a p-value of 0.06 and 0.04 under 
OLS and Fama-Macbeth regressions, respectively.    This finding indicates that investors 
move flows into church funds when the past fund return is negative, a result completely 
opposite to the convex flow-to-performance sensitivity of investors well-documented by 
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extant studies.   This behavior is puzzling.  Perhaps, guided by strong religious loyalty, 
investors in church funds feel obligated to support poorly-performing funds.   
 
4.4 Performance Analyses 
We have seen that investors in religious funds exhibit flat flow-performance sensitivity.  
Screening would lead to inefficient diversification of the religious funds and limit the 
ability of fund managers to capitalize on their informational advantage when selecting the 
industry concentration of the fund.  Additionally, the flat flow-performance sensitivity 
could result in low effort by fund managers.  In this section, I analyze the Sharpe ratio, 
industry concentration and performance of religious funds.  The secular socially 
responsible funds are used for comparison.  The first part examines the transformed 
Sharpe ratio between two portfolios and the industry concentration of the fund while the 
second part examines the abnormal returns using unconditional factor models as well as 
pooled OLS and Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
 
4.4.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio has commonly been used to gauge the effects of inefficient 
diversification.  One issue with using the Sharpe ratio to compare two portfolios comes 
from establishing the statistical significance of the observed differences in performance.  
Jobson and Korkie (1981) propose a transformed difference of the Sharpe ratios between 








                           SR =σ μ -σ μ ......................................................(4.3)
r rwhere μ=  ,  σ =  
T (T-1)∑ ∑
 
and rt is the return of the portfolio minus the risk-free rate at time t and T is the no. of 
time observations in the return series.  The asymptotic distribution for the transformed 
difference of Sharpe ratios is normal with mean SRab and variance according to (4.4) and 
the approximate Z statistic is given by (4.5). 
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I use the z-statistic in (4.5) to test the null hypothesis of SRab = 0 between 2 portfolios. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
 
From Table 4.4, the religious portfolio, the church portfolio and the non-church portfolio 
all have a lower transformed Sharpe ratio than the CRSP market index and the S&P 500 
total return index at a 5% significance level. In other words, these religious portfolios are 
less well diversified than the market index.  In contrast, the secular socially responsible 
portfolio appears as well-diversified as both the CRSP market index and the S&P500 
total return index.  When the DS 400 market index is used as the market portfolio, Panel 
C shows that only the church portfolio has a lower transformed Sharpe ratio than the 
market portfolio at 10% significance level. 
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4.4.2 Industry Concentration Index  
As mentioned previously, screened portfolios would mechanically have a higher industry 
concentration due to under-representation in excluded industries and over-allocation of 
the fund assets to the remaining industries.  I follow the approach of Kacperczyk, Sialm 
and Zheng (2005) in constructing an industry concentration index (ICI) of a mutual fund 
by taking the difference between the industry weights21 of the fund and the industry 
weights of the total market portfolio, and summing the squared differences across the 48 
industries for each fund.  If a fund excludes a particular industry, its weight in that 
industry is assigned to zero.  A higher ICI represents a more concentrated portfolio.   
[Insert Table 4.5] 
 
From Table 4.5, religious funds have a higher ICI than secular socially responsible funds, 
as evident from the positive and significant loading of 0.017 on the religious dummy 
under Fama-Macbeth regression.  Since the standard deviation of ICI is 0.055, a typical 
religious fund has an ICI that is 0.31 of a standard deviation higher than the ICI of a 
secular socially responsible fund.  OLS regression gives similar results.  Among the 
religious funds, Church funds do not significantly differ from non-church funds in terms 
of ICI.   These findings are consistent with the transformed Sharpe ratio results. 
 
4.4.3 Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Returns 
To examine buy-and-hold portfolio returns, I form equal-weighted portfolios for each 
group of funds so as to obtain the secular socially responsible portfolio and the religious 
                                                 





portfolio. I further separate the religious portfolio into a church portfolio and non-church 
portfolio.  For each portfolio, I use simple t-tests to compare the monthly portfolio returns 
with the monthly returns of a market index.  Three market indices are used – the CRSP 
value-weighted index, the S&P 500 total return index and the DS 400 index.   
[Insert Table 4.6] 
 
From Panel A of Table 4.6, the religious portfolio significantly under-performs only the 
CRSP market index.  The mean difference in returns is -0.23% per month.   From Table 
B, the church portfolio under-performs all three market indices by about -0.42% per 
month at a 5% significance level.  In contrast, the non-church portfolio weakly under-
performs the CRSP market index and do not differ in terms of raw returns from the other 
two indices.  
 
4.4.4 Unconditional Factor Models 
The above analysis does not incorporate the risk and style of the fund.  Therefore, I 
estimate the risk- and style-adjusted performance using the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997) according to (4.6). 
1 2 3 4
m SMB HML UMD
i,t i,t m,t t t t i,tr =α +β r +β SMB +β HML +β UMD +ε ..........(4.6)  
 
where ri,t is the return on a portfolio in excess of the one-month T-bill return,  rm,t is the 
excess return on a value-weighted aggregate market proxy, and SMB, HML and UMD 
are returns on a value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, 
book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns.    The beta coefficients 
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can be interpreted as the loadings of the fund portfolios on the four risk and style factors.  
The intercept, α, is a measure of the abnormal performance of the fund portfolio during 
the estimation period.    
[Insert Table 4.7] 
 
From Table 4.7, the religious portfolio has a significantly negative alpha of at 
least -0.20% per month over the sample period 1993 to 2006 when all three market 
indices are used separately in the four-factor model.  On the other hand, the secular 
socially responsible portfolio does not generate significant negative alpha consistently 
across all three market indices.   
[Insert Table 4.8] 
 
From Table 4.8, a difference portfolio that longs the religious portfolio and shorts the 
secular socially responsible portfolio generates a significantly negative alpha of at 
least -0.13% per month for all three market indices. 
[Insert Table 4.9] 
 
Next, when the religious portfolio is separated into a church portfolio and a non-church 
portfolio, both portfolios generate significantly negative alpha using the four-factor 
model.  Moreover, the non-church portfolio appears to generate larger negative alpha that 
ranges from -0.26% to -0.30% per month while the church portfolio generates a less 
negative alpha that ranges from -0.18% to -0.21% per month, depending on the market 
index being used.   However, using an investment strategy that longs the church portfolio 
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and shorts the non-church portfolio generates insignificant abnormal returns, suggesting 
that the church portfolio does not differ significantly in terms of abnormal returns from 
the non-church portfolio. 
[Insert Table 4.10] 
 
4.4.5 Multivariate Performance Analyses 
One major advantage of aggregating funds into portfolios is that the long-run fund 
performance can be evaluated without requiring a long time-series for each fund.  
However, by aggregation, we lose information specific to the fund and cannot control for 
fund characteristics.  A multivariate framework allows us to control for individual fund 
characteristics.   Second, the previous section determines the abnormal returns in the 
four-factor model contemporaneously with the factor loadings.  Such an approach 
implicitly assumes that the factor loadings remain invariant with time.  A multivariate 
framework allows us to avoid such a strong assumption.  The abnormal returns are 
computed based on factor loadings estimated on a rolling basis using the previous 24 
months of returns.  The cost of this approach is a reduction in the number of time-series 
and cross-sectional observations since young funds are excluded and the first two years 
of a fund history are used to estimate the factor loadings.    
 
The multivariate regression equation has the following form in (4.7):  
i,t i,t 1 i 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1
4 i,t-12 5 i,t-12 6 i,t-1 i,t
AR =α +β RELIGIOUS +β log(TNA )+β log(AGE )




ARi is the monthly abnormal return, Religiousi is a dummy variable that takes on unity 
for a religious fund, and zero otherwise; and the other variables are previously defined in 
(4.2).  The coefficient of interest is β1 which measures the abnormal performance of the 
religious funds relative to the secular socially responsible funds.  The time unit is one 
month. 
[Insert Table 4.11] 
 
From Table 4.11, religious funds continue to weakly under-perform the secular socially 
responsible funds by at least -0.14% per month, even after controlling for various fund 
characteristics.  Fama and Macbeth regressions, which address serial correlation in 
performance, produce consistent results.  Fund size also has a significantly negative 
impact on the abnormal return of the fund. 
 
4.4.6 Performance and Industry Concentration 
Lastly, to examine whether the poor performance of a religious fund is related to its 
industry concentration, I estimate specification (4.8) 
 
i,t i,t 1 i 2 i,t-1 3 i i,t-1 4 i,t-1
5 i,t-1 6 i,t-4 7 i,t-4 8 i,t-1 i,t
AR =α +β RELIGIOUS +β ICI +β RELIGIOUS ×ICI +β log(TNA )
           +β log(AGE )+β TO +β EXP +β SD +ε ...................(4.8)  
 
where ICI is the industry concentration index of the fund.  The time unit is quarterly since 
fund holdings are reported on a quarterly basis.  I expect β3 to be significant and negative 
if a higher industry concentration arises mechanically due to screening and leads to 
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inefficient diversification for the religious fund.  I also expect β1 to become non-negative 
and insignificant once the ICI variable and the interaction term are controlled for. 
[Insert Table 4.12] 
 
When alpha is computed using the CRSP market index and the S&P 500 total return 
index as in Column 1 and 2 of Table 4.12, respectively, β3 is significantly negative.   
From Column 1, β3 is -3.684.  Hence, for religious funds, the marginal change of alpha 
with ICI is -2.448 ( = 1.236 – 3.684), i.e., when ICI changes by one standard deviation of 
0.05519, alpha changes by -0.135% (= -2.448*0.05519).  Furthermore, β1 turns positive 
and statistically insignificant, which is as expected if the under-performance of religious 
fund is related to its industry concentration.   However, when alpha is computed using the 
DS400 index, β3 is negative but insignificant.   Lastly, under Fama-Macbeth regressions, 
β3 is again negative but insignificant.  Since the time unit is quarterly and the length of 
the time series is only 56, the power of Fama-Macbeth regression is greatly reduced due 
to the short time-series. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I find that investors in religious funds exhibit flat flow-to-performance 
sensitivity.   Furthermore, religious funds perform worse by at least -0.21% per month 
relative to market indices such as the CRSP value-weighted market index, the S&P 500 
total return index and the DS 400 index.  Religious funds also perform worse relative to 
the secular socially responsible funds by about -0.13% per month.  In terms of Sharpe 
ratio, the religious portfolio is statistically significantly less well-diversified than both the 
 
142 
CRSP market index and the S&P500 total return index, but not the DS400 index.  In 
terms of their industry concentration, the average religious fund is also significantly more 
concentrated than the average secular socially responsible fund.  I further find evidence 
that the poor performance of religious funds is related to their industry concentration.  
 
Next, I separate the religious funds into church and non-church funds.   I find that 
investors in non-church funds exhibit flat sensitivity to both positive and negative past 
returns of the fund.  On the other hand, while investors of church funds exhibit flat 
sensitivity to past positive performance of the fund, they move flows into the fund when 
past returns are negative.  This is an interesting finding and suggests that investors of 
church funds increase their support when fund performance is poor.  
 
Last but not least, I examine whether church funds differ from non-church funds in terms 
of diversification and performance.  The portfolio of church funds is significantly less 
well-diversified than all three market indices while the portfolio of non-church funds is 
only significantly less well-diversified than the CRSP market index and the S&P 500 
total return index, but not the DS 400 index.   However, the industry concentration of 
church funds does not differ significantly from that of non-church funds.  Church funds 
also do not differ significantly from non-church funds in terms of the abnormal returns 




Religious denomination of faith-based funds 
 





1 Amana Funds Islamic No Alcohol, gambling, and 
pornography, and non-
Islamic banks. Avoids 
interest income. 
2 Azzad Funds Islamic No Alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, pornography, 
meat products, weapons, 
conventional financial 




Catholic No Guidelines established by 
Catholic Bishops.  Screens 
for abortion, 
contraceptives, embryonic 
stem cell research, weapons 
of mass destruction, human 
rights, environmental 
responsibility and fair 
employment practices. 
4 Ave Maria 
Funds 
Catholic No Guidelines established by 
Catholic Bishops.  Screens 
for anti-family practices 
such as non-marital partner 
benefits, abortion, 
pornography, and 












No Alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, caffeine, meat, 
and pornography. 
7 Timothy Plans Judeo-Christian No Abortion, pornography, 
anti-family entertainment, 
non-married lifestyles, 
alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling) 
8 AB Funds Southern 
Baptist 
Yes.  Southern 
Baptist Convention. 
Liquor, tobacco, gambling, 
pornography or abortion. 
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Yes.  Mennonite 
Church. 
Supports the environment, 
employment, and human 
rights.  Screens out 
weapons, alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, nuclear power. 
10 New Covenant 
Funds 

























Panel A reports the no. of funds and the fund age for the sample.  Fund age is computed from the first trading date of the fund to 
present.  Multiple share classes are value-weighted by total net assets of the fund.  Panel B reports the annual time-series trend of 
monthly total net assets (TNA), annual expenses, annual turnover ratio, and industry concentration index (ICI) of the funds.  TNA 
includes all share classes of the fund.  Sample period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006. 
 
Panel A: Sample funds 




#Funds 38 13 25 79 
Mean age (yr) 6.7 5.8 4.6 12.8 
Median age (yr) 4.9 5.4 6.4 8.7 
 
Panel B: Time series trend of fund’s characteristics. 
  Total Monthly Assets (millions) Expense Ratio (%) Turnover Ratio (%) 
Year  Religious Church Non-Church Secular Religious Church Non-Church Secular Religious Church Non-Church Secular
1993  10 0 10 406 1.58 - 1.58 1.05 28.65 - 28.65 45.15 
1994  10 7 10 376 1.62 2.38 1.56 1.10 42.94 210.23 29.00 56.95 
1995  10 9 11 374 1.97 2.38 1.56 1.13 119.62 172.87 29.00 56.73 
1996  21 32 10 379 1.91 2.31 1.74 1.20 74.67 124.79 34.03 75.49 
1997  30 46 13 393 1.69 1.71 1.67 1.27 91.62 128.68 58.45 69.35 
1998  39 60 18 478 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.26 82.34 100.33 36.00 67.04 
1999  43 68 20 570 1.66 1.72 1.60 1.26 71.38 78.67 46.57 63.98 
2000  49 81 26 629 1.64 1.67 1.63 1.29 60.57 24.67 47.00 64.37 
2001  60 77 52 478 1.53 1.66 1.48 1.32 43.37 50.50 51.68 74.69 
2002  115 194 45 400 1.31 1.13 1.46 1.33 57.01 76.29 62.80 71.57 
2003  102 203 30 411 1.33 1.15 1.46 1.34 57.97 65.93 44.23 83.02 
2004  108 226 40 505 1.35 1.16 1.45 1.29 50.67 90.13 41.95 57.57 
2005  133 258 52 554 1.26 1.13 1.34 1.28 51.85 56.94 26.15 62.68 
2006  149 263 79 597 1.25 1.10 1.35 1.23 50.49 106.94 46.50 60.35 




Panel B Cont’d 
  ICI  
Year  Religious Church Non-Church Secular 
1993  0.118 - 0.118 0.073 
1994  0.212 0.586 0.118 0.086 
1995  0.162 0.206 0.119 0.091 
1996  0.091 0.098 0.085 0.083 
1997  0.098 0.119 0.084 0.089 
1998  0.090 0.095 0.087 0.087 
1999  0.143 0.143 0.142 0.092 
2000  0.104 0.067 0.122 0.087 
2001  0.098 0.110 0.094 0.091 
2002  0.113 0.114 0.113 0.097 
2003  0.105 0.109 0.101 0.091 
2004  0.118 0.117 0.119 0.086 
2005  0.115 0.089 0.125 0.093 
2006  0.123 0.106 0.129 0.094 


















Fund flow and past performance  
This table reports the coefficients of the monthly panel regression of the general form: 
NMGi,t = β0+ β1RETi,t-1 + β2NEGDUM*RETi,t-1 + β3log(TNAi,t-1) +  β4log(AGEi,t-1) + 
β5TOi,t-12 + β6EXPi,t-12 + β7SDi,t-1 +β8NMGi,t-1 +  εi,t.   Sample period is Jan 1993 to Dec 
2006.  Column (1)-(4) report the results for religious funds while column (5)-(8) report 
the results for secular socially responsible funds.  NMG is the new money growth of the 
fund computed as (TNAi,t -TNAi,t-1(1  +  RETi,t))/ TNAi,t-1).  RETi,t-1 is the raw monthly 
returns of the fund in the previous month.  NEGDUM is a dummy that takes on unity if 
RETi,t-1<0, and zero otherwise.  TNAi,t-1 is the total net assets of the fund lagged by one 
month.  AGEi,t-1 is the fund’s age (in months) lagged by one month.  EXPi,t-12 is the 
annual expense ratio lagged by 12 months.  TOi,t-12 is the annual turnover ratio lagged by 
12 months. SDi,t-1 is the standard deviation of fund returns over the past 24 months up to 
month t-1.  Year dummies are included.   Standard errors are clustered by fund for OLS 
regressions.  Fama-Macbeth regressions are run each month and the estimates are 
averaged across the sample period.   P-values are reported in parenthesis.  NMG is 
winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%.  ***,**,* represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable is monthly new money growth  
 Religious Funds Secular Socially Responsible Funds 
 OLS FAMA-MACBETH OLS FAMA-MACBETH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RET i,t-1 0.0427 0.0383 -0.0424 0.1755 0.1779 0.2444 0.2833 0.6070 
 [0.121] [0.616] [0.695] [0.572] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]***
NEGDUM  
*RET i,t-1 
 0.0105  0.2433  -0.1650  -0.3878 
  [0.939]  [0.785]  [0.001]***  [0.241] 
Log(TNA i,t-1) -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0032 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.649] [0.651] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log(AGE i,t-1) -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0087 -0.0091 -0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0120 -0.0121 
 [0.010]*** [0.010]** [0.040]** [0.034]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
TURNOVER 
i,t-12 
-0.0015 -0.0014 0.0051 0.0053 -0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0065 
 [0.569] [0.569] [0.215] [0.204] [0.083]* [0.041]** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
EXPENSES 
i,t-12 
-0.0826 -0.0779 0.1550 0.1710 0.0067 -0.0081 0.0497 0.0328 
 [0.836] [0.846] [0.425] [0.391] [0.962] [0.954] [0.747] [0.839] 
NMG i,t-1 0.3240 0.3241   0.3228 0.3212   
 [0.000]*** [0.000]***   [0.000]*** [0.000]***   
INTERCEPT 0.0400 0.0401 0.0552 0.0573 0.0547 0.0520 0.0804 0.0799 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Obs 2798 2798 2800 2800 11484 11484 11488 11488 
R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.065 0.034 0.246 0.247 0.099 0.084 
# groups - - 168 168 - - 168 168 
# funds 38 38 38 38 79 79 79 79 
Clustered by 




Differences in flow-performance sensitivity for church funds 
This table reports the coefficients of the monthly panel regression of the general form: 
NMGi,t = β0 + β1RETi,t-1 + β2NEGDUMi,t-1*RETi,t-1 + β3CHURCHi*RETi,t-1 + 
β4CHURCHi* NEGDUMi,t-1*RETi,t-1 + β5CHURCHi + β6log(TNAi,t-1) +  β7log(AGEi,t-1) 
+ β8TOi,t-12 + β9EXPi,t-12 + β10NMGi,t-1 +  εi,t.   The sample consists of religious funds for 
the period Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  NMG (%) is the new money growth of the fund 
computed as TNAi,t -TNAi,t-1(1  +  RETi,t))/ TNAi,t-1.  RETi,t-1 is the raw monthly returns 
of the fund in the previous month.  NEGDUMi,t-1 is a dummy that takes on unity if 
RETi,t-1<0, and zero otherwise.  CHURCHi is a dummy that takes on unity if the religious 
fund is managed and distributed by churches, and zero otherwise.  TNAi,t-1 is the total net 
assets of the fund lagged by one month.  AGEi,t-1 is the fund’s age (in months) lagged by 
one month.  EXPi,t-12 is the annual expense ratio lagged by 12 months.  TOi,t-12 is the 
annual turnover ratio lagged by 12 months.  Monthly time fixed effects are included.   
Standard errors are clustered by fund for OLS regressions.  Fama-Macbeth regressions 
are run each month and the estimates are averaged across the sample period.   P-values 
are reported in parenthesis.  NMG is winsorized at 2.5% and 97.5%.  ***,**,* represent 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable is monthly new money growth 
 Religious Funds 
 OLS FAMA-MACBETH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RET i,t-1 0.0416 0.0132 0.0243 0.0944 
 [0.132] [0.865] [0.841] [0.688] 
NEGDUM*RETi,t-1  0.0624  1.7146 
  [0.649]  [0.416] 
CHURCHi*RETi,t-1 -0.0011 0.1081 -0.2621 0.1517 
 [0.979] [0.129] [0.019]** [0.492] 
CHURCHi*NEGDUM 
*RETi,t-1 
 -0.2136  -1.0722 
  [0.061]*  [0.044]** 
CHURCHi -0.0031 -0.0059 -0.0001 -0.0038 
 [0.277] [0.068]* [0.973] [0.404] 
Log(TNAi,t-1) -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0045 -0.0044 
 [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.474] [0.488] 
Log(AGE i,t-1) -0.0049 -0.0047 -0.0074 -0.0068 
 [0.005]*** [0.008]*** [0.096]* [0.135] 
TURNOVER i,t-12 -0.0015 -0.0013 0.0071 0.0067 
 [0.560] [0.591] [0.093]* [0.118] 
EXPENSES i,t-12 -0.1124 -0.1319 0.0119 -0.0173 
 [0.779] [0.740] [0.952] [0.936] 
NMG i,t-1 0.3210 0.3206   
 [0.000]*** [0.000]***   
INTERCEPT 0.0405 0.0413 0.0571 0.0552 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Obs 2798 2798 2800 2800 
R-squared 0.249 0.250 0.060 0.004 
# groups - - 168 168 
# funds 38 38 38 38 





Transformed Sharpe Ratio 
This table presents the transformed difference of the Sharpe Ratio between two portfolios 
according to Jobson and Korkie (1981).  RELIGIOUS - MKT represents the difference in 
Sharpe Ratio between the religious portfolio and the market portfolio.   SECULAR - 
MKT represents the difference in Sharpe ratio between the secular socially responsible 
portfolio and the market portfolio.  CHURCH - MKT represents the difference in Sharpe 
ratio between the church religious portfolio and the market portfolio.  NON-CHURCH - 
MKT represents the difference in Sharpe Ratio between the non-church religious SRMF 
and the market portfolio.   Market portfolios are (i) the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in Panel A, (ii) the S&P500 total return index in Panel B, and (iii) the DS 400 index 
in Panel C.  The average excess return for each portfolio is computed as the raw returns 
less the 30-days t-bill rate over the sample period Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  Z-statistics are 
reported.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  
Panel A: CRSP value-weighted market index as market portfolio 
 RELIGIOUS-MKT SECULAR-MKT CHURCH-MKT NON-CHURCH-MKT 
     
abSR
∧
 -7.51E-05** -3.98E-05 -6.73E-05** -1.18E-04** 
     
ϕ  3.74E-05 3.80E-05 3.13E-05 4.91E-05 
     
   Z -2.004 -1.045 -2.150 -2.395 
     
 
Panel B: S&P 500 total return index as market portfolio 
 RELIGIOUS-MKT SECULAR-MKT CHURCH-MKT NON-CHURCH-MKT 
     
abSR
∧
 -7.03E-05*** -5.04E-05 -7.13E-05*** -1.25E-04** 
     
ϕ  2.49E-05 3.31E-05 2.32E-05 6.29E-05 
     
   Z -2.829 -1.531 -3.074 -1.995 
     
 
Panel C: DS 400 index as market portfolio 
 RELIGIOUS-MKT SECULAR-MKT CHURCH-MKT NON-CHURCH-MKT 
     
abSR
∧
 -6.66E-05 -4.55E-05 -7.14E-05* -1.25E-04 
     
ϕ  6.65E-05 4.10E-05 3.81E-05 8.09E-05 
     
   Z -1.00 -1.111 -1.874 -1.545 




Industry concentration index 
This table examines the industry concentration index (ICI) of religious and secular 
socially responsible funds.  Dependent variable is the ICI of each fund constructed 
following the approach of Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005).  Religious is a dummy 
variable that takes on unity if the fund is a religious fund, and zero otherwise.  Church is 
a dummy variable that takes on unity if the fund is sponsored by churches, and zero 
otherwise.  The time unit is a quarter.  Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund lagged 
by one year.  EXPENSE is the expense ratio of the fund lagged by one year.  SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total net assets summed across all share classes of the fund lagged by 
one quarter.  AGE is the natural logarithm of fund age in months lagged by one quarter.  
SD is the standard deviation of monthly fund returns over the past six quarters up to the 
previous quarter.  Year dummies are included to control for time variation.  For OLS 
regressions in Column (1) and (2), standard errors are clustered by fund.  Column (3) and 
(4) report the results for Fama-Macbeth regressions.  Sample period is Jan 1993 to Dec 
2006.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent variable is the fund ICI 
 OLS Fama-Macbeth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RELIGIOUS 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.014 
 [0.081]* [0.149] [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 
CHURCH  0.005  0.018 
  [0.794]  [0.118] 
TURNOVERt-4 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.007 
 [0.467] [0.541] [0.000]*** [0.004]*** 
EXPENSEt-4 -1.906 -1.918 -1.209 -1.259 
 [0.048]** [0.047]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
LOG(SIZEt-1) -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
LOG(AGEt-1) -0.001 -0.000 0.004 0.005 
 [0.934] [0.942] [0.036]** [0.011]** 
SD t-1 0.333 0.328 0.446 0.269 
 [0.066]* [0.070]* [0.003]*** [0.042]** 
INTERCEPT 0.130 0.131 0.109 0.111 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.092 0.097 




Buy-and-hold portfolio returns relative to market index returns 
This table uses simple t-tests to examine the monthly return differences for a fund 
portfolio minus the market index.  In Panel A, the fund portfolios are (i) an equally-
weighted portfolio of religious funds in column (1) to (3), and (ii) an equally-weighted 
portfolio of secular socially responsible funds in column (4) to (6).  In Panel B, the fund 
portfolios are (i) an equally-weighted portfolio of church religious funds in column (1) to 
(3), and (ii) an equally-weighted portfolio of non-church religious funds in column (4) to 
(6).  Market indexes are (i) the CRSP value-weighted market index, (ii) the S&P 500 total 
return index, and (iii) the DS 400 index.  Sample period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  




Panel A: Religious and secular socially responsible funds 
 Religious Funds Secular Socially Responsible Funds 

















-0.23% -0.22% -0.24% -0.089% -0.079% -0.095% 
P-value 0.017** 0.106 0.117 0.105 0.413 0.409 
# Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168 




Panel B: Church and non-church religious funds 
 Religious Funds 
 Church Religious Funds Non-Church Religious Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













-0.42% -0.42% -0.45% -0.20% -0.19% -0.21% 
P-value 0.020** 0.015** 0.024** 0.083* 0.263 0.247 
# Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168 




Performance analysis using unconditional factor model  
This table presents the performance results using the four-factor model for (i) an equally-
weighted portfolio of religious funds in column (1) to (4), and (ii) an equally-weighted 
portfolio of secular socially responsible funds in column (5) to (8).  The four-factor 
model loads on the value-weighted market index net of risk-free rate, the size (SMB) 
factor, the book-to-market (HML) factor, and the momentum factor (UMD).  Market 
indexes are (i) the CRSP value-weighted market index, (ii) the S&P 500 total return 
index, and (iii) the DS 400 index.  Dependent variable is the monthly portfolio returns net 
of the risk-free rate.  Sample period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  Alpha is the risk and 
style-adjusted abnormal monthly return.  Robust standard errors are used.  P-values are 
indicated in brackets.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable is the monthly portfolio returns net of risk-free rate 
 Religious Portfolio Secular Socially Responsible Portfolio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ALPHA (%) -0.21 -0.25 -0.24 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11 
 [0.009]*** [0.003]*** [0.023]** [0.219] [0.019]** [0.171] 
       
MKTRFt 0.8543   0.9345   
 [0.000]***   [0.000]***   
       
SP500RFt  0.8581   0.9464  
  [0.000]***   [0.000]***  
       
DS400RFt   0.8040   0.8929 
   [0.000]***   [0.000]*** 
       
SMB t 0.1477 0.3206 0.3236 0.0826 0.2733 0.2781 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
       
HMLt 0.0299 0.0139 0.0561 0.0540 0.0411 0.0919 
 [0.293] [0.656] [0.156] [0.002]*** [0.056]* [0.005]*** 
       
UMDt 0.0273 0.0528 0.0323 -0.0192 0.0102 -0.0112 
 [0.080]* [0.006]*** [0.202] [0.079]* [0.423] [0.578] 
       
Obs 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-Squared 0.933 0.919 0.883 0.977 0.973 0.942 




Performance differences between religious and secular socially responsible funds 
This table presents the performance differences between an equally-weighted portfolio of 
religious funds and an equally-weighted portfolio of secular socially responsible funds 
using the four-factor model.  The four-factor model loads on the value-weighted market 
index net of risk-free rate, the size (SMB) factor, the book-to-market (HML) factor, and 
the momentum factor (UMD).  Market indexes are (i) the CRSP value-weighted market 
index, (ii) the S&P 500 total return index, and (iii) the DS 400 index.  Dependent variable 
is the difference in monthly returns between the religious portfolio and the secular 
socially responsible portfolio.  Sample period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  Alpha is the 
risk and style-adjusted abnormal monthly return of the difference portfolio.  Robust 
standard errors are used.  P-values are indicated in brackets.  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Dependent variable is the difference in monthly portfolio returns 
 (Religious minus Secular) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ALPHA (%) -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 
 [0.054]* [0.077]* [0.090]* 
    
MKTRFt -0.0801   
 [0.000]***   
    
SP500RFt  -0.0883  
  [0.000]***  
    
DS400RFt   -0.0889 
   [0.000]*** 
    
SMB t 0.0652 0.0473 0.0455 
 [0.000]*** [0.011]** [0.014]** 
    
HMLt -0.0241 -0.0273 -0.0359 
 [0.362] [0.300] [0.192] 
    
UMDt 0.0466 0.0426 0.0435 
 [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
    
Obs 168 168 168 
R-Squared 0.220 0.232 0.239 





Performance of church and non-church religious funds using unconditional factor 
model 
This table presents the performance results for an equally-weighted portfolio of church 
religious funds in Column (1)-(3) and an equally-weighted portfolio of non-church 
religious funds in Column (4)-(6).  A religious fund is classified as a church fund if the 
fund is sponsored by churches, and a non-church fund otherwise.  Dependent variable is 
the monthly portfolio returns minus the risk-free rate.  The four-factor model loads on the 
value-weighted market index net of risk-free rate (MKTRF), the size (SMB) factor, the 
book-to-market (HML) factor and the momentum factor (UMD).  Market indexes are (i) 
the CRSP value-weighted market index, (ii) the S&P 500 total return index, and (iii) the 
DS 400 index.  Sample period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  Alpha is the risk and style-
adjusted abnormal monthly return.  Robust standard errors are used.  Robust standard 
errors are used.  P-values are indicated in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable is monthly portfolio returns net of risk-free rate 
 Church Religious Funds Non-Church Religious Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
ALPHA (%) -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 -0.26 -0.30 -0.28 
 [0.015]** [0.004]*** [0.012]** [0.008]*** [0.004]*** [0.027]** 
       
MKTRF t 0.5670   0.9702   
 [0.000]***   [0.000]***   
       
SP500RF t  0.5744   0.9715  
  [0.000]***   [0.000]***  
       
DS400RFt   0.5386   0.9074 
   [0.000]***   [0.000]*** 
       
SMB t 0.0121 0.1275 0.1306 0.2155 0.4111 0.4139 
 [0.623] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
       
HMLt 0.1252 0.1166 0.1452 -0.0206 -0.0406 0.0052 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.526] [0.280] [0.913] 
       
UMDt -0.0406 -0.0236 -0.0366 0.0497 0.0779 0.0543 
 [0.008]*** [0.117] [0.047]** [0.012]** [0.001]*** [0.079]* 
Obs 155 155 155 168 168 168 
R-Squared 0.892 0.890 0.845 0.932 0.916 0.880 





Performance differences between church and non-church funds 
This table presents the performance differences between an equally-weighted portfolio of 
church funds and an equally-weighted portfolio of non-church funds using the four-factor 
model.  The four-factor model loads on the value-weighted market index net of risk-free 
rate, the size (SMB) factor, the book-to-market (HML) factor, and the momentum factor 
(UMD).  Market indexes are (i) the CRSP value-weighted market index, (ii) the S&P 500 
total return index, and (iii) the DS 400 index.  Dependent variable is the difference in 
monthly returns between the church portfolio and the non-church portfolio.  Sample 
period is from Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  Alpha is the risk and style-adjusted abnormal 
monthly return of the difference portfolio.  Robust standard errors are used.  P-values are 




Dependent variable is the difference in monthly portfolio returns 
 (Church minus Non-Church) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ALPHA (%) 0.089 0.101 0.097 
 [0.440] [0.394] [0.431] 
    
    
MKTRF t -39.455   
 [0.000]***   
    
SP500RF t  -38.894  
  [0.000]***  
    
DS400RFt   -36.272 
   [0.000]*** 
    
SMB t -19.867 -27.646 -27.805 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
    
HMLt 14.970 16.258 14.470 
 [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.003]*** 
    
UMDt -7.956 -8.903 -7.980 
 [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.010]*** 
Obs 155 155 155 




Multivariate analysis of fund performance 
This table examines the abnormal performance of religious funds relative to the secular 
socially responsible funds using a panel framework.  Dependent variable is the alpha (%) 
computed using the four-factor model with the factor loadings estimated on a rolling 
basis using 24 months of lagged fund returns.  Religious is a dummy variable that takes 
on unity if the fund is a religious fund, and zero otherwise.  The time unit is one month.  
Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund lagged by one year.  EXPENSE is the expense 
ratio of the fund lagged by one year.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total net assets 
summed across all share classes of the fund lagged by one month.  AGE is the natural 
logarithm of fund age in months lagged by one month.  SD is the standard deviation of 
monthly fund returns over the past 24 months up to the previous month.  Year dummies 
are included to control for time variation.  For OLS regressions in Column (1) to (3), 
standard errors are clustered by fund.  In Column (4) to (6), the Fama-Macbeth 
regressions are presented.  Sample period is Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent variable is the alpha (%) computed using four-factor model 
 OLS Fama-Macbeth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RELIGIOUS -0.139 -0.141 -0.140 -0.178 -0.177 -0.190 
 [0.072]* [0.070]* [0.082]* [0.071]* [0.072]* [0.055]* 
TURNOVERt-12 -0.025 -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 
 [0.504] [0.678] [0.680] [0.852] [0.910] [0.948] 
EXPENSEt-12 -12.816 -12.225 -12.050 -4.902 -4.770 -4.527 
 [0.046]** [0.058]* [0.062]* [0.531] [0.539] [0.558] 
LOG(SIZEt-1) -0.053 -0.056 -0.058 -0.065 -0.067 -0.070 
 [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
LOG(AGEt-1) 0.008 0.017 0.023 0.074 0.076 0.084 
 [0.854] [0.695] [0.602] [0.112] [0.099]* [0.062]* 
STDEV t-11 1.611 1.409 0.975 -1.053 -1.021 -0.715 
 [0.549] [0.613] [0.743] [0.779] [0.787] [0.851] 
INTERCEPT 0.241 0.223 0.345 -0.020 -0.029 -0.041 
 [0.318] [0.355] [0.166] [0.933] [0.900] [0.851] 
#obs 7490 7490 7490 7490 7490 7490 





















Multivariate analysis of fund performance and industry concentration 
This table examines the abnormal performance of religious funds relative to the secular 
socially responsible funds conditioned on the industry concentration of the fund.   
Dependent variable is the alpha (%) computed using the four-factor model with the factor 
loadings estimated on a rolling basis using 24 months of lagged fund returns.  Religious 
is a dummy variable that takes on unity if the fund is a religious fund, and zero otherwise.  
The industry concentration index (ICI) of each fund is constructed following the 
approach of Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005).  The time unit is one quarter.  
Turnover is the turnover ratio of the fund lagged by one year.  EXPENSE is the expense 
ratio of the fund lagged by one year.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total net assets 
summed across all share classes of the fund lagged by one quarter.  AGE is the natural 
logarithm of fund age in months lagged by one quarter.  SD is the standard deviation of 
monthly fund returns over the past six quarters up to the previous quarter.  Year dummies 
are included to control for time variation.  For OLS regressions in Column (1) to (3), 
standard errors are clustered by fund.  In Column (4) to (6), the Fama-Macbeth 
regressions are presented.  Sample period is Jan 1993 to Dec 2006.  ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 Dependent variable is the alpha (%) computed using four-factor model 
 OLS Fama-Macbeth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RELIGIOUS 0.256 0.285 0.199 0.111 0.109 0.086 
 [0.326] [0.293] [0.503] [0.724] [0.728] [0.784] 
ICI t-1 1.236 1.211 0.797 1.523 1.593 1.496 
 [0.188] [0.200] [0.417] [0.179] [0.161] [0.206] 
RELIGIOUS* 
ICI t-1 
-3.684 -3.850 -2.998 -1.891 -1.893 -1.786 
 [0.045]** [0.046]** [0.157] [0.571] [0.574] [0.598] 
TURNOVERt-12 -0.166 -0.163 -0.169 -0.231 -0.234 -0.245 
 [0.076]* [0.081]* [0.065]* [0.083]* [0.078]* [0.062]* 
EXPENSEt-12 12.474 10.604 7.860 25.850 24.951 22.255 
 [0.279] [0.351] [0.472] [0.086]* [0.096]* [0.144] 
LOG(SIZEt-1) -0.092 -0.093 -0.095 -0.072 -0.074 -0.071 
 [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.057]* [0.048]** [0.050]** 
LOG(AGEt-1) 0.094 0.093 0.077 0.112 0.110 0.095 
 [0.216] [0.225] [0.286] [0.152] [0.156] [0.209] 
STDEV t-11 -2.686 -1.539 -1.337 -12.466 -12.486 -10.660 
 [0.659] [0.812] [0.839] [0.072]* [0.079]* [0.133] 
INTERCEPT -0.262 -0.120 0.392 -0.185 -0.153 0.093 
 [0.607] [0.817] [0.441] [0.695] [0.739] [0.835] 
#obs 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 
























In Chapter Two and Three, I posit and find strong evidence that managerial controlling 
power has direct wealth implications on the firm’s suppliers because of the ability of 
management to protect implicit agreements with suppliers.   Using complete loss of 
managerial power under management turnover in Chapter Two, and partial control loss of 
management through the use of stock financing in mergers in Chapter Three, I find strong 
evidence that control dilution of management has a large negative wealth impact on the 
firm’s suppliers, especially under circumstances where suppliers are most vulnerable to 
breach of implicit contracts.   
 
In Chapter Four, I find that the average investor in religious funds exhibits flat flow-to-
performance sensitivity, as would be predicted by the doctrine of religious loyalty.   
Furthermore, religious funds sponsored by churches experience positive fund flows when 
past return is negative.  Religious funds under-perform major market indices and the 
secular socially responsible funds by at least -0.13% per month. The average religious 
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fund also has a higher industry concentration than the average secular socially 
responsible fund, and the poor performance of religious funds is related to their industry 
concentration.   Lastly, I find no evidence that church’s sponsorship affect fund 
concentration and performance.  
 
5.2 Future Work 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the area of managerial controlling power and wealth 
implications on stakeholders is relatively under-explored.   In future work, I plan to 
examine how the governance structures of a firm can affect relationship-specific 
investments by suppliers.  The difficulty in such a study comes from the endogeneity of 
anti-takeover provision adoptions.  It is my goal to explore new methodologies that can 
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